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truly demonstrated an ingenuity and talent that protected and strengthened New Jersey’s heritage. 
Finally, I thank my family for instilling me with a love for the Jersey Shore.  The traditions, 
memories, and pure fun that have brought my family down the shore every year of my life serves 
as the foundation for the sense of connection and continuity that I feel with the place.  The ocean 





This thesis seeks to contribute to the resilience of historic resources on the Jersey Shore by 
analyzing ways in which the New Jersey preservation community’s response to Superstorm Sandy 
can inform future plans for hazard mitigation and adaptation to climate change.  In order to 
accomplish this, this work attempts to identify the pre-existing conditions that influenced the ways 
in which preservationists responded to Superstorm Sandy, the strengths and weaknesses of 
preservation agencies’ responses, and how these can inform the ways in which heritage 
practitioners promote the resilience of historic resources in the face of climate change.  By 
compiling oral histories of preservationists working in the aftermath of Sandy, this thesis provides 
a comprehensive narrative for a previously untold story.  Additionally, this research aims to 
contribute to the growing body knowledge surrounding the incorporation of historic preservation 
into planning for both natural disasters and sea level rise. Taking the issues identified on the Jersey 
Shore and recognizing the opportunities for change, this thesis fills a gap in academic literature by 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
The 130 miles of New Jersey’s Atlantic coast feature a diverse array of communities that 
range from the dense urban setting of Atlantic City to the undisturbed natural landscape of Island 
Beach State Park.  These year-round and seasonal communities are often recognized for their 
economic and social importance as both the source of many tourist dollars and the site of happy 
memories for generations of families. Significantly, these beach towns also boast a plethora of 
historic resources that continue to actively contribute to the unique character of the New Jersey 
shore.  Including both the gaudy neon of mid-century modern motels and the modest simplicity of 
late nineteenth century camp meeting cottages, this heritage survives to tell the story of the region’s 
development.  However, the seaside setting that remains crucial to understanding the context of 
these resources now poses the greatest threat to their very survival.  The unprecedented destruction 
wrought by Superstorm Sandy in 2012 shed light on the vulnerability of these coastal 
places.  Dramatic shifts in public policy that followed, such as reforms to the National Flood 
Insurance Program and the revision of Base Flood Elevation maps, have posed additional threats 
and obstacles to the region’s historic resources.  Historic preservationists must now address short-
term issues surrounding the implications of post-Sandy policy decisions while simultaneously 
coping with the realities of increasingly frequent superstorms and rising sea levels that accompany 
climate change.   
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This thesis aims to assess the challenges posed to the heritage of the Jersey Shore and 
consequently identify the opportunities available to preservationists as they work to promote the 
resilience of the region’s historic resources.  Superstorm Sandy initially opened up larger 
discussions surrounding the heightened vulnerability of New Jersey’s coastal ecosystems, but the 
conversation was soon replaced by the narrative of the Shore’s reconstruction to be something 
“stronger than the storm.”  Influenced by the political and economic imperative to rebuild. the 
state’s preservation agencies have largely missed an opportunity to take the lessons learned from 
Sandy and inform a strategy of mitigation and adaptation for historic resources in New Jersey.  
Therefore, this thesis will address the issues that emerged in the response to Sandy and use these 
to inform recommendations for hazard mitigation and climate change adaptation.  Using 
Superstorm Sandy and the Jersey Shore as a frame for analysis, this work represents attempt to 
bridge the gap between disaster recovery and planning for resilience in historic preservation,  
These goals prompted a key set of questions that have guided the development of this 
thesis: 
● Which pre-existing conditions influenced the ways in which preservationists 
responded to Superstorm Sandy? 
 
● What were the strengths and weaknesses of preservation agencies’ responses to 
Superstorm Sandy? 
 
● How can this response to Superstorm Sandy inform the ways in which heritage 




The scope of this work will thus center on providing answers to these questions, using these 
findings to fulfill the aforementioned aims of addressing the issues associated with historic 
preservation in post-Sandy New Jersey. 
This thesis will fulfill the goals and answer the questions posed above with a multi-step 
methodology.  Chapter 2 examines existing literature to provide a foundational understanding of 
the challenges and strategies associated with the preservation of historic resources in coastal 
environments, identifying the gaps in literature and the niche that this thesis will fill.  Chapter 3 
establishes the character and significance of the Jersey Shore, examining the ecological, historical, 
social, political, and economic conditions that have defined this cultural landscape Chapter 4 
defines the issues created by Superstorm Sandy and analyzes the response of New Jersey’s 
preservation community, relying on communication with key actors as the primary source of 
information.  Chapter 5 synthesizes the perspectives of preservation agencies are identifies the key 
challenges in terms of preparedness and recovery on the Jersey Shore.  Chapter 6 uses the lessons 
learned from Sandy to recognize the opportunities for change and consequently make specific 
recommendations about how to capitalize on those opportunities. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by 
integrating the specific context of Superstorm Sandy in New Jersey with the larger set of policy 
issues surrounding sustainability, adaptation, and resilience in preservation and planning.   
This thesis is influenced by the perspective of a researcher raised in New Jersey, whose 
familiarity with the assets of and threats to the Jersey Shore informed his analysis of the 
information presented.  To expand beyond the inherent assumptions of a New Jersey native, 
interviews were conducted with individuals associated with the Federal Emergency Management 
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Agency [FEMA], U.S. National Park Service [NPS], American Institute of Architects [AIA], New 
Jersey Historic Preservation Office [HPO], New Jersey Historic Trust [NJHT], Preservation New 
Jersey [PNJ], Beach Haven Historic Preservation Advisory committee, Ocean City Historic 
Preservation Commission, and Cape May Historic Preservation Commission.  However, this 
reliance on interviews has limited thus limited this analysis to the perspectives of those who 
responded.  For instance, while four historic preservation commissions on the shore are recognized 
as Certified Local Governments [CLGs], only three were accessible for questions.   Additionally, 
this thesis primarily focuses on the work of preservation agencies rather than all preservationists.  
This served to exclude the perspectives of the other stakeholders and preservationists, such as the 
hundreds of property owners, architects, planners, and curators that each made very deliberate 
decisions on how to treat their historic resources in the aftermath of the storm.  Nevertheless, this 
thesis assumed that the information gathered would serve an important role in providing a context 
for making future decisions regarding the response, recovery, mitigation, and adaptation 
surrounding climate change. 
“Adaptation”, “mitigation”, “recovery”, “resilience”, “response”, and “vulnerability” are 
often used within the context of planning for hazards, both single disaster events and long-term 
threats like climate change.  While the definitions of these terms vary with each user, this thesis 
will define these key terms for the sake of clarity and continuity.  Vulnerability is “a set of 
conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, economic and environmental factors, 
which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards.” Resilience, on the 
other hand, “is the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
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adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning 
and structure.” Responses “address the short-term, direct effects of an incident.”  Following 
response comes recovery, which encompasses the “decisions and actions taken after a disaster 
with a view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community, 
while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk.” Mitigation is 
characterized as “the social attempt to reduce the occurrence of a disaster, to reduce the 
vulnerability of certain populations, and to more equitably distribute the costs within the society.”1 
Adaptation “involves efforts to limit vulnerability...through various measures, while not 
necessarily dealing with the underlying cause of those impacts.”2  The case of Superstorm Sandy 
on the Jersey Shore serves to illustrate all aspects of this process, from the historical, social, and 
political conditions that contributed to the shore’s vulnerability to planning for a Jersey Shore 
where rising seas will likely inundate entire communities.    
                                               
1  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Guide to Emergency 
Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive 
Orders & Legislation. By B. Wayne Blanchard. 2008.  




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Resilience & Historic Resources 
While the demographic and geographic landscape of the Jersey Shore represents a very 
different setting from that of the Gulf Coast, preservationists and the mainstream media alike have 
drawn parallels between Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy even before the floodwaters had 
receded from Battery Park.  M.B. Hackler’s 2010 book, Culture after the Hurricanes: Rhetoric 
and Reinvention on the Gulf Coast, represents a comprehensive analysis of the cultural politics of 
recovery in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  In the book’s introduction, titled 
“‘Louisiana’s New Oil’: Planning for Culture on the New Gulf Coast.” M.B. Hackler tackles the 
discourse surrounding the role that cultural identity would play in the region’s recovery following 
the storms.  According to Hackler, the Gulf Coast’s re-emerging culture and the experiences 
associated with it are the construct of cultural policies that are themselves the product of historic, 
social and political forces. In New Orleans, as elsewhere, advocates had been slowly shifting their 
emphasis away from the “intangible benefits” of heritage by turning towards economic 
justifications for the institutional support of culture.  When Katrina hit, the Gulf Coast already had 
an established “cultural economy” with “creative industries” sustaining it.  Once the process of 
rebuilding began, policymakers pledged that New Orleans’s cultural economy would drive the 
city’s rebirth and make it a top tourist destination again. However, by placing culture solely within 
the marketplace, decisionmakers had neglected the dynamic communities, institutions, and places 
that fostered the vibrant exchanges and traditions that constituted the culture - from cuisine to 
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architecture - that made New Orleans distinct.3  In a similar manner, historic preservation on the 
Jersey Shore has largely been valued for its potential to attract tourists, rather than its ability to 
sustain a community’s cultural identity.   
 Jay D. Edwards’ chapter of this book, “New Orleans Shotgun: A Historic Cultural 
Geography,” is an analysis of the cultural, economic, and racial implications associated with the 
history and preservation of shotgun houses in New Orleans.  The author starts by laying out the 
socioeconomic landscape of New Orleans, highlighting how the city’s working class African-
American communities became associated with low-lying, cheaper areas in the city and were thus 
more severely impacted by the flooding of Hurricane Katrina.  During the 2006 mayoral election, 
the low voter turnout in black neighborhoods away from the high ground of the old levees 
demonstrated how African-Americans were disproportionately displaced by both the storm itself 
and the financial mechanisms of recovery. According to Edwards, interest and documentation of 
the city’s architectural heritage also follows similar geographic patterns of inequality with “the 
house types of the Island and the Garden District receiving by far the bulk of the interest and 
publication space, while less glamorous historic houses of equal age situated in the lower-lying 
areas of the back of town...receive cursory mention at best.”4  The shotgun house is the 
predominant typology of these back of town neighborhoods, forming a “shotgun crescent” that 
encircles New Orleans’ colonial core.   
 
                                               
3  M. B. Hackler. Culture After the Hurricanes: Rhetoric and Reinvention on the Gulf Coast. Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2010, 3-15. 
4  Ibid., 50. 
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The Four Steps of FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Planning Process. 















Edwards argues that the popular history of the shotgun house largely dismisses the 
typology, framing it as a mere offspring of the “Creole Cottage” style found in the French Quarter.  
However, this neglects the narrative of the shotgun as a product of Haitian immigrants in the early 
nineteenth century.  By bringing their building traditions to the growing African-American districts 
of New Orleans, these immigrants blended their practices with the architectural language of the 
city to produce a truly unique vernacular.  Acknowledging this bias, the author raises the question: 
“Is there a strong possibility of a direct correlation between the lack of socially and culturally based 
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architectural histories of the shotgun crescent and the lack of social and political will to rebuild 
those neighborhoods?”5  The deteriorating neighborhoods surrounding the vibrant tourist district, 
which itself directly profits from the cultural products of the shotgun crescent, seems to provide 
answer enough for Edwards. Accepting the author’s assertions, it becomes evident that 
preservationists’ understanding of significance can have direct implications for the social and 
economic recovery of communities following a disaster. 
Much attention has been given to promoting the resilience of historic properties in the face 
of natural disasters.  The FEMA’s 2005 Integrating Historic Property and Cultural Resource 
Considerations into Hazard Mitigation Planning: State and Local Mitigation Planning How-to 
Guide provides an in-depth, step-by-step instructions for mitigating losses to historic properties in 
all forms of disasters.  Acknowledging that “it is more cost effective to assess potential effects 
from a disaster and to implement preventative measures than to wait for a disaster to strike and 
then assess actual impacts,” the authors lay out a four phase approach.6 The first step, “Organize 
Resources,” involves assembling the necessary information, staff, support, and funding to 
effectively consider historic resources in hazard mitigation planning.  The publication then 
delineates how practitioners can interpret the value of historic properties and thereafter establish 
preservation priorities during the “Assess Risks” phase.  In the “Develop a Mitigation Plan” step, 
FEMA recommends identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing a number of potential action 
categories, including prevention, resource protection, and structural diversions. The final phase 
                                               
5 Ibid., 60. 
6 United States. Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Integrating Historic 
Property and Cultural Resource Considerations into Hazard Mitigation Planning. 2005, ii. 
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calls for planners and preservationists to “Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress,” emphasizing 
the importance of coordination among stakeholders and agencies.7 In the case of Superstorm 
Sandy, the degree to which preservationists in New Jersey had adhered to this framework varied 
greatly, resulting in inconsistent consideration of historic resources in recovery plans.    
In 2008, FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program [NFIP] produced a “Floodplain 
Management Bulletin for Historic Structures.” Floodplains, or “Special Flood Hazard Areas,” are 
defined by FEMA as the ‘land area covered by the floodwaters of the base flood...where the 
National Flood Insurance Program's floodplain management regulations must be enforced and the 
area where the mandatory purchase of flood insurance applies.”  A “Floodway,” on the other hand, 
is “the channel of a river or other watercourse and the adjacent land areas that must be reserved in 
order to discharge the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation more 
than a designated height.”8  Through NFIP, FEMA provides vulnerable communities with flood 
insurance coverage if they enact ordinances that require new, substantially improved, and 
substantially damaged residential buildings to be elevated above the Base Flood Elevation 
determined for the site.   FEMA also provides Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) that identify 
flood zones and thus dictate the cost of coverage for structures within hazard areas.  Before new 
legislation was adopted in 2012, buildings built before the implementation of FIRMs were 
                                               
7 Ibid., 1.1-4.11 
8  "National Flood Insurance Program Policy Index." Federal Emergency Management Agency. February 10, 2016. 
Accessed April 22, 2016. http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-policy-index.  
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grandfathered in as “pre-FIRM” structures, receiving subsidized insurance rates that didn’t reflect 
actual risk.9   
While other pre-FIRM buildings would lose their subsidized insurance premiums if they 
are not elevated following substantial damages or improvements, the NFIP historically gave 
special consideration to historic resources that are listed or eligible to be listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places, as well as those on state or local registries.  The NFIP allows municipal 
floodplain management ordinances to include two provisions that serve to incentivize owners to 
maintain the historic character of their properties: 
1. “Any alteration of a ‘historic structure,’ provided that the alteration will not preclude 
the structure’s continued designation as an “historic structure,” does not constitute a 
substantial improvement necessitating elevation.” 
 
2. “Variances may be issued for the repair or rehabilitation of historic structures upon a 
determination that the proposed repair or rehabilitation will not preclude the structure’s 
continued designation as a historic structure and the variance is the minimum necessary 
to preserve the historic character and design of the structure.”10 
 
The Floodplain Management Bulletin identifies stricter standards for improvements to historic 
structures in designated “floodways,” which could potentially raise water surface elevation during 
a flood.  
Within historic districts, non-contributing structures and undeveloped lots are subject to all 
requirements, for exempting them “would create a significant flood risk to structures and to the 
health and safety of the population.”  FEMA maintains that “there are ways to elevate or floodproof 
                                               
9 The Biggert-Waters Act of 2012 and the Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 limited pre-FIRM status to 
only primary residences, not second homes or businesses. Historic buildings were no longer given any special status 
that reduces premiums under these Acts. 
10 United States. Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Floodplain 
Management Bulletin on Historic Structures. 2008, 4. 
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new structures and substantially improve non-contributing structures so that they comply with the 
NFIP regulations, but that are still in harmony with the historic nature of the district,” However, 
owners of non-contributing properties may be eligible for exemption if they undertake substantial 
improvements, including “the removal of modern additions to the building, replacement of modern 
siding or roofing materials with historic materials, and other actions to restore the historic nature 
of the structure,” so that their building qualifies as “contributing to the historical significance of a 
registered historic district.” 11  Significantly, NFIP acknowledges that despite these exemptions 
“flood mitigation measures should be a consideration to minimize flood damages when 
rehabilitating a historic structure or repairing a damaged historic structure.”12 Additionally, these 
strategies will be most effective when historic resources are identified and incorporated into a 
community’s hazard mitigation plan.  The protection and mitigation strategies developed in 
response to flooding and hurricanes prove particularly relevant for adaptation to the challenges of 
climate change and sea level rise.  Even so, FEMA has not effectively addressed climate change 
within the recommendations and analyses found in the two aforementioned documents.  In addition 
to this, FEMA has not adequately updated this literature to reflect the changes mandated by recent 
flood insurance reform, only providing a two page document on “Historic Structures and the 
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.”13 
Two master’s theses have attempted to highlight this gap between disaster mitigation and 
climate change adaptation by providing solutions for threatened historic communities on the 
                                               
11 Ibid., 7-8. 
12 Ibid., 10. 
13  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Historic Structures 
and the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. By Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration.  
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United States’ Eastern seaboard.  Ann Horowitz’ 2013 master’s thesis, “The Effects of Sea Level 
Rise on Historic Districts and the Need for Adaptation,” uses three cities on the Atlantic coast 
(Saint Augustine, Florida; Elizabeth City, North Carolina; and Alexandria, Virginia) as case 
studies to synthesize the threats that sea level rise poses to historic districts.  Horowitz powerfully 
overlays maps of National Register-listed historic districts with projected inundation levels for the 
years 2050 and 2100.  After identifying the specific challenges in each community, she provides 
an analysis of the data as a whole.  Horowitz found that, “[g]enerally, the adaptation solutions have 
been initiated at the local levels with funding secured from all tiers of government” and “the 
communities’ adaptation efforts mitigate current chronic flood conditions and exclude long-term 
solutions to sea level rise impacts.”14  While historic development patterns shared by all of the 
communities precluded certain strategies, like vegetative buffer zones, the local adaptation 
approaches varied with the economic valuation of properties, the density of the communities’ 
urban form, and the availability of open space.  Regardless of the specific community context, 
funding from the state and federal governments was necessary to carry out larger, more 
comprehensive adaptation projects.  Horowitz asserts that while adaptation measures could affect 
the integrity of each community’s historic resources, preservationists must understand that they 
may be necessary to prevent the resources’ loss to the projected sea level rise. 
 Horowitz then puts forward a set of findings and assertions based on this data, maintaining 
that successful adaptation planning requires an understanding of a community’s sea level rise 
                                               
14Ann D. Horowitz. "The Effects of Sea Level Rise on Historic Districts and the Need for Adaptation." Master's 
thesis, Goucher College, 2013, 177. 
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projections and the ways in which these will specifically impact historic resources.  These 
recommendations include:  
● Planning adaptations in anticipation of sea level rise 
● Designing adaptation strategies at the local level 
● Adding social and environmental benefits to cost-benefit analyses 
● Educating local stakeholders on sea level rise, 
● Expanding the participation of local governments within adaptation planning 
groups 
● Conducting further research 
 
Decisions regarding historic properties will ultimately come down to whether a “property conveys 
more meaning to the community as a gradual ruin or as a fully functioning but compromised 
property.”15 While the determination of value and the proposal of solutions should come from the 
community itself, local practitioners must remain familiar with the growing body of scientific data 
on sea level rise that will largely come from sources at the state or federal level, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  
Horowitz concludes her analysis of these three historic coastal communities with a warning: even 
as “sea level rise threatens the country’s connections to its shoreline heritage,” communities facing 
financial challenges and more imminent issues will have difficulties in shifting their priorities 
towards long-term adaptation planning.16  
  Horowitz’s work lays the foundation for Rachel Isacoff’s 2014 master’s thesis, titled 
“Raised or Razed: The Challenge of Climate Adaptation and Social Equity in Historic Coastal 
Communities.” Focusing on historic resources in the Mid-Atlantic region, Horowitz attempts to 
                                               
15 Ibid., 207. 
16 Ibid., 222. 
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address the social equity issues embedded within the process of choosing strategies and allocating 
limited resources to protect heritage.   According to her, coastal communities have a long history 
of responding to environmental threats. As heritage practitioners increasingly recognize the 
growing severity of the threats posed by climate change, these local traditions of adaptation can 
actually be used to strengthen the distinct tangible and intangible values of a specific place.  If 
cultural and historic values are to be incorporated into a community’s long-term adaptation plan, 
Isacoff asserts that preservationists must engage in a collaborative effort that reconciles multiple 
goals through a variety of strategies.  Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that historic 
preservation in an era of climate change seems to present “a heartwrenching dilemma: preservation 
professionals must choose which precious resource not to harm – the natural environment, the built 
environment, or the cultures of longstanding communities.”17 Isacoff thus looks at three forms of 
response to sea level rise: protection (flood barriers), accommodation (elevation), and retreat 
(relocation), and discusses the options, precedents, constraints, and considerations associated with 
each.  
 
                                               
17 Rachel B. Isacoff. "Raised or Razed: The Challenge of Climate Adaptation and Social Equity in Historic Coastal 
Communities." Master's thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2014, 1. 
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Isacoff applies the applies barriers adaptation to the context of historic coastal communities 




Given the sensitive economies and cultural identities of coastal towns, these communities 
are often restricted in their ability to build protective infrastructure.  Even though many examples 
of levee and dike construction serve as successful historic precedents, they may ultimately prove 
insufficient if design standards are not reassessed to respond to intensified flooding threats.  
Despite this vulnerability, the significance of many historic buildings in these communities rests 
in their relationship to the coastal environment, warranting preservation in situ.  This can be 
achieved through accommodative strategies like elevation and flood-proofing, which should be 
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undertaken with sensitivity to the surrounding cultural landscape that contributes to the building’s 
significance.  While poorly done elevation has the potential to diminish the historic integrity of 
both individual structures and historic districts, preservationists must reassess their traditional 
notions of significance so as to remain relevant to the threats and interests of the community.  
Isacoff’s third adaptation measure, retreat, acknowledges the very real chance that if “Greenland 
is deglaciated, societies would not be able to adapt through coastal protection...abandonment of 
coastal areas would be necessary.”18  In the long-run, allowing nature to take its course would 
protect public and private funds from the costs of responding to intensifying climate change 
impacts.  Restrictions on reconstruction have promoted relocation on an individual, ad hoc basis, 
but historic communities should consider relocating as a whole in order to retain the context so 
important to cultural significance.  Ultimately, both of these theses are certainly valuable in 
solidifying an understanding of the implications of sea level rise for coastal heritage in the United 
States.  In their works, Isacoff and Horowitz clearly delineate the threats posed to historic 
resources, the responses available to preservationists, and the implications of these responses.  
However, comparatively little attention is given to the ways in which preservationists within this 
context will practically utilize these findings and recommendations.  
Superstorm Sandy & Historic Resources 
 Before the unprecedented destruction wrought by Hurricane Sandy in October of 2012, 
there was little literature on disaster recovery and cultural resource management specifically 
                                               
18 Ibid., 65. 
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geared towards the context of coastal New Jersey.  After the storm, the New Jersey HPO quickly 
provided a “Hurricane Sandy Cultural Resources Recovery” webpage with links to relevant 
information for owners and managers of cultural resources.19  However, few of these materials 
were produced by the HPO for this particular scenario.  For issues related to Hurricane Sandy, 
users were directed to the websites of the state’s Office of Emergency Management and 
Department of Environmental Protection.   FEMA publications provided information regarding 
recovery and reimbursement for nonprofits, museums, and cultural institutions. Under the 
“Elevation of Historic Properties” section, the New Jersey HPO provided a link to the Mississippi 
Development Authority’s “elevation guidelines for homes in the unique context of the Gulf Coast 
Region.”  
  Regarding the National Flood Insurance Program, the only material listed was FEMA’s 
“Floodplain Management Bulletin: Historic Structures” document, which dated to 2008 and did 
not reflect the recent policy shifts embodied in the Biggert–Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 2012. Links to information supplied by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the 
Maryland Historic Trust, and the North Carolina State Historic Preservation Office, among others, 
were “provided for your use in planning and undertaking your response for cultural resources 
impacted by the disaster.”  The website also listed previous cultural resource documentation for 
Hudson County, Monmouth County, and Ocean County, but the most recent survey dated back to 
2007.  Significantly, with the goal of determining where additional recovery assistance was 
                                               
19 "Hurricane Sandy; Cultural Resources Recovery." NJDEP - Historic Preservation Office. January 29, 2016. 
Accessed April 18, 2016. http://www.nj.gov/dep/hpo/hurricane_sandy.shtml.  
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needed, the HPO provided an email address for users to submit updated data regarding damage to 
historic properties.  Although this web page represented a useful assemblage of resources in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, it nonetheless illustrated how ill-prepared New Jersey’s 
preservation community was for a disaster of this scale. 
 One of the first official publications put forward by New Jersey’s preservation community 
was an article, titled “Sustained Survival: Challenges and Tools for New Jersey's Historic 
Resources During Hurricane Sandy Recovery,” that was featured in the March 2013 issue of 
Garden State Legacy.  PNJ’s Senior Programs Director at the time, Stephanie Cherry-Farmer, 
MSHP, acknowledged the particular vulnerability of communities defined by their relationship to 
places of rapid and dramatic change, contending that “Hurricane Sandy is exactly the type of 
environmental change that holds the future of places hostage” and it is therefore “the type of threat 
that we historic preservationists fear the most, as we can do very little in the short-term to safeguard 
the heritage we work so hard to protect.”20  Providing a snapshot of the statewide priorities of 
preservationists in the months following the storm, Cherry-Farmer announced that the annual New 
Jersey History and Historic Preservation Conference would host several sessions based on lessons 
learned from Sandy with the goal of preparing heritage practitioners for challenges ranging “[f]rom 
federal funding that may or may not require preservation-conscious review, to local code officials 
that may be working with the needs of historic resources for the first time ever, to an unprecedented 
need for recovery funding and technical assistance.”  However, she reminds preservationists that 
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countless undocumented historic properties were also lost in the storm, so “we will never be able 
to accurately quantify just how detrimental Hurricane Sandy was to New Jersey’s built heritage.”21  
Cherry-Farmer leaves readers with the command to “stay tuned” as the HPO staff begins their 
survey work, Section 106 reviews requiring community participation start to filter in, and the state 
receives its share of the $50 million allocated to historic resources by the Disaster Relief Act of 
2013. 
In May of 2013, the “Historic Resources and Communities Damaged By Superstorm 
Sandy” were placed on Preservation New Jersey’s annual 10 Most Endangered Historic Places 
list. This entry provides a succinct analysis of the issues developing as the process of rebuilding 
began.  Sandy’s long-term impact on the built environment of New Jersey remained uncertain, 
and the process of recovery did not provide the time needed for a holistic and thoughtful approach 
to historic preservation.  Preservation New Jersey anticipated that revisions to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps would put historic resources in 
jeopardy.  Additionally, while historic property repairs would be required to meet the Secretary 
of the Interior’s standards, many property owners remained uneducated as to what constituted an 
“appropriate” repair during disaster recovery.  Acknowledging these challenges, the article asked 
many of the key questions that prompted this thesis:  
● “What is the best approach for preserving existing historic integrity when that integrity does 
not accommodate new environmental realities such as sea level rise?” 
 
● “What does the future look like in storm-ravaged communities like Mantoloking, where, of the 
512 buildings that comprised the borough before the storm, 135 were destroyed, an estimated 
56 are partially underwater in the bay, and around 100 are entirely or partially off their 
foundation?” 
                                               




● “How can preservationists most effectively institute a holistic approach that prioritizes 
preservation of the historic character that makes these communities special, while respecting 
that recovery and future planning must accommodate unprecedented development realities?”22 
 
 
Superstorm Sandy brought renewed attention to the vulnerability of historic properties in coastal 
communities, and placed climate change and sea level rise into mainstream conversation.  
However, the early attention given to these heightened threats has largely failed to manifest itself 
in the reconstruction and adaptation strategies implemented.  Therefore, the questions posed by 
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Preservation New Jersey included images such as this to demonstrate the damage inflicted by Sandy.  
Image Source: Preservation New Jersey 
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In November of 2013, around a year after the storm made landfall, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency released its “Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York Mitigation Team 
Report.”  The “Historic Properties” chapter identified historic buildings as the core of a 
community’s identity and used eight sites “that represented the typical damage observed after 
Hurricane Sandy” as case studies.23  These examples ranged from the Erie-Lackawanna Terminal, 
a Beaux-Arts transit hub located directly on the waterfront of Hoboken, to the streetscape of early 
nineteenth century mercantile architecture found in Manhattan’s South Street Seaport Historic 
District.  Of particular interest for to this thesis was the section covering the All Saints Episcopal 
Church in Bay Head, New Jersey.  Even after Sandy, this cedar-clad Shingle style church complex 
remained a key contributing property within the Bay Head Historic District.  Rather than elevating 
the structure after rising bay water destroyed the bulkhead and flooded the property, the 
congregation chose to sensitively restore the building in situ by removing the relatively new, “non-
historic” siding to allow the original interior woodwork to dry with natural ventilation. 
In contrast, the Ocean Grove Auditorium, a large Ruskinian Gothic structure located three 
blocks away from the ocean in the historic camp meeting community of Ocean Grove, received no 
flood damage but saw a portion of its recently installed (also “non-historic”) roof uplifted by strong 
wind gusts, exposing the interior and damaging windows.  In fact, storm damage from wind 
appeared to be the biggest threat to Ocean Grove, as the only flooding in this town community 
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occurred along the street adjacent to the beach.  Repairs to the roof were underway at the time of 
publication, but there was no mention of any steps taken to address the increased likelihood of 
flooding coming from sea level rise and more powerful storms.  Focusing on repair and recovery 
rather than long--term resilience, the Mitigation Team Report failed to provide any examples of 
building elevation or relocation, the strategies promoted by FEMA as most effective at preventing 
flood damage.   This proves particularly problematic for historic resources, as context-specific case 
studies would benefit property owners attempting to reduce flood vulnerability while 
simultaneously maintaining historic integrity. 
Conclusion 
The New Jersey preservation community’s response to Superstorm Sandy will frame a 
critical analysis of the recommendations, assertions, and findings of this literature.   This work 
assumes that, like New Orleans, the resilience of New Jersey’s heritage has hinged on its ability 
to integrate itself within the economic imperative of recovery promulgated by state institutions in 
their “Restore the Shore” campaign.  However, heritage also has the ability to positively contribute 
to the recovery of communities. Therefore, preservationists’ understanding of significance can 
directly impact a community’s cultural resilience.  These principles serve as the fundamental 
assumptions that will guide this thesis’ interpretation of the response to Superstorm Sandy in New 
Jersey. 
The guidelines for historic structures provided in the aforementioned FEMA publications, 
while practical and widely applicable, utterly neglected the new realities posed by climate change 
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and the recent shifts in policy, such as reforms to flood insurance.  Conversely, the 
recommendations for adapting to sea level rise provided by Horowitz and Isacoff have not been 
examined against the realities facing preservationists in the field. Building off of this previous 
work, the lessons learned on the Jersey Shore will contribute to an enhanced understanding of the 
practical consequences of response, recovery, mitigation and adaptation strategies for historic 
resources in coastal communities.  These will then inform long-term action plans for climate 
change that are specifically geared to the context of the shore.   The means of addressing the 
challenges of this particular case can then be extrapolated to make more widely applicable 
recommendations. 
The lack of literature that specifically responds to the challenges faced by historic resources 
in post-Sandy New Jersey warrants a thesis in and of itself.  Consequently, the information 
gathered to form more general assertions regarding the vulnerability of historic resources will also 
provide some clarity for the issues raised by preservationists on the Jersey Shore.  This thesis will 
help to synthesize the debates occurring along the coast, from Bay Head to Cape May, surrounding 
the appropriate balance between preserving historic integrity and adapting to sea level rise.  
Additionally, this work will aim to critically examine the varied ways in which communities have 
responded to a large-scale loss of historic fabric. Beyond the information provided within these 
pages, this thesis will also shed light on the gaps where additional work is most needed in order to 
adequately protect resources at the shore. Hopefully, the findings presented here will provide the 
tools necessary to answer the aforementioned question posed by Preservation New Jersey in 2013:  
“How can preservationists most effectively institute a holistic approach that prioritizes 
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preservation of the historic character that makes these communities special, while respecting that 





Chapter 3: Character & Significance of the Jersey Shore 
 Diane Bates, Ph.D., a Sociology Professor at The College of New Jersey, provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the social, ecological, historical, political, and economic circumstances 
that contributed to the particular vulnerability of the Jersey Shore.  In her work, Superstorm Sandy: 
The Inevitable Destruction and Reconstruction of the Jersey Shore, Dr. Bates argues that “unlike 
other living things, people don’t just occupy habitats, they inhabit places rich with social, cultural, 
and personal meanings.”24   Accordingly, the Jersey Shore is both a physical and cultural 
landscape, and the upheaval caused by Hurricane Sandy forced its stakeholders to grapple with 
both the loss of familiar places and the need to move forward and rebuild within a new 
environmental reality.  However, in order to better understand the values that visitors and residents 
ascribe to the shore, one must first look at its continued use as a place of recreation.  The shore has 
evolved from being a destination of longer stays at resort hotels in amusement centers like Atlantic 
City and Asbury Park to a place of second homes and day trips conveniently linked to metropolitan 
centers by highways.   As the middle class of nearby metropolitan areas became increasingly 
affluent, they abandoned the hotels and boarding houses of historic resort cities to purchase a 
vacation houses in less developed communities on the coast, so that by 2010 there were 109,075 
seasonal vacant housing units in the four counties of the Jersey Shore.  For the working and middle 
class in the immediate postwar period, shore homes were an asset to be passed down through 
generations.  Therefore, while the national imagination characterizes the Jersey Shore as a place 
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of white working class complacency and stagnation, shore homes have traditionally served as 
desirable symbols for New Jersey’s upwardly mobile middle class.  As the state’s economic 
interests and cultural identity depend on the shore, residents can consequently dismiss those who 
question post-Sandy reconstruction as outsiders who lack the moral imperative to rebuild because 
they simply do not understand the shore’s importance.  “How people imagine the Shore, or as 
sociologists might say, how they “construct” the Shore, is as important as the physical reality, 
because the way that people think and feel affects their decisions regarding their use of the physical 
space.” 25 
Region 
The New Jersey Shore is not easily ascribed a singular identity.  “Down the shore” 
encapsulates a diverse social and environmental landscape that includes both the beachfront 
enclaves of the mega-rich and the rural inland communities that remain tied to the shore’s 
economy.  Dr. Bates identifies “five overlapping human ecological sub-regions with somewhat 
unique current and historic relationships between people and the physical landscape.”26  These are:  
● The Raritan Bay shore, lying adjacent to New York Bay, is a region of estuaries 
with a tradition in the fishing industry. Superstorm Sandy pushed unprecedented 
volumes of water into the bay, subjecting this portion of the shore to some of worst 
storm surge and devastating the communities of modest year-round homes that 
lined the coast. 
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● The Monmouth headlands, the only spot on the Jersey Shore where the mainland 
directly fronts the ocean, are characterized by bluffs leading down to narrow 
beaches. During Superstorm Sandy, powerful ocean waves eroded the beaches, 
destroyed the boardwalks, and overtopped the inland lakes of the Monmouth 
headland towns. 
● The barrier islands “are permanent but somewhat ephemeral landforms that 
separate bays from the open ocean.”  Superstorm Sandy subjected the barrier 
islands to both direct onslaught from the ocean and overflow from the bay, which 
proved devastating to some communities in Ocean County. 
● The bay communities landward from the barrier islands feature a drastically 
altered landscape where bulkheads and artificial waterways have largely replaced 
the historical ecosystem of wetlands and tidal creeks.  Superstorm Sandy’s high 
winds and storm surge backed up the flow of tidal rivers into their floodplains, 
which were unable to adequately absorb excess water due to intensive development 
along the bay. 
● The inland communities may not front the ocean or bays, but lie within the same 
watershed and remain culturally connected to the coast.  Although the winds of 
Superstorm Sandy knocked down trees and disrupted power lines, this area served 
as the primary place of refuge for those fleeing more vulnerable waterfront 
communities.27 
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In addition to Dr. Bates’ sub-regions, the Jersey Shore is politically divided into four counties with 
distinct development patterns and socioeconomic profiles.  From north to south, Monmouth, 
Ocean, Atlantic, and Cape May Counties each have unique histories that warrant further 
explanation. 
Monmouth County 
Monmouth County stretches from the Raritan Bay to the Manasquan River, encompassing 
both the working class bay shore and the affluent towns of the Monmouth headlands.  Although 
they appear as one continuous string of development, the character of Monmouth County’s coastal 
communities varies sharply, with a simple municipal boundary seemingly dictating the style, 
reputation, and income of visitors.  For instance, Ocean Grove, a religious camp-meeting town 
where tents on permanent foundations still pop up every summer and driving on Sundays was 
prohibited until 1974, sits across Wesley Lake from Asbury Park.28  Memorialized by Bruce 
Springsteen, Asbury Park was once “too burdened with its current plight - low tax revenues, and 
intense pressure for service delivery - [to] devote attention or resources to local protections for 
historic resources.”29  Within the past ten years, this town has recently seen a rebirth through 
gentrification, capitalizing on both underutilized historic resources and new construction.  On the 
other hand, some towns in Monmouth County, developed in the nineteenth century as exclusive 
vacation communities with easy access to Manhattan, rank among the oldest and wealthiest seaside 
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Map of Monmouth County municipalities. 
Image Source: New Jersey Department of Transportation 
resorts in the country.  Perhaps due to this accessibility, these mainland towns have always had a 
larger year-round population than the resorts located on barrier islands further south.  Linked to 
jobs in New York City by commuter rail and ferry service, Monmouth County’s year round 
population is also distinctly more “white collar” than the rest of the shore, ranking as the 38th 
highest-income county in the United States in 2011.30  
 
                                               




Ocean County contains some of the fastest growing suburban communities in the state. In 
fact, Ocean County may be better typified as an exurb of New York City than as a seasonal resort.  
Remaining sparsely populated into the late twentieth century, the county still retains large swaths 
of undeveloped inland forests.31  The coast of Ocean County can be divided into two geographic 
regions, the Barnegat Peninsula and Long Beach Island.  Among the last stretches of the shore to 
be developed, most of the Barnegat Peninsula are populated with towns that developed and 
expanded in the immediate postwar era, like Ocean Beach and Seaside Heights.  These 
communities are characterized by small houses on streets that “could be the closest together 
anywhere in the state” with “so many of them that the developers would seem likely to run out of 
names.”32  The wide beaches and varied communities of the Barnegat Peninsula, from the 
nightclubs and amusement piers of Seaside Heights to the multimillion dollar mansions and 
inaccessible beaches of Bay Head, were among the hit hardest by Hurricane Sandy.  With overflow 
from the bay and waves pounding the beach, the ocean broke through and created a new channel 
across the peninsula in Mantoloking. South of the Barnegat Peninsula is Long Beach Island.  
Stretching nineteen miles and sitting four miles out at sea, Long Beach Island is a thin strip of land 
containing countless tiny communities with quirky names like Ship Bottom, Loveladies, and 
Harvey Cedars.  Once home to just a series of hotels only accessible to the mainland by steamships 
plying the wide Barnegat Bay, most of Long Beach Island developed much later than the rest of 
the shore, maintaining a quieter and more residential identity.  While some iconic landmarks, like  
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Map of Ocean County municipalities. 
Image Source: New Jersey Department of Transportation 
the Barnegat Lighthouse and Beach Haven’s Victorian cottages, have stood the tests of time, most 
of the Long Beach Island’s housing was constructed after the Ash Wednesday Storm of 1962, 






The northern stretch of Atlantic County’s coast, where the Mullica River empties into the 
pristine wetlands just north of Brigantine Island, remains protected as the Edwin B. Forsyth 
National Wildlife Reserve.33 Looming in the background are the hotel towers of Atlantic City, the 
largest municipality on densely-populated Absecon Island.  Atlantic City gained fame as one of 
America’s most popular resorts in the early twentieth century before white flight and economic 
collapse made the city a shadow of its former self in the 1960s.  While the legalization of gambling 
in 1976 may not have alleviated the poverty and isolation of residents, it did place Atlantic City 
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Map of Atlantic County municipalities. 
Image Source: New Jersey Department of Transportation 
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back on the map and solidified the city’s role as an employment center for a small metropolitan 
region of inland towns and shore communities with sizeable year round populations.34    
Consequently, the towns of Ventnor, Margate, and Longport, located further south on Absecon 
Island, maintain a higher socioeconomic status and a demonstrably more suburban character than 
their neighbor the north. 
Cape May 
Cape May County includes a mixture of densely developed barrier islands separated from 
mainland residential communities by large salt marshes, as well as agricultural areas further 
inland.35  The most tourist-dependent of the shore counties, the population of Cape May County 
balloons in the summer months when an influx of visitors from the Philadelphia metropolitan area 
flock to second homes and vacation rentals.  Located on a series of barrier islands linked together 
by bridges, the character of these seasonal resorts runs the gamut from neon-covered motels and 
crowded boardwalk in Wildwood to landscaped medians and McMansions in Avalon. In the late 
nineteenth century, prominent individuals purchased large tracts of land at cheap prices, clearing 
away the unique natural landscape of the barrier islands (hence the name, Wildwood) and 
parcelling out lots for residential development.  Although they were once easily accessible to the 
urban masses by railway, Cape May County’s beach towns weathered the postwar decline 
relatively intact and now cater to the more affluent and suburbanized descendants of Philadelphia 
and Camden’s working class. 
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Map of Cape May County municipalities. 
Image Source: New Jersey Department of Transportation 
 
History 
In his 1830 novel, The Water-Witch, James Fennimore Cooper paints a picture of the 
sixteenth century Jersey Shore as a landscape of “low and narrow bank[s] of sand” with “smooth 
and regular beach[es],” featuring inlets “indented in a manner to form several convenient 
anchoring-grounds for ships that seek shelter from easterly gales.”36  For most of its history, the 
Jersey Shore remained just that: an undisturbed natural landscape, populated by a few hardy 
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individuals and occasionally visited by passing ships.  In fact, navigators actually viewed the New 
Jersey coast as a place to be avoided.  The shallow waters and shifting sand bars that now make 
for excellent bathing beaches made the shore an especially treacherous location for ships.  For 
instance, in 1846 a particularly powerful winter storm wrecked nine vessels off the New Jersey 
coast in a single day.37   
Recognizing these human and economic costs, the U.S. Life-Saving Service was created 
by an act of Congress.  Between 1848 and 1898, the Jersey Shore saw the construction of 41 Life-
Saving stations, each equipped with rescue boats and lookout towers.  Many of the later ones, 
constructed in the Duluth style, survive along the coast from Manasquan to Stone Harbor, despite 
outliving their original use.38 In the 1850s the federal government appropriated additional funds 
for the construction of four lighthouses along the coast between Sandy Hook and Cape May.  The 
169-foot-tall Barnegat Lighthouse, built by Lieutenant George Meade in 1857 at the northern end 
of Long Beach Island, still stands as one of the Jersey Shore’s iconic landmarks.39  This investment 
in life-saving stations and lighthouses in the mid-nineteenth century marks the beginning of a 
history of large-scale investment in infrastructure on Jersey Shore that continues to this day. 
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Completed in 1895, Life-Saving Station #35 was built in the Duluth style in Stone Harbor. 
Image Source: Scenic USA 
 
 
While most of the shoreline remained an inaccessible and inhospitable place, the first 
resorts on the Jersey Shore developed at the points most easily accessible by water from larger 
cities.  The development of steamship technology meant that by the 1820s, there were dependably 
scheduled sailings along the Delaware and Raritan Bays from Philadelphia to Cape May and New 
York to Long Branch, at the foot of Sandy Hook.  Settlement was largely confined to these northern 
and southern extremes until this period of isolation was abruptly ended with the coming of the 
railroad.  Industrialization, which spurred the rapid expansion of New York, Philadelphia, Newark, 
Camden, and other urban centers, was accompanied by the growth of a massive railway network.  
Now only a day trip away from the oppressive conditions of these burgeoning cities, the swaths of 
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undeveloped land and pleasant natural setting of the Jersey Shore suddenly presented an 
opportunity.40  In 1854, Jonathan Pitney and a bold group of investors had completed the 
construction of a railway heading straight from Camden through the Pine Barrens to the marshes 
and forests of Absegami Island, the site of a proposed “Atlantic City.”  The Camden & Atlantic 
Railroad soon proved to be the fastest route to the ocean, and Atlantic City quickly surpassed Cape 
May and Long Branch as the state’s preeminent seaside resort.   
 
However, the shore remained largely undeveloped into the 1870s until increased rail 
connections initiated a boom period.  Real estate interests capitalized on the Shore’s coastal 
location while also promoting public investment in the development of infrastructure, offsetting 
                                               
40 Stansfield. Vacationing on the Jersey Shore, 60-80. 
Atlantic City Boardwalk, 1870s. 
Image Source: Margaret Thomas Buchholz 
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the risk of their ventures.41  Dunes were flattened, marshes were filled in, canals were dredged, 
and vegetation was removed to reshape this temporal coastal ecosystem into a commodifiable 
landscape. In Allenhurst, “30 cottages were constructed, along with sidewalks, sewers, electric 
lights, and an artesian well system...with a year of the first residential lot purchases” in 1895.42  
Appealing to a new middle class which suddenly had leisure time,  real estate speculators 
aggressively marketed their shore resorts through advertisements and attention-grabbing 
gimmicks.  Lucy the Elephant, a six-story-tall structure built of wood and tin to resemble a large 
elephant topped by a howdah, was constructed in 1881 to attract potential buyers to undeveloped 
land south of Atlantic City.43  These efforts were largely successful, and “by the end of the 1880's 
the shorefront had become nearly a continuous line of resort communities” along parts of the 
coast.44 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are often characterized as the peak of the 
first period development for many communities along the Jersey Shore.  Genteel Cape May 
remains nationally recognized for its Victorian architecture dating from this era when, after a fire 
in 1878, it intentionally rebuilt in a unified style to set itself apart from more raucous resorts.45  
Atlantic City saw its golden age in the first decades of the twentieth century, when millions of 
                                               
41 Bates.  Superstorm Sandy. 58-59. 
42 National Register of Historic Places, Allenhurst Residential Historic District, Allenhurst, Monmouth County, 
New Jersey, National Register #10000353. 
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vacationers thronged the boardwalk each year in search of both wholesome and illicit forms of 
entertainment.  While clusters of seaside resorts grew into mature communities that took on a truly 
urban appearance, other stretches of the shore saw only light development and retained an idyllic 
atmosphere, such as the Barnegat Peninsula.  The hotel and amusement centers, including Long 
Branch, Asbury Park, Atlantic City, and Wildwood, reigned supreme until the onset of a rapid 
decline in the postwar era as the expansion of highways opened up quieter towns for new 
development.  In his analysis of twentieth century Atlantic City, Bryant Simon succinctly describes 
the varied factors that attributed to the downfall of these older resorts: 
To be sure, backyard swimming pools, televisions, air conditioners, jet travel, and 
a growing thirst for the rugged outdoors took bites out of Atlantic City's tourism 
business. Yet neither separately nor together can these factors explain where the 
crowds went. Not everyone was staying at home. While demolition companies 
began to implode Atlantic City's massive Boardwalk hotels in the late 1960s, the 
crowds swelled at other Jersey and Delaware shore towns. From this time on, real 
estate prices and summer rental rates soared at beach towns north and south of 
Atlantic City, places like Long Beach Island, Avalon, and Bethany Beach, the quiet, 
middle-class resort where the Frosts relocated. Each of these spots had a quaint 
town center, sandy side streets, and places to park bikes with baskets without fear 
of them being stolen. Clearly then, the people who used to go to Atlantic City and 
their children were not fleeing the shore entirely, nor did airplane trips and package 
tours rule out a weekend at the beach or diminish the desire for a beach house. The 
flight from Atlantic City was, more accurately, part of another flight pattern, the 
one that swept the white middle class from the cities to the suburbs, from the 
downtown movie palaces to the drive-ins, and from urban  
amusement parks to the tightly controlled worlds of Disneyland and its imitators.46 
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These changing consumer preferences left many of the older seaside resorts in decay, spurring a 
period of redevelopment that resulted in the displacement of vulnerable populations from more 
desirable locations.   
Dr. Bates identifies the three important redevelopment strategies implemented along the 
shore as public-private partnerships, gentrification, and second-home ownership.47  In Long 
Branch, the success of the Pier Village public-private redevelopment project prompted the city to 
use eminent domain to aid a developer in its plans to create a new luxury development on the site 
of thirty-six bungalows in the Beachfront North neighborhood.  While the project was ultimately 
unsuccessful, many residents were still displaced, opening up land for the construction of large 
vacation homes and destroying the physical and social integrity of a community.  In some older 
shore communities, gentrification has preserved a community’s built fabric while displacing the 
low-income residents that occupied it.   For instance, the demographic profiles of oceanfront 
neighborhoods in historic communities like Asbury Park and Ocean Grove have been transformed 
by an influx of new year-round and seasonal residents.  In many cases, historic preservation was 
key to this process, Ocean Grove, with over 65% of its housing built before 1940, marketed this 
historic integrity to professionals seeking year round and vacation homes. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated by Hurricane Sandy, the benefits of revitalization have been spread unevenly. In the 
aftermath of the storm, well-resourced local governments and established economic interests could 
pool their resources to facilitate the recovery of better-off towns while less affluent resorts with 
vulnerable populations continued to languish in worsening conditions.  
                                               





 While the primary draw of the Jersey Shore may be its natural amenities of sandy beaches 
and mild sea breezes, it is not a natural landscape.  Even the limited stretches of preserved natural 
coast reflect a history of human intervention and the rearrangement of landscapes to meet various 
needs.  Yet the temporality of this coastal environment seems to fly in the face of attempts at 
permanent development.   Besides the stretch of headlands along the northern coast, where the 
ocean erodes away at the mainland to create high bluffs and narrow beaches, barrier islands are 
the predominant landform along the Jersey Shore.   Varying in width from four miles to one 
hundred yards, the natural profile of barrier islands begins on the ocean side with quartz sand 
Stark contrasts now characterize Long Branch’s Beachfront North neighborhood. 
Image Source: NJ.com 
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beaches and high dunes formed by wind action.  The broad beaches take the brunt of the energy 
from incoming waves, but the high dunes prevent particularly strong storm surges from washing 
over the island. These dunes flatten out into a ridge of dense vegetation that stabilizes the island 
and serves as a habitat for diverse wildlife. The barrier flats level down to a fringe of salt marshes 
leading into the bay.  The wetlands, which line both the mainland and island sides of a bay, serve 
as natural sponges that absorb excess water, reducing flooding and erosion.  Over time, the 
consistent force of ocean waves gradually pushes barrier beaches landward, simultaneously eating 
away at beaches while forming new ones from sand bars.  The ocean also has a strong influence 
on the microclimate of the Jersey Shore, keeping it generally milder than cities further inland.  
Heating up and cooling down more slowly than adjacent landmasses, the ocean decreases the range 
of average temperatures at the shore and keeps the coast relatively cooler in the summer and 
warmer in the winter.48  
While it may appear that the Jersey Shore’s economy depends on the exploitation of its 
beaches, the coastal ecosystem has traditionally provided other means of sustenance for local 
residents.  Although the destruction of many of the salt marshes and wetlands has deprived 
fishermen of a diverse ecosystem, major commercial fishing ports remain operational in Port 
Norris, Cape May, Atlantic City, Barnegat Light, Point Pleasant, and Belford.  In 2003, New 
Jersey’s boats yielded over 170 million pounds of fish with over $120 million in value.49  However, 
unlike the commercial trawlers sailing out daily, recreational fishing from the shoreline proves less 
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fruitful.  As far back as 1953, a state survey showed that fishers at the oceanfront averaged a catch 
of only 0.37 fish per hour while those along the bay fared slightly better at 0.69 fish an hour.50  
Even so, recreational fishing and its associated services, such as party boats and supply shops, 
provided 10,000 jobs and generated in $1.7 billion in sales in 2011.51  
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Nevertheless, the Jersey Shore’s sandy ocean beaches are clearly its most valuable natural 
resource.   Given this importance, local governments spend massive amounts of funds fighting to 
stabilize their beaches against the natural process of erosion and replenishment.  Alongshore 
currents, flowing underneath the waves at the surface, carry sand either north or south along the 
coast.  Currents are also influenced by tides, with the twice daily ebb and flow of water through 
the inlets between the ocean and bays.  Manmade groins and jetties attempt to stabilize beaches by 
blocking the flow of currents along the shore, yet they result in an unequal distribution of sand on 
either side of these rock barriers.  Beach replenishment projects introduce additional sand, typically 
from dredging projects in nearby inlets and bays, but these foreign sands are often incompatible, 
disrupting ecosystems and washing away quickly in storms.  Consequently, efforts to stabilize 
these dynamic landforms for permanent development are associated with impermanent solutions 
that require large expenditures and constant maintenance.52 
Demographics 
In her summary of the region, Dr. Bates asserts that “while the Jersey Shore is not as 
affluent as the state as a whole, it is also not as poor.”53  However, a demographic analysis of 
Atlantic, Cape May, Ocean, and Monmouth Counties’ combined population of 1,578,861 residents 
paints a more complex picture of the region.  The shore is noticeably more white than the rest of 
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the state, with 83.1% of its population identifying as white in the 2010 Census, compared to 68.7% 
of the state as a whole.  A similar trend appears regarding the native born population, which makes 
up 82.5% of the shore but only 79.7% of the state.  While distinct social characteristics may 
distinguish the shore from the rest of the state, variations appear within the region as well.  
Regarding occupations, a demonstrably higher percentage of Atlantic County’s population is 
employed in the “Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, and Accommodation and Food Services” 
and “Retail Trade” industries than that of the other four counties (39.5% compared to 28.6% in 
Cape May, 22% in Ocean, and 19.4% in Monmouth).54  This is likely due to the employment 
opportunities provided by the twelve casino hotels that were operating in Atlantic City in 2010. 
However, this has definitely changed in the last couple of years, with the closure of 4 large casinos 
that put thousands out of work. The legalization of gambling in other parts of New Jersey will 
likely exacerbate these conditions.  On the other hand, given its accessibility to Northern New 
Jersey and New York City, 23.4% of Monmouth County’s working population is employed in the 
“Finance and Insurance, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing” and “Professional, Scientific, 
and Management, and Administrative and Waste Management Services” industries.  This is 
measurably higher than in Ocean (16.2%), Cape May (14.7%), and Atlantic (12.1%) Counties.   
However, an analysis of the distribution of socioeconomic status along the Jersey Shore 
requires a more nuanced look at census tracts.  Dr. Bates’ used data from the 2000 Census to 
determine the twenty highest- and lowest-income census tracts along the Jersey Shore.  While 
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Superstorm Sandy likely resulted in a shift in demographics, this analysis nevertheless proves 
useful in demonstrating patterns of economic and social inequity along the shore.  The median 
household income of the wealthiest census tracts averages at $139,998 a year, with 87.3% of 
residents over age 25 boasting a college education.  Eighteen of these high-income tracts were 
located in Monmouth County, reinforcing the previous observation of its higher concentration of 
white collar employment.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, the population of the twenty 
poorest census tracts features a college educate rate of only 18.9% of the population and an average 
median household income of just $26,717.  While all four shore counties are represented on the 
list of the twenty lowest-income tracts, nine of them are found within the boundaries of Atlantic 
City.   
The de facto segregation of the Jersey shore becomes apparent when comparing Rumson & Asbury Park. 
Image Source: NJ.com 
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Unsurprisingly, the socioeconomic inequity of these tracts reflects the de facto racial 
segregation that predominates within the region.  The percent of the population identifying as white 
on the 2000 Census in the twenty highest-income tracts ranges from 96% (Rumson) to 80% 
(Holmdel).  Interestingly, the white population constitutes anywhere from 97% (Berkeley) to 2% 
(Asbury Park) of the lowest-income tracts. These observations demonstrate that the shore’s white 
population represents a range of socioeconomic classes occupying communities of varying 
character, but the region’s minority population remains concentrated in poorer locales with lower 
rates of educational attainment.55  Understanding the nuanced demographic profile of this region, 
one sees how the social consequences of Hurricane Sandy varied by community.  Although Sandy 
unleashed its fury on both the mansions of Mantoloking and the Cape Cod houses of Ortley Beach, 
the Jersey Shore’s social stratification led to inequitable processes of recovery and unbalanced 
patterns of displacement. 
Municipal Politics in New Jersey 
The race and class dynamics of the Jersey shore are closely tied to larger demographic 
shifts in the metropolitan regions of New Jersey.  The middle class exodus from urban centers in 
the postwar era meant that by 2010, New Jersey’s cities had higher levels of unemployment, 
poverty, and welfare recipients than the rest of the state.   Newark, for instance, lost more than 
55,000 residents, more than half of its manufacturing jobs, and became a predominantly African-
American city between 1950 and 1970.  As of 2014, African-Americans remained a majority 
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(52.4%) of Newark’s population, while 29.9% of the city’s residents still had an income below the 
poverty level.56  The population of the counties of New Jersey’s urban core grew by nearly a third 
between 1940 and 2010, even as vacancy rates in the state’s inner cities remained six to ten times 
higher than the rest of the state.   Therefore, even without this seaside location, shore counties 
would have likely become increasingly suburban and affluent as the white middle class left the 
urban centers and the state became home to a diverse set of cultural, economic, and social groups.  
Metropolitan regions across the country have evolved to be largely segregated, with an urban core 
of impoverished minority groups isolated from middle-class suburbs and wealthy exurban 
communities, a trend which, as noted by Dr. Bates, continues unquestioned because of the 
American emphasis on self-determination that accepts inequality as the product of differential 
levels of work ethic in society.57   
In New Jersey, this segregation is reinforced by the 565 municipalities within the state.58 
New Jersey has a higher density of local governments, defined as county governments, 
municipalities, and school districts, than any other state, averaging 20.4 local governments per 
square mile in 1992 (compared to 2.4 per square mile for the United States as whole).59  Each of 
these municipalities enact their own zoning laws that can effectively exclude certain segments of 
the population by regulating land use and lot size, thus creating a demographically and politically 
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balkanized environment in which regional cooperation is limited. New Jersey’s coastal counties 
contain 125 municipalities, including 24 with less than a square mile in area, as well as distinct 
“Census-Designated Places” that remain within the jurisdiction of a larger municipality.  This 
proliferation of small local governments leaves many communities with part-time municipal 
administrations managed by residents who may lack the specialized knowledge needed for the 
dynamics of coastal communities.  The fragmented nature of local government down at the shore 
has proven particularly problematic when coping with environmental issues.  For instance, before 
Hurricane Sandy, Mantoloking maintained a beach replenishment program, but neighboring Bay 
Head had constructed a sea wall.  While Bay Head remained relatively unscathed by the storm, a 
devastated Mantoloking claimed that its neighbor’s sea wall had exacerbated damage within their 
community and argued that any expansion would increase flooding in the future.  As flooding does 
not follow municipal boundaries, truly effective adaptation strategies can only be accomplished 
with interventions at the regional level, which has proven particularly difficult in a political climate 
favoring home rule. 
Economics 
  In 2015 tourism was a $41.2 billion industry in New Jersey.  The four counties of the 
Jersey Shore account for 48% of the tourism direct sales in the state.60 Given the importance of 
tourism to the Shore’s economy, regional business interests have effectively allied with local 
governments to funnel resources into the infrastructure necessary to support this industry.  The 
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beach badges charged by municipalities along the shore do not come close to covering the massive 
subsidies that go towards beach and soil stabilization and the construction of long bridges to the 
mainland.   Dependent upon this coastal setting for tourist and real estate revenues, civic and 
economic interests accept storm damage as an inherent and expected cost and actively oppose land 
preservation as a threat to continued growth.  The concentration of employment in the tourist 
industry at the shore, particularly so in Atlantic and Cape May Counties, drove rapid reconstruction 
efforts to accommodate the expected thirty million visitors in the summer following Sandy.  In 
fact, tourism direct sales in the four shore counties dropped by only 1% between 2012 and 2013.61  
Thus, while homes remained uninhabitable, this economic imperative ensured that the most of the 
boardwalks and amusement piers of the Jersey Shore were open for business by the summer of 
2013.62   
Historic Preservation 
Located within the state’s Department of Environmental Protection, the Historic 
Preservation Office oversees preservation activity within New Jersey.  With a staff of around 
twenty, the HPO reviews the effect of federal actions on historic resources, nominates properties 
to the National Register of Historic Places, administers tax incentives for historic preservation, 
undertakes cultural resources surveys, and provides information for practicing preservationists 
throughout the state.  At the local level, preservation is carried out by 161 municipal historic 
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preservation commissions.63  45 of these preservation commissions take part in the Certified Local 
Government program, administered by the National Park Service and state historic preservation 
offices, recognize municipalities with historic preservation ordinances that meet national 
preservation standards and opens up additional resources and grants.  At the Jersey Shore, 6 
municipalities have historic preservation commissions but only 4 are designated CLGs: Beach 
Haven Borough, Cape May City, Middletown Township, and Ocean City.   
                                               
63  New Jersey. Department of Environmental Protection. Historic Preservation Office. New Jersey Historic 
Preservation Commission Directory 1999. By Terry Karschner, Meghan MacWilliams, and Caroline Gavin. 




Certified Local Governments of New Jersey with those along the Shore outline in red. 
Image Source: New Jersey Historic Preservation Office 
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Serving as a liaison between the public and private sectors, the New Jersey Historic Trust 
is closely affiliated with the state’s Department of Community Affairs and serves as the primary 
grant maker for historic preservation in the state.  Since 1990, NJHT has awarded $137 million 
through its eight distinct grant programs.  On the other hand, Preservation New Jersey serves as 
the only statewide nonprofit organization devoted to advocating for historic preservation.  While 
serving as the voice for heritage at the state level, PNJ also provides resources for preservation 
groups working at the local level.  Preservation organizations at the Jersey Shore vary in their 
mission, resources, and membership.  This stakeholder group includes both well-established 
organizations like Cape May’s Mid-Atlantic Center for the Arts and Humanities, which restored 
the Frank Furness-designed 1879 Emlen Physick Estate and produces educational programming 
for local students, as well a single-purpose groups like the Inlet Public/Private Associate in Atlantic 
City, which operates the Absecon Lighthouse as a museum and promotes the redevelopment of 
the surrounding neighborhood.   Additionally, New Jersey’s preservation community extends 
beyond these agencies to include the individual property owners, architects, engineers, consultants, 
historians, planners, and developers who actively rally around preservation issues and provide 
input into the continuous discourse surrounding the state’s heritage Typically, the actors that make 
up this wide array of preservationists each fill their own particular niches in the field and only 
coordinate to achieve specific goals.  However, the sheer magnitude of the challenges posed by 




 The varied group of preservationists working within this specific context reflects the 
diverse set of character-defining features that constitute the the unique identity of the Jersey Shore.  
While the shore can be broken down into distinct ecological and political subregions, the 
communities of this landscape all share certain ecological, historical, demographic, and economic 
commonalities.  Barrier islands are the predominant landform along the Jersey Shore.    
This temporal ecosystem of constantly shifting ocean beaches remained largely undeveloped until 
the late nineteenth century, when real estate interests capitalized on the Shore’s natural amenities 
and proximity to urban centers.  Tourism and real estate thus dominate the Shore’s economy, with 
the four counties of the Jersey Shore account for almost half of the direct tourist sales in the state. 
Business and civic interests accept storm damage as an inevitable cost while actively promoting 
reconstruction and opposing land-use controls.  Therefore, governments have expended massive 
amounts of funds to stabilize the beaches against the natural processes of erosion and 
replenishment that shape this landscape.  Despite these similarities, the socioeconomic profiles of 
shore communities vary widely and reflect the dominance of home-rule governance in New Jersey 
that prevents regional cooperation and promotes segregation.  These physical and social 
characteristics help to both define the Jersey Shore and inform an understanding of why the 






Chapter 4: Superstorm Sandy & the Preservation 
Community’s Response 
Superstorm Sandy 
Although residents across the state had been preparing for the late season landfall of 
Hurricane Sandy on October 29, 2012, the storm’s impact resulted in widespread damage to 
businesses, infrastructure, and homes across the state, appearing to affect both rich and poor alike 
in a democratic manner.  Inland communities faced fallen trees, power outages, and gas shortages, 
but over 80% of the state’s damaged homes were found within the four counties along the shore.  
44,000 displaced households received rental assistance following Hurricane Sandy, and 63% of 
the displaced people surveyed reported at least mild distress.  While residents statewide mourned 
the loss of homes and local landmarks along the Jersey Shore, 81.6% of the deaths attributed to 
Hurricane Sandy actually occurred outside the four coastal counties.  Even as social media outlets 
became memorials to the destroyed cultural landscape, the storm proved to be less of an apocalypse 
and more of a harbinger of the increasingly evident vulnerability of the Jersey Shore.64   
While survivors may have been shocked by the dramatic fracturing of social networks, 
changes in their lifestyle, and alterations to their physical environment, Hurricane Sandy actually 
strengthened the processes already in place that have been transforming the shore into an 
increasingly affluent place.  Structures built before the National Flood Insurance Program was 
enacted in 1968 were originally grandfathered into the program and thus not subjected to elevation 
requirements.  In an attempt to make this federal program financial self-sufficient, the Biggert-
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Waters Act, enacted in July of 2012, raised the cost of subsidized flood insurance premiums on all 
previously grandfathered buildings.  While the National Flood Insurance Homeowner 
Affordability Act of 2014 reintroduced subsidies for primary homes, the effects of these reduced 
subsidies were compounded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s introduction of 
new Advisory Base Flood Elevation maps two months after Sandy, prompting elevations and 
demolitions.65  Middle-class homeowners who could not afford to repair, let alone elevate, their 
shore houses were compelled to sell to their property to wealthier buyers, eroding away the Jersey 
Shore’s traditional landscape of small, older homes for the middle class. 
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Individuals were frequently overwhelmed by the task of recovery, as seen in Toms River, 
where around half of the 956 homes with demolition permits still remained standing a year after 
the storm. Yet survivors reported a stronger sense of community and togetherness as residents 
united in solidarity to help one another.  The United States Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, State of New Jersey’s Department of Community Affairs and Department of 
Environmental Protection all played a role in recovery efforts, but the State Office of Emergency 
Management’s Recovery Bureau was particularly important in providing affected communities 
with everything from direct public assistance to preparedness and mitigation plans.  According to 
a Monmouth University/Asbury Park Press poll conducted in the months following the storm,  69% 
of those affected by Sandy felt that the response of their local government was “excellent” or 
“good.”  The approval of the state government’s response was only slightly less at 66%, while 
feelings regarding the federal government were noticeably lower at 51%.  Of the 816 interviewees, 
only a minority believed that the municipal (6%), state (5%), or federal (5%) government had done 
a poor job.66 
While Sandy may have left shore residents with a strengthened faith in their community 
and home rule governance, this contrasted sharply with a growing antipathy towards what was 
perceived as insufficient and unreliable financial support from government agencies.  Although 
the emergency response to Sandy was performed with more organization and success than 
Hurricane Katrina, residents of affected areas quickly grew dissatisfied with the federal 
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government once aid was blocked by the United States Congress in January of 2013. Additionally, 
as late as 2015, FEMA had denied payment to such a large number of flood insurance claims that 
it reopened the cases of 141,800 Sandy victims amid charges of fraud.67Governor Chris Christie 
enjoyed remarkably strong support following the storm, even after the state adopted FEMA’s 
controversial preliminary Flood Insurance Rate Maps that identified most of the shore as a high 
risk flood zone.   This support eroded away after the uproar surrounding Christie’s distribution of 
$159.8 million in federal housing funds earmarked for Sandy victims.  16.1% of these funds were 
allocated to Essex County, where Christie received endorsements from two communities after they 
received funding for affordable housing complexes ostensibly built for victims displaced by 
Sandy.68  While Essex County saw damage from the storm, hard hit Ocean County, where 1,620 
structures saw major damage or were destroyed, only received 7.7% of this aid.69  Ultimately, their 
belief that the inherent vulnerability of the Jersey Shore could be solved with technical solutions 
and infrastructural improvements meant that New Jersey residents saw the government’s 
ineffective handling of Superstorm Sandy as a violation of its responsibility.  However, by taking 
perspective this perspective residents’ ignored their own culpability that comes with inhabiting 
and investing in flood-prone areas.70   
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Dr. Bates correctly asserts that “knowledge of historic storms along the Jersey shore is 
widespread and easily accessible to anyone interested; at the same time, residents can deny these 
threats in their everyday interactions with the coastal environment because these disruptions do 
not jibe with the dominant construction of the Shore, which is rooted in the security of family.”71  
As a place for celebrations and vacations, the Jersey Shore represents a cultural continuity that 
spans generations. Regardless of the inevitability of future storms, the cultural value that New 
Jersey residents ascribe to the shore is justification enough for reconstruction.  Through this lense, 
questioning development on the coast is equivalent to denying these emotional connections.    
In a stable modern society, the perceived responsibility of government shifts from 
providing basic needs towards protecting citizens from potential threats to the routine of their daily 
lives.  Therefore, New Jersey residents expect their government to implement engineering 
solutions to strengthen the shore despite the strong chance that future storms will be even costlier 
and more powerful than Superstorm Sandy.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers adopted a strategy 
to construct higher dunes and build wider beaches along the portion of the coast most severely 
affected by Sandy.  However, even the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recognizes that beach 
replenishment projects are not a permanent fix to the problems posed down the Jersey Shore, 
demonstrating that the acceptance of the status quo is not based purely on economics but rather on 
the feelings of security that come from habitual behaviors and responses. 
                                               




 Despite the different focuses of the stakeholders that make up New Jersey’s preservation 
community, Superstorm Sandy’s 2012 landfall brought with it a set of challenges that drew the 
attention of preservationists statewide. Of the 90,027 documented historic properties identified by 
the New Jersey Bureau of GIS, 12,357 (13.7%) were located within the storm surge zone.  
Breaking this down further, one finds a differential distribution of impacted resources by county.  
Only 12.5% of Monmouth County’s historic resources were in the storm surge zone, but Atlantic 
and Cape May Counties respectively saw 27.8% and 45.6% of their historic resources inundated 
during Sandy. Ocean County stands out as the most significantly affected county in New Jersey, 
with 59.3% of its historic properties impacted by the storm. This analysis corresponds with the 
path of Sandy which brought the “right wall” of the storm, typically the strongest part of the 
hurricane, directly in line with the Ocean County coast.72  At the municipal level, a band of affected 
municipalities stretched around the borders of New Jersey, corresponding to the municipalities 
that front the Atlantic Ocean, bays, and major rivers. Comparing these two units of analyses shows 
that even the counties with less than 25% of their historic resources affected still had municipalities 
where over 75% of the historic properties were in the storm surge zone. As lost heritage is often 
most keenly felt at the local level, a more detailed analysis of historic resources in Ocean County 
would provide a more enriched understanding of Sandy’s differential impact on communities.  
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 Ocean County features 5,041 documented historic properties within its 33 municipalities. 
59.4% (2,993) of these historic resources were within Superstorm Sandy’s storm surge, and 8 
municipalities saw over 75% of their historic properties affected by the storm. Even within Ocean 
County, one can see 9 municipalities where no historic properties were within the storm surge. 
While most of these communities were located further west on the mainland, some coastal towns 
saw none of their few documented resources impacted by the storm surge either. At this detailed 
level of analysis, looking at quantitative values reveals more than simply looking at normalized 
data. 100% of South Toms River’s resources were within Sandy’s storm surge, but there was only 
1 identified historic property. On the other hand, 76% (or 1,266) of Toms River’s 1,656 historic 
properties were located within the inundation zone.  Despite the sharp contrast in the sheer numbers 
of affected properties, the destruction of a community’s single documented resource may have the 
same cultural impact as damage to a number of properties in a town with an extensive built 


















While this serves as a general analysis that overlays the storm surge zone onto mapped 
historic resources, the HPO and EFMA provided a more in depth analysis how “cultural resources” 
were affected by the storm.  Although the HPO never explicitly identified what constitutes a 
“cultural resource,” the National Park Service identifies them as “physical evidence or place of 
past human activity: site, object, landscape, structure; or a site, structure, landscape, object or 
natural feature of significance to a group of people traditionally associated with it”73  A total of 
8,421 cultural resources suffered damage during the storm.  Of these, 660 were identified with 
major damage or classified as destroyed.  Ultimately, Sandy damaged 13% of the state’s historic 
resources while inflicting severe damage or destruction on 1%.  GIS also shed light on the 
geographic distribution of affected properties, illustrating that 45% of the total number of cultural 
resources impacted by Hurricane Sandy were located in Ocean County.  Cultural resources in 
Hudson County, located further north on New York Bay, constituted 28% of those damaged.  
Along the shore, Cape May, Monmouth, and Atlantic Counties made up 16%, 5%, and 2% of the 
totals, respectively.74  
According to FEMA, 82,565 structures in New Jersey were damaged to some degree by 
Superstorm Sandy, including 5,582 that saw major damage or were destroyed.  The HPO found 
that cultural resources represented around 10% of the total number of structures that were 
evaluated at an “affected,” “minor,” or “major” level of damage. On the other hand, cultural 
resources constituted 33% of the total number of destroyed resources identified by FEMA.  In 
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conclusion, while Superstorm Sandy’s storm surge significantly damaged properties across the 
state, historic resources were disproportionately impacted.  The majority of this destruction 
occurred in a select group of coastal counties, but even within these divisions it affected properties 
are concentrated in the communities directly lining the ocean and bay shores.75 
New Jersey Historic Preservation Office 
 Located within the state’s Department of Environmental Protection, the New Jersey 
Historic Preservation Office [HPO] is tasked with a mission to “assist the residents of New Jersey 
in identifying, preserving, protecting and sustaining our historic and archaeological 
resources...through our annual conference, consultation with professionals, training workshops, 
co-sponsorship of history and historic preservation related activities, the Historic Preservation 
Bulletin and other free publications.”76  Given New Jersey’s coastal setting, the HPO has had a 
long history dealing with storms and their effects on historic resources.  However, Hurricane Sandy 
was by far the largest and most destructive storm to hit New Jersey since the creation of the office 
in 1966.  In December of 2013, the HPO published its “Action Plan Narrative for the Preservation, 
Stabilization, Rehabilitation, and Repair of Historic Properties” to qualify the agency for the 
federal Hurricane Sandy Disaster Relief Assistance Grant for Historic Properties.  This document 
provided a thorough analysis of the office’s response to the disaster and its subsequent recovery 
strategies.  The narrative laid out in the action plan was complemented by the testimony of three 
members of the HPO staff: Daniel Saunders, the Administrator and Deputy State Historic 
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Preservation Officer; Jonathan Kinney, in charge of the Certified Local Government program; and 
Andrea Tingey, in charge of cultural resource surveys, outreach activities, and Certificates of 
Eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places.. 
When Hurricane Sandy made landfall near the barrier island community of Brigantine, 
New Jersey, it was classified as a Category 2 Post-Tropical Cyclone with Hurricane Force.  Dan 
Saunders described the situation at the office Trenton: 
So Hurricane Sandy hits and we’re all without lights and power at home for ten 
days.  We’re basically just out of it.  Then things sort of come back to life. We come 
back to work and it’s really quiet. There’s stuff going on at the shore, but you can’t 
get there. The police have got it all blocked off.  After awhile of it being quiet, we 
sort of go, ‘Well let’s talk to FEMA, They’re at the shore….77 
 
While the first survey didn’t begin until November 29th, the process of gathering information 
regarding Hurricane Sandy’s impact on historic properties began immediately after the storm made 
landfall.  The HPO solicited anecdotal accounts of damage to cultural resources through the online 
portal provided on their website.  The reported effects of floodwater inundation “spanned the 
spectrum from immediately and obviously catastrophic to substantial interior damage which will 
result in gutting or demolition,” while the storm surge’s movement of large quantities of sand left 
archaeological sites associated with Native American settlements exposed to the threats of 
erosion.78   
These reports provided an important initial grasp of the destruction at hand, but a more 
systematic assessment was needed to provide an aggregated understanding of the disaster.   As 
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data and imagery became available through the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA], the HPO’s GIS point person, Kinney Clark, used information from its Cultural Resources 
Geographic Information System [CRGIS] to produce a more thorough assessment of impacts.  
Clark’s analyses provided a rough estimate for the number of cultural resources impacted by the 
storm surge determined how these were geographically distributed across the state.  As more data 
came in, HPO staff was able to classify the degree of damage to each cultural resources as either 
“affected,” “minor,” “major,” or “destroyed.”  The HPO then compared this CRGIS data to the 
damage statistics produced by FEMA in order to place historic properties within thea broader 
understanding of the impact of Sandy on New Jersey’s built environment. 
The data gathered through Clark’s CRGIS work helped inform windshield surveys that 
were conducted from the end of November through December of 2012.  Survey teams consisted 
of HPO employees partnered with staff from FEMA’s Office of Environmental Planning and 
Historic Preservation, many of whom had previous experience surveying in New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina.  Ultimately, surveyors, compiled over 4,500 images to assess the damage and 
historic significance of properties within a 93 square mile area.  According to HPO staff, 
This random ‘let’s drive around and figure out what damage we can see’ evolved 
into a clear survey. We did green and pink because we had green markers and pink 
markers on the day we started. Green means there’s nothing there.  Pink means it’s 
interesting.  [At] most preservation offices...you go out looking for historic types. 
This is the exact opposite...if you can exclude large areas with the survey, you won’t 
get crushed with reviews.  I mean that really was a danger for us...At that point we 
didn’t know if we’d get more staff.79 
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Surveying attempted to apply the National Register criteria in a “very rough and quick way,” 
excluding “neighborhoods that didn’t have integrity or areas with a lot of new buildings,” of which 
there are many at the Jersey Shore, by literally marking them as green on a survey map.80  Andrea 
Tingey elaborated, “Pink and green is kind of a unique New Jersey response of looking at just 
clear-cut areas.  Most of the other states were either sitting in their offices reviewing things as they 
came in or looking for positive historic resources in a more traditional way. We were the ones 
looking for: ‘No that’s crap go do whatever you want.  Don’t bring that to me again.’ We did have 
this huge expanse of territory and we were scared.”81  The pink and green survey ultimately 
informed a programmatic agreement that streamlined the Section 106 review process for projects 
in green zones.  
 Surveyors were also tasked with identifying when a property “wasn’t a building anymore.”  
After two field visits to Mantoloking, the site of the infamous ocean breech across the peninsula, 
the HPO-FEMA team reached an agreement as to what “wasn’t a building anymore.”  According 
to HPO staff, affected properties were no longer considered buildings if they were so damaged that 
they could no longer be evaluated against the National Register criteria as a “resource.”  According 
to the National Park Service’s National Register Bulletin, a historic resource is a “building, site, 
district, object, or structure evaluated as historically significant.”82  While this standard for 
assessing damage against integrity may have been clear for surveyors in the field, evidently the 
exact criteria for determining a total loss of integrity remains unclear.  After the survey, the HPO 
                                               
80 Ibid. 
81 Andrea Tingey. Interview by Chuck Hovanic, Trenton, January 15, 2016. 
82  United States. Department of the Interior. National Park Service. National Register Bulletin: How to Apply the 
National Register Criteria for Evaluation. 1997.  
78 
 
returned to particular areas identified as pink, meeting with local stakeholders to inform their 
understanding of the storm’s impact on the community’s historic properties.  The drive to 
streamline the regulatory review process was largely driven by political pressure to keep things 
moving:  “Nobody wants to be the reason why somebody is not back in their house.”83  Even so, 
regulatory reviews at the HPO more than doubled from the year before to a total of around six 
thousand projects.   
The dramatic increase in the HPO’s workload prompted it to shift priority away from 
projects not involved in Hurricane Sandy recovery.  While the agency continued to carry out 
National Register nominations and Certified Local Government subgrants, the programs “shifted 
the focus of their work efforts from program development to providing technical assistance and 
outreach to those communities who were hardest hit by the storm.” Regarding the Hurricane Sandy 
Disaster Relief Assistance Grant for Historic Properties, the HPO instituted a three-pronged 
approach to ensure the most effective use of funds.  Partnering with the New Jersey Historic Trust 
[NJHT], the office established a Cultural Resource Recovery Assistance grant program.  Having 
already communicated with affected communities and local preservation organizations, the joint 
HPO-NJHT developed a scoring criteria based on: 
● Historic Significance 
● Ability to Complete the Project Promptly and Successfully 
● Ability to Correct Storm Damage 
● Degree and Nature of Damage 
● Completeness and Accuracy of the Application 
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The HPO did not extend funding to private property owners, despite acknowledging that they 
demonstrated the greatest need, as “this potential applicant group is unfamiliar to the office” and 
would therefore “require revising existing grant agreement templates.”84   However, social and 
political issues factored into this decision too.  Jonathan Kinney noted, “It’s just an interesting 
piece of the story.  As opposed to where disasters happen elsewhere in the country, this for the 
most part, was extremely wealthy, secondary homes being destroyed and damaged.  But then 
you’ve got other areas at the shore where it’s absolutely primary homeowners and they are not 
wealthy. It’s an interesting spectrum.”85  
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As private secondary homes, many shore houses were both disqualified from the grant 
program and ineligible for flood insurance subsidies.  While there are certainly ethical issues 
associated with directing disaster relief towards repairing vacation homes, many historic resources 
were nonetheless lost due to these policy decisions. “The best house in Mantoloking,” for example, 
had an owner that “had been in [the house], taken all the wainscotting off, dried it, taken doors 
down, and was being very loving and appropriate, but at high tide the dining room was underwater 
still.”86  Unable to distribute a grant, the HPO’s only course of action was determining that it was 
individually-eligible for the National Register of Historic Places.  Facing stiff fines from the 
borough and increased flood insurance premiums, the owner ultimately demolished the house. 
As, attention shifted away from recovery to rebuilding, the HPO’s second program 
attempted to address the problems posed by changes to the National Flood Insurance Program, 
providing technical assistance aimed at helping property owners understand the impact of 
elevation and other site planning considerations on the historic integrity of both individual 
buildings and entire districts.  HPO staff acknowledged the seemingly contradictory stance of the 
National Flood Insurance Program, which exempted historic properties from elevation 
requirements but nevertheless subjected them to increasing insurance rates if they were not raised.  
Even with the streamlined review processes set forth in the aforementioned Programmatic 
Agreement, the HPO estimated a 130% increase in the office’s workload, prompting them to 
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request funding for five additional full time employees, including two architectural historians and 
a GIS specialist, in their action plan.87 
 Staff at the HPO that noted the character of the shore itself posed problems for developing 
comprehensive preservation strategies.  The Jersey Shore is not one place, but a string of distinct 
communities that seem to only share a coastal setting and robust real estate markets.  Any state-
level strategy for promoting the resilience of historic resources thus had to take these diverse 
identities into account.  In addition, the HPO staff felt that the preponderance of seasonally vacant 
homes in shore towns played a large part in shaping the actions and response of local governments. 
Often, the implementation of immediate repairs, such as drying out interiors before mold sets in, 
was delayed by municipalities that were slow to inform secondary homeowners of damage. In 
addition, the chaos of recovery left some local governments largely unaware of the applications 
and plans of individual homeowners, hindering their ability to shape the reconstruction.  When 
asked about what they felt were the strengths and places for improvement in the response of New 
Jersey’s preservation community to Hurricane Sandy, HPO staff offered good insight.  As Andrea 
Tingey saw it, “The weakness was what we didn’t know: the amount of information, the format of 
the information, and the difficulty in sharing what information we did have.”   Regarding previous 
surveys, most of them were around thirty years old and thus woefully out of date in the dynamic 
real estate market of the Jersey Shore.  “We didn’t have the reports scanned.  We scanned all the 
reports from Monmouth and Ocean Counties so that we could put them up on our website to have 
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them available to communities and FEMA, but all of that scanning happened after the storm.”88  
Regarding the positives, Jonathan Kinney acknowledged “our ability to adapt and create these 
systems and procedures from scratch.  I think we did a lot of good outreach to states and other 
areas that had previously gone through this.  We weren’t trying to reinvent the wheel, but no two 
areas are the same so there was lot of adaptation that had to happen.”89 The HPO also had the 
advantage of being within the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.  By sharing 
an office, the HPO was “kept at the table” and thus remained in the consciousness of the state and 
federal agencies that were central to recovery efforts.  In fact, the HPO’s previous work in Section 
106 reviews had fostered strong working relationships with FEMA and the Department of 
Transportation, allowing staff at the HPO to serve as informal liaisons between other state 
departments and federal agencies in the aftermath of the storm. 
The Historic Preservation Office’s response and recovery plan for Hurricane Sandy clearly 
developed in an ad hoc and reactive manner.  Even so, the staff at the HPO demonstrated a 
remarkable adaptability to the difficult circumstances presented to them.  The actions taken to 
defend historic resources in the immediate aftermath of Sandy seem to be slowly developing into 
codified strategies to prepare for future storms.  The rapid “pink and green” surveys, while less 
than ideal, laid the foundation for more in-depth surveying that will hopefully lead to more a 
meaningful understanding of both the extent and vulnerability of historic resources along the coast.  
 If budgets allow, the difficult tasks of assessing the integrity of hundreds of damaged 
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resources and certifying appropriateness for thousands of Section 106 reviews will lead to 
established guidelines that inform the future treatment of properties damaged by storms and 
flooding.  Nevertheless, even the ingenuity of the HPO staff cannot provide a satisfying solution 
that prepares historic properties for the projected inundation of barrier island communities as sea 
levels rise. 
New Jersey Historic Trust 
 According to its website, the New Jersey Historic Trust [NJHT] was founded by state law 
in 1967 with a mission “to advance historic preservation in New Jersey for the benefit of future 
generations through education, stewardship and financial investment programs that save our 
heritage and strengthen our communities.”  To address the challenges to this mission, NJHT 
established the following goals for itself: 
● “Establish stable sources of funding to support activities that contribute directly to the 
preservation and use of New Jersey’s heritage resources.” 
● “Increase visibility for heritage preservation and its ability to contribute to the vitality 
of New Jersey’s economy and communities.” 
 
● “Support effective collaboration among all state-level preservation related endeavors 
to maximize the public benefits from these efforts.”90 
 
In this capacity, the Trust has become a large source of funding for a variety of historic preservation 
projects throughout the state.   The Trust’s Executive Director, Dorothy Guzzo, and Jennifer Stark, 
Program Manager for Sandy Disaster Relief Grants, provided their perspectives on Hurricane 
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Sandy’s effect on historic resources.  When asked about the role of NJHT in the recovery effort 
immediately following Sandy, Guzzo responded that: 
We had none here, none whatsoever.  We were sitting here at the Historic Trust, 
offering help like crazy, saying, ‘We can do things.  We can survey.’ And 
absolutely no role here.  This administration took a very different view in how they 
were going to address Sandy. The Historic Preservation Office was front and center 
with all of that.  They worked hand-in-glove with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.  They were out in the fields doing the survey work with them, 
the spot work.  After a time, when the federal money came in through the National 
Park Service [NPS], it came in through the Department of Interior.  It was part of 
the big omnibus package of funding that came down for Sandy.  That money that 
was to go back out for a grant program was funneled to us through the Historic 
Preservation Office because we already knew about how to make grants, so then 
we hired Jennifer.  We had a larger staff at one point, but now we’re down to 
Jennifer, who is also a historic architect, to administer the Sandy grant program.91 
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Of the twelve states that received disaster relief funding for historic properties, only New 
York and New Jersey denied subgrants to repairs on historic houses.  It is probably no coincidence 
that these were the two states that also saw the most destruction during Hurricane Sandy.  New 
Jersey’s Sandy Disaster Relief Grants for Historic Properties program, which accepted Expression 
of Interest forms until July 30, 2014, provided awards of up to $500,000 for properties listed or 
eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.  Eligible applicants were limited 
to non-profit organizations, places of public accommodation, religious organizations, and 
municipal and county governments that intended to carry out non-construction and construction 
activities, including, but not limited to, survey assessments, engineering drawings, landscape 
studies, archaeological stabilization, stabilization of documented historic landscapes, and the 
“elevation or moving of structures per FEMA regulations, in limited circumstances.”92   
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [DEP], which received the 
federal funding package, stipulated that the grant program would not accept applications from 
private homeowners.  Although Guzzo contests that the NJHT had the staff and resources ready 
to vet the potentially large quantity of applications, she surmised that the DEP’s decision was 
based on the assumption that funding from the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development [HUD], channeled through New Jersey’s Department of Community Affairs, would 
sufficiently address the needs of residential properties.  However, the aforementioned Action Plan 
Narrative for the Preservation, Stabilization, Rehabilitation, and Repair of Historic Properties 
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produced by the HPO justifies the exclusion of private properties on the grounds that the “HPO 
has not provided funding to private property owners since the 1980s, and the NJHT has never 
funded private individuals or business owners, so funding construction projects will require 
revising existing grant agreement templates. We anticipate substantially more guidance will be 
needed for many private property owners unfamiliar with grant application processes, the 
Secretary of the Interior’s Standards, significant capital improvement projects, and preservation 
easement restrictions.”93   
“Once you took residences out and you’re left with churches and public buildings and 
some businesses, there wasn’t a huge demand for the money,” Dorothy Guzzo observed, “so in 
some instances the criteria was: ‘Do you have damage?’”94  The New Jersey Historic Trust did 
not fund any elevation projects following Sandy.  However, as grant program manager Jennifer 
Stark observed, “Utilities are being elevated.  We’ve got floodgates going in.  We’ve got flood 
vents going in.”95  These represent a mix of dry and wet floodproofing techniques that have less 
of an impact on the historic character of a building, yet they are not taken into account as 
mitigation strategies under the NFIP.   Flood gates, for instance, can be erected rapidly when 
flooding is imminent, providing more protection than sandbags in less time.  Flood vents installed 
in walls, on the other hand, allow water to flow under a building without obstruction, preventing 
the buildup of water pressure.  Guzzo added that “part of that is just relative to where you fall in 
the flood zones. So although some of these properties are, ours are not in the prime tier where 
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they have to be elevated.”96  While the use of NJHT grant money to fund flood-proofing measures 
indicates a step towards promoting resilience, it nonetheless falls short of actually developing the 
necessary long-term adaptation plans for historic structures that will become increasingly 
vulnerable as the climate changes.  Ultimately, despite the program’s limited scope and 
application, NJHT successfully funded a variety of resources that served important roles within 
their communities, from Elberon’s Church of the Presidents to a former United States Life Saving 
Station in Seaside Park. 
Jennifer Wellock, an employee at the NPS, provided an astute comparison of the treatment 
of private properties following Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy.  While the NPS typically did not 
grant money to homeowners for disaster recovery, congressional legislation specifically 
mandated that funding help get people back into their homes after Katrina.  Following Sandy, 
HPOs generally seemed more interested in activities like surveying rather than on the ground 
restoration work.  The distribution of homeowner’s insurance may have contributed to this 
divergence.  Property owners that received insurance payouts for storm damages were unable to 
apply additional federal disaster relief money to those repairs that were covered by insurance.  
Whereas homeowners insurance was widespread by mandate in most of the northeastern United 
States, many of the properties affected by Katrina were handed down through generations and 
thus never required insurance.  Regardless of the reasons behind it, the exclusion of private homes 
from the NJHT grant had profound implications for a region where residential properties, from 
camp meeting cottages to Gilded Age mansions, make up a large part of the historic fabric. 
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 When asked about NJHT’s continued role in promoting the long-term resilience of New 
Jersey’s historic resources, Dorothy Guzzo noted that they had updated their “historic structures 
reports and preservation plan guide to include some disaster management stuff in there, so that 
when an architect was looking at a property they would be incorporating this idea of disaster as 
part of their planning documents.”97  While nothing had been officially implemented, Guzzo 
presumed that future grant programs would ask applicants to address resilience in some sort of 
way, be it elevating utilities to reduce flood damage or trimming trees to prevent downed power 
lines. If a disaster similar to Hurricane Sandy were to hit again, she believes that NJHT would be 
better prepared than before.  Guzzo also hypothesized about what might have been if New Jersey 
had not taken such a pro-reconstruction stance by devoting large sums of money to strengthening 
the shore.  Rather than taking Sandy as a “unique opportunity to refocus its development priorities 
and re-examine whether allowing construction in the most flood-prone areas is a good idea,” 
Governor Christie asserted that “there is no choice but to rebuild, especially at the Jersey Shore, 
not only because it's a part of the cultural heartbeat of our state, but also because it's a huge part 
of the economic engine of our state.”98  Had more questions been asked, heritage practitioners 
may have been forced to evaluate and prioritize threatened resources, thus articulating a stronger 
argument for historic preservation.  As Guzzo explains, 
Preservationists might have come out better because there may have been more of 
an effort to say, ‘These are the places that matter’...You could’ve been asked to 
make those decisions.  They would have been hard decisions, but I would have 
rather looked at that value question...Now everything is treated the same.  It might 
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have actually worked out better because if you were stepping back to look at a 
policy decision...you would’ve incorporated or could’ve incorporated historic 





The role of the New Jersey Historic Trust following Hurricane Sandy is emblematic of 
the limited ability of organizations to operate outside of the role set by established frameworks 
of recovery and reconstruction.  For instance, NJHT’s history as a grant provider precluded its 
inclusion in the joint FEMA-HPO damage assessment surveys, despite its willingness to provide 
money and manpower.  A similar disconnect surfaced regarding private homes’ ineligibility in 
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the Sandy Disaster Relief Grants program. While Dorothy Guzzo felt that the NJHT was 
prepared for a deluge, the HPO’s “Action Plan Narrative for the Preservation, Stabilization, 
Rehabilitation, and Repair of Historic Properties” stated that the “HPO has not provided funding 
to private property owners since the 1980s, and the NJHT has never funded private individuals 
or business owners, so funding construction projects will require revising existing grant 
agreement templates.”  When it comes time to determine the role of historic resources in planning 
for climate change, the fragmented nature of New Jersey’s preservation community will surely 
present similar challenges in forming an integrated approach for resilience. 
Preservation New Jersey 
 According to their website, Preservation New Jersey, Inc. [PNJ] was founded in 1978 to 
advocate for and promote “historic preservation as a sustainable strategy to protect and enhance 
the vitality and heritage of New Jersey’s richly diverse communities. PNJ is the only statewide 
private membership-supported historic preservation organization in New Jersey.”  Among its 
many activities, PNJ publishes the aforementioned annual list of the 10 Most Endangered 
Historic Places in New Jersey,  advocates for sound public policy at all levels of government, 
provides instructional toolkits on issues ranging from affordable housing to preservation 
planning, and runs workshops to educate the public on preservation and sustainability issues.100  
As mentioned earlier, in 2013 PNJ placed “Historic Resources and Communities Damaged by 
                                               




Superstorm Sandy” on its annual most endangered.  This article raised a clarion call for 
preservationists statewide and clearly set forward the priorities of the organization: 
The preservation community is only now beginning to get a clear handle on the 
tools available for Superstorm Sandy recovery...From federal funding that may or 
may not require preservation-conscious review, to local code officials that may be 
working with the needs of historic resources for the first time, to an unprecedented 
need for recovery funding and technical assistance, it will continue to be up to those 
of us who care about heritage and historic places to help ensure that the preservation 
of New Jersey’s historic resources is an ongoing priority.101 
 
Despite the strong rhetoric, the role of PNJ was limited to serving as a conduit for information 
that would enable other preservationists to carry out recovery work.   
Deborah Kelly, a former PNJ board member and executive, felt that the organization had 
an evolving role in preservation in New Jersey: 
PNJ has been through many phases in its life. They went from, years ago, when it 
was first formed with part-time staff to actually three or four full-time staff for a 
while. Then when the recession happened and a lot of organizations lost funding, 
they went down again to no staff. So they’re rebuilding right now. They used to be 
able to be more effective at being advocates and a resource for these townships and 
homeowners than they might be able to right this minute. But they’re building a 
new website. Their website might be the first place a lot of people go to try to get 
information, but they’re advocates. Their primary mission is to advocate for New 
Jersey’s historic resources and to offer resources and education to homeowners, 
municipalities, and just the public who is interested in promoting historic 
preservation.   As I said, they are not as active right now as they have been at 
different points in the past, but I think they’re still a good resource.102 
 
This state of transition within the organization influenced the ways in which PNJ carried out its 
mission following Hurricane Sandy.  Originally, PNJ received a grant from the National Trust 
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for Historic Preservation for a year-long project of interacting with communities with damaged 
historic resources, making sure that they were aware of grant programs and were focusing on 
historic resources, while also providing comments for Section 106 reviews on Federal 
Emergency Management Agency actions.  This grant was soon supplanted by funding from the 
New Jersey Historic Trust, which saw PNJ as a tool to get preservationists down in the trenches 
at the shore. Ultimately, these two sources of funding, along with consultation from the New 
Jersey Historic Preservation Office, enabled the organization to undertake three projects: 
facilitating public awareness, providing assistance, and interacting with affected communities; 
holding two workshops that focused on practical issues at the shore and in urban environments, 
respectively; and creating a resource guide to be posted on their website.  
While the direct assistance, toolkit, and workshops certainly proved valuable to interested 
parties, PNJ’s success as an advocate was more questionable.  The attendees at the two 
workshops held in Bay Head and Newark were “generally historical societies, historic 
preservation commissions, or somebody who already had an interest.”  The owner of an old 
house in a random community without a strong preservation identity was not likely to show up.  
Rather than serving as the voice for historic preservation when it was intentionally or 
inadvertently left out of the discussion, PNJ primarily built upon the work already being done 
by preservationists in the field.  Instead, Preservation New Jersey’s advocacy efforts focused on 
pushing for the creation of statewide elevation design standards.  They took no stance on the new 
Base Flood Elevation maps that posed dramatic implications for historic resources in high risk 
flood zones, only encouraging FEMA to complete the new advisory maps so that homeowners 
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could finally begin to make repairs and adapt their houses to the new standards.  Regarding the 
future, Kelly noted that “there has been flooding down there in [other] hurricanes, [and] probably 
everyone feels that they are not going to go away.  Probably, these extreme weather conditions 
will just keep happening too.”103  If another storm similar to Sandy were to strike the shore again, 
PNJ would likely respond in the same manner, attempting to facilitate the flow of money and 
information to the communities and resources most at danger.  
 
                                               
103 Ibid., 
Online information advertising Preservation New Jersey’s 2015 Resiliency Workshop Series. 
Image Source: Preservation New Jersey 
94 
 
In its response to Hurricane Sandy, PNJ stayed true to its mission of providing resources 
and serving as a voice for New Jersey’s heritage.  That being said, the response of the only 
statewide preservation organization still left something to be desired.  A not-for-profit advocacy 
group typically has the ability to take the issues identified by preservationists and clearly articulate 
them in the forums where they can have the most impact.  While overwhelmed preservationists at 
the shore often lamented that heritage was rarely prioritized in the recovery and reconstruction 
plans at the municipal and state levels, PNJ only issued two public statements regarding the issue.  
After Hurricane Sandy, Preservation New Jersey mainly “preached to the choir” of heritage 
advocates rather than attempting to insert preservation into larger discussions of resiliency.  While 
it seems easy to blame the organization, PNJ’s focus on campaigning for more technical resources, 
like design guidelines or disaster-recovery toolkits, is more a reflection of the current state of 
affairs in New Jersey rather than a deficiency in the organization.   
Preservationists and residents alike have overlooked the inherent challenges associated 
with vulnerable coastal environments to maintain a more politically and economically beneficial 
“business as usual” approach.  Strikingly, maintaining the status quo is done in the face of the 
widespread belief among New Jersey residents that the storms of 2011 and 2012 (Hurricanes Irene 
and Sandy, as well as the 2011 Halloween blizzard), were partially attributable to climate 
change.104   Rather than capitalizing on this new awareness of vulnerability and addressing the 
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fundamental issues of rebuilding down at the shore, PNJ’s focus on technical fixes echoed the call 
to “Restore the Shore” that was heard throughout the state. 
Beach Haven Historic Preservation Advisory Committee 
 Eighteen miles long and only a few blocks wide, Long Beach Island sits six miles out from 
the mainland in Ocean County.  Located towards the southern end of this barrier island, the 
Borough of Beach Haven has a year round population of 1,170 and an historic district with 
“architecturally-distinctive houses spanning seven decades of seaside resort construction” that 
demonstrates the town’s “role as a preferred summer resort community for Philadelphia 
businessmen.”105  The sparsely populated island saw its start as a resort community with the 
coming of the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1872 and the incorporation of the Tuckerton and Long 
Beach Building, Land, and Improvement Association in 1873.  Platted out along a narrow part of 
the island, where “a rifle-ball might be shot across the island from one to the other,” the newly 
founded community of Beach Haven provided access to both bathing in the ocean and aquatic 
sports in the bay.  As the town grew in popularity, members of Philadelphia’s business elite built 
elegant summer houses that often remained within the family for generations.  Although by the 
1910s, the town had begun to market itself to a larger audience by citing its proximity to major 
urban centers and describing its alluring social life and amusements.  At this point, development 
in Beach Haven was concentrated within twelve square blocks at the center of the island.106   
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As automobile ownership increased, a regional road network was established and 
subsequently improved upon to promote easy access to the shore.   Increased automobility spurred 
the construction of new tracts of cottages that pushed development up to the ocean and bay.  By 
1925, the borough had a year round population of 625 with an average of 4,000 visitors during the 
summer.  Responding to this increasing demand, a local construction industry developed with a 
small community of builders and suppliers producing many of the later Cape Cod and ranch 
houses. Yet as bungalows proliferated in Long Beach Island’s other communities during the 1930s, 
Beach Haven remained distinctly dominated by large, three-story houses.  Although the end of rail 
service in 1936 and the destruction of its boardwalk during the 1944 Great Atlantic Hurricane 
posed challenges to the borough, the community demonstrated its commitment to continued 
growth in 1948 by extending its water and sewer network to accommodate planned development 
even closer to the bay.  However, the Ash Wednesday Storm of 1962 brought devastation that 
“resulted in new local building codes and construction techniques that significantly changed the 
character of shore architecture beginning in the 1970s, with the living spaces of residences raised 
to the second floor on pilings.”107  Remarkably, the sturdy homes of Beach Haven’s golden age 
rode out the storm and the subsequent boom in construction to serve as examples of the early 
development of this Jersey shore community. 
When Superstorm Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, storm surge from the bay left 
the “Queen City” of Long Beach Island inundated in six feet of water.  Jeanette Lloyd, a member 
of the Beach Haven Historic Preservation Advisory Committee [HPAC], provided an account of 




the storm and the ongoing recovery process.  A total of 106 out of 384 houses in the historic district 
were flooded, but most of the damage was seen in bungalows with first floors only one to three 
steps above ground level.  The New Jersey HPO reached out to the HPAC shortly after the storm.  
According to Lloyd:  
The state said, ‘You can’t demolish.’  We said, ‘Come down here.’ So...about six 
of them came down here, and they spent the day with us.  We took them in about 
six houses. I said, ‘Do you see what’s happening? His foundation is not only gone, 
but the whole thing has been tweaked…You can’t save a shack bungalow.’  And 
so they said, ‘Jeanette do what you have to do’108  
 
Whereas the HPO was perceived as an uninvolved and uninformed outsider, HPAC 
members were aware of the challenges posed to owners of damaged historic properties and 
thus seemed more sympathetic to demolition.  Ultimately, the HPAC only permitted the 
demolition of six homes within the historic district.  However, this fierce autonomy 
dominated discussions of outside involvement in Sandy recovery: 
The federal government wouldn't budge, so most of us now don't have flood 
insurance. We dropped it because we saw what a disaster the federal government 
is, and it’s not all the federal government.  Christie was given a lot of money and 
he held it.  So all of the sudden we’re here, and people need the money.  And we 
are finding out that Keansburg or someplace up near Perth Amboy...he spent a lot 
of the money up there.109 
 
Even if some commissioners opted out of the National Flood Insurance Program, the HPAC was 
compelled to address FEMA’s placement of the entire historic district within an AE flood zone.  
Any new construction or substantial work done on existing properties would require a base flood 
                                               




elevation of eight feet, which was pushed up to nine feet after Governor Chris Christie’s statewide 
mandate for an additional foot of elevation above federal requirements. 
As requests for elevations came in, HPAC commissioners began by asking questions: 
“What are you putting the house on?  How are you raising it?”  Eventually they developed a highly 
contextual standard for what they felt maintained historic integrity within the district, 
recommending that the foundations of both elevated homes and new construction be covered in 
half-brick or lattice-work.  The historic idiosyncrasies of Beach Haven’s development pattern 
further complicated the process.  Lots only twenty-five feet wide, the result of large family 
properties being subdivided by later generations, housed small bungalows that were particularly 
devastated by the flooding.  The committee thus had to determine how rehabilitation and new 
construction could meet both historic district guidelines and elevation requirements within the 
spatial constraints of a small lot.  As Lloyd described the process, “we’re lucky because all of our 
blocks are eclectic, so if a new construction is going in or a new addition is coming in we can say, 
‘Well here are two or three different ideas that you can have.’ So we don’t have cookie cutter 
houses on any of our blocks.”  The HPAC also anticipated other threats posed by elevation 
requirements.  “If you've been down to Ocean City, you see how close the houses are.  They are 
all cookie-cutter, the same.  It’s a mess, and that’s what we didn't want to happen here.  But we 
knew if you're going to stop people from building a McMansion, and that is a two car garage 
underneath, then you better find yourself a damn alternative. Because a lot of these people around 
here are very wealthy.”110   




With parking at a premium in older, more densely developed communities along the shore, 
the promise of a garage could incentivize owners to demolish only slightly damaged properties 
and rebuild at new heights.  Therefore, after three meetings the HPAC was able to persuade the 
borough’s land use board to exclude detached garages from coverage restrictions.  This allowed 
owners to fit a small structure at the back of the typically larger lots of old houses.  As a concession 
to property owners that were undertaking the expense to elevate their bungalows, height 
restrictions in the historic district were also raised by three feet.  As Jeanette Lloyd saw it, 
“whenever you take away something, if you’re going to be really successful, you have to give it 
back.”111   
However, this close collaboration with stakeholders and sensitivity to community 
preferences grew out of a rather tense start when the HPAC was first formed in 2003.  Facing 
allegations that the historic district was simply another set of regulations, from the start the HPAC 
actively strived towards a consistent application of design standards to demonstrate to residents 
the value of living in a neighborhood where things don’t change as rapidly as the rest of the Jersey 
Shore.  This attitude shaped the ways in which the committee interacted with homeowners 
following Hurricane Sandy.   Jeanette Lloyd explained how the HPAC held 98 technical review 
meetings after the storm: 
We don’t want you spending any money on an architect or a lawyer or a builder or 
anything. If you selected your builder, then come to us.  There’s only three of us, 
so it’s a meeting without a quorum. We meet with you, and it’s usually here 
downstairs [the Beach Haven Public Library].  We will tell you, “You are going 
down the wrong path.” We suggest to you what path to go down...“And I think 
giving that technical review committee has really helped us because by the time 




they come with these projects to the regular publicly scheduled meeting, they're on 
target.  We’ve gone through the things that are allowed and are not allowed, and 
that is what the community really likes.112 
 
Given its comparatively large budget and strong working relationships with other borough 
departments, the committee now appears ready to devote the extra funding and time to ensuring a 
satisfactory outcome for a large redevelopment project located in the heart of the historic district.   
Ocean City Historic Preservation Commission 
Ocean City, a dry town with a crowded boardwalk and two amusement piers, brands itself 
as “America’s Greatest Family Resort.”  While this city’s origins as a religious retreat remain 
widely acknowledged by its 11,701 year-round residents, the physical reminders of this past appear 
swallowed up by the proliferative development of duplex vacation housing in recent years.   
The Ocean City Residential Historic District, encompassing roughly seventeen square 
blocks just north of downtown, stands as a bulwark against constant development pressure in the 
city.  This collection of 157 buildings is significant “as the well-preserved initial settlement of 
Ocean City, New Jersey, founded as one of several religious resorts along the New Jersey coast in 
the late 19th century.”  




However, for the first two centuries of European settlement in New Jersey, Peck’s Beach, 
the future site of Ocean City, remained largely unchanged from its description in 1633 as “a slight 
sand beach full of low sand hills.”113  Ocean City was originally conceived as a religious resort 
along the lines of Ocean Grove, yet unlike the rural cottage mode of its older northern neighbor, 
the city’s architecture strongly reflected the contemporary styles popular throughout New Jersey. 
Although a house had been built at the corner of 7th Street & Asbury Avenue by the 1850s, true 
settlement of the community commenced in earnest in 1879.  The Ocean City Association, the 
religious camp meeting group backing the community, platted, cleared, and graded a four block 
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long area stretching from the bay to the ocean, so that within a year, thirty-five dwellings, ten 
private stables, two public bath houses, and a hotel had been built.114   
The focal point of this settlement, however, was the large wood frame Ocean City 
Tabernacle, which catered to the spiritual needs of the city’s population: a mix between the original 
Methodist settlers, Philadelphia residents, and mainland locals.  Like the rest of the barrier islands 
in Cape May County, Ocean City remained inaccessible and grew slowly until the introduction of 
modern utilities induced a “concentrated development that was almost urban in character.”  With 
the completion of a road to the mainland, numerous hotels were erected to accommodate summer 
vacationers.   
Despite this rapid growth in its early history, Ocean City maintained a reputation as a clean 
and wholesome resort into the early twentieth century.  The 1920s brought increased population 
and land speculation, as well as charges against the Mayor for harboring gambling and liquor 
interests in town.  However, the greatest changes to the social and physical character of Ocean 
City have occurred after the 1960s, as laws restricting activity on Sundays were loosened and high 
property values drove redevelopment.  Still, the historic district survives as a well-preserved turn 
of the century residential neighborhood.  While nearby shore communities, like Sea Isle City, 
developed within the same period, Ocean City is the only one with its original core settlement 
intact, largely unaltered save for the proliferation of synthetic siding on houses.   
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 Alterations to properties in the district are subject to review by the Ocean City Historic 
Preservation Commission [HPC].  This nine member commission is charged with “identifying, 
recording and maintaining a system to survey and inventory all building sites, places, landmarks 
and structures of historical or architectural significance, based on the ‘Secretary of the Interior's 
Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation,’ and aiding the public in 
understanding their worth, methods of preservation, techniques of gathering documentation and 
related matters.”115  Formed in 1980s with the goal of establishing a large historic district at the 
heart of the island community, in 1993 the HPC was finally granted jurisdiction over an area 
roughly 15% of that which it originally proposed.  Even this scaled down version of the district 
has faced strong opposition from the community, with a city council subcommittee exploring the 
option of shrinking the district in 2014.116   
South of the eye of hurricane, Ocean City was at the fringe of the area affected by Sandy 
in 2012. While large portions of the city were subjected to flooding, the original settlement around 
the tabernacle was built on some of the highest ground on the island, meaning that the historic 
district was largely spared from severe damage.  Additionally, to avoid mosquitos many homes in 
the historic district were originally constructed without accommodation on the ground floors.  It 
was only with the demand for additional accommodations that these “basements” were infilled 
with living units. The grade-level apartments thus sustained a majority of the flood damage in the 
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district that occurred during Sandy, while the main living areas of these houses often sat 
comfortably at around sixteen feet above base flood levels.  
Eight members of the Historic Preservation Commission provided their perspective on the 
implications of Hurricane Sandy for Ocean City.  There was a general disdain directed at the 
response of outside government agencies.  When asked about what the state could have done better, 
one commissioner asserted, “A lot of us looked to the state: ‘What do we do?’ They never got back 
to us...The state did nothing.  There’s nothing to do differently.”117  Regarding the New Jersey 
Historic Preservation Office, one of the commissioners explained that 
When the state came down, we were concerned about houses being raised and 
others not. They basically said...what they are trying to do is make the streetscape 
stay essentially the same. They didn't really explain how they would accomplish 
that.  So logically it makes sense.  Every house needs to be consistently raised above 
flood levels...It never happened because you would have to get everyone to buy 
into it, so don’t think that any solid framework came out of it.  I think they just 
came up with ways to fund people to fix their problem.  There is no way to make a 
historic district comply with flood requirements without changing character.118 
For those in Ocean City, elevation to avoid rising flood insurance rates proved to be the primary 
issue raised by Hurricane Sandy.  In May of 2013, Ocean City Council enacted an ordinance that 
allowed property owners to elevate their properties, as long as they did not enlarge the building 
footprint, without submitting an application to the Zoning Board of Adjustment. With parking at 
a premium on the densely built island, this change in zoning encouraged homeowners to raise their 
cottages and construct a garage at grade level.119  While elevations may occur as of right in the rest 
of the city, any alterations in the historic district are held to a higher standard of contextual 
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sensitivity.  The HPO went by the city’s floodplain ordinance, which required two feet of freeboard 
above FEMA’s new Base Flood Elevation.  Commissioners themselves had raised their homes in 
the district, but the elevation of a small bungalow at the corner of 6th Street and Central Avenue 
proved particularly controversial.  With a squat upper porch on the “first floor” raised above a live-
in basement by brick piers, the building was dramatically elevated, so that in the words of one 
commissioner, “it doesn’t look historic anymore.”120  
 
Although the HPC has the power to review all projects within the historic district, the city’s 
preservation ordinance included a provision that if a property owner could prove “financial 
liability,” the commission would have to grant permission to tear it down.121  While the HPC did 
not provide clear definition of what constituted a financial liability, the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation acknowledges that “many preservation ordinances provide for variances from the 
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strict application of its rules in cases of economic hardship.” The criteria used for determining 
economic hardship typically includes the property’s current rate of return, efforts to sell the 
property in its current condition, the economic feasibility of alternative uses for the property, and 
the property owner’s knowledge of the likelihood of designation at the time of purchase.122  In 
Ocean City, commissioners noted that the wood frame, turn of the century houses that proliferated 
within the district were largely constructed by local builders without blueprints, which made them 
particularly difficult to elevate without compromising their structural integrity. Commissioners 
acknowledged that a lawyer could make a strong argument for demolition given the expense of 
elevating historic properties and the cost of insurance premiums for maintaining homes at grade 
level.  One commission shared, “that was my biggest fear after Sandy, but no one has come forward 
after that even thought it would be very easy to do.”123 Another added, “Who’s to say it won’t 
happen?  They’ve fixed their properties the best they can, but now that insurance rates are starting 
to rise…”124 
The infill apartments of historically elevated houses proved particularly problematic in the 
recovery period.  Rather than subject themselves heightened insurance rates for the habitable space 
at ground level, many homeowners chose not to repair their basements and thus abandon upwards 
of 3,000 square feet of floor area, denying themselves the potential of earning rental income on 
their properties.  Even if a building was properly elevated, members of the HPC cited the 
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inadequacy of flood insurance coverage, with one commissioner stating that his house, valued at 
$850,000, would only be insured at the program’s maximum limit of $250,000.125  While this may 
have been the case in this particular scenario, the commissioner did not acknowledge the 
availability of supplemental insurance through a private carrier. 
 Regardless of the emphasis on property elevation, the Historic Preservation Commission 
remained aware of the potential of alternative measures to protect historic properties.  In the 
commissioners’ experiences, floodgates on individual properties proved all but ineffective in low 
lying areas.  Shore municipalities’ reliance on individual owners to maintain and upgrade 
bulkheads on the bay meant that flooding would remain problematic as well.  As one commissioner 
opined, “I think that until the cities do something like a cohesive bulkhead system across the bay, 
there is nothing they are going to do to stop this flooding. It always comes in from the bay.  There 
was one breach during Sandy in the Gardens [a neighborhood at the northern end of the island]. 
They leave the bulkhead systems up to the individual homeowner to maintain or not, and that 
floods the entire island.”126  Another commissioner criticized the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency’s prohibition on the use of dredged sand for defensive beach dunes, stating that 
“it’s like they fight themselves in spite of themselves.”127   
Despite climate change’s promises of increasing superstorms and inundation by sea level 
rise, preservationists in Ocean City cited real estate development as the greatest threat to the 
survival of the historic district.   As one commissioner stated, “It’s purely economics.  That’s the 
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biggest threat.  As they run out of places to tear down, if a storm hits and a homeowner is faced 
with rebuilding or demolition, a developer comes in and they take the money. Those are year-
round people who can’t afford to buy another place. The year-round population is dropping. People 
buying second homes don’t want historic homes because they are too expensive to maintain.  
What’s driving it [demolition] is the need for inventory to build new stuff.”128  Hurricane Sandy 
and the threat of future flooding only serve to exacerbate the displacement. In a city where the land 
is more valuable than the house on it, “the older people’s homes got flooded, but they couldn't 
repair because it would cost too much.  It’s not cost effective. In a historic district it multiplies 
because you couldn't sell it [as is] or demolish it, so it’s an excuse to move out.”129  Another 
commissioner added, “I do think that the storm has played an important part.  People who have 
lived here awhile have seen the tides rise.  As it does, people are going to get tired.  That might be 
a reason to get rid of the historic district. We let her raise that house (at 600 Central Avenue) 
because we don’t have a right to keep it at a level where she continues to get flooded.”130  
Ultimately, even HPC members saw historic district regulation as adding to the hardships of 
owners of flood-prone properties.   
Conclusion 
 While New Jersey may benefit from a well-resourced and fairly robust preservation 
community, Superstorm Sandy’s landfall dramatically exposed the vulnerability of the state’s 
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coastal heritage.  The unprecedented destruction forced the state’s preservation agencies to work 
together, often in an ad hoc manner, to confront the threats posed to historic properties down at 
the Shore.  Cooperating with federal agencies like the NPS and FEMA, the HPO took on a 
leadership role as it coordinated resources to assess damage, respond to threats, and promote 
recovery.  With a more narrow scope, PNJ and the NJHT filled specific roles to convey information 
and resources to those on the ground.  Preservationists working in impacted communities, 
including preservation commissions, architects, and property owners, were the ones making the 
decisions that ultimately determined the fate of threatened resources. By providing a cohesive of 
narrative of the preservation community’s response to Superstorm Sandy, this thesis can synthesize 
the perspectives of different actors to determining the challenges and opportunities for heritage at 





Chapter 5: Key Challenges in Preparedness & Recovery 
Thus far, this thesis has knit together the varied testimonies of preservationists to create a 
compelling narrative of a community galvanized to protect its threatened heritage in the face of 
unprecedented challenges.  While this story deserves to be told in its own right, its true strength 
comes from its ability to convey the challenges and opportunities associated with responding to 
vulnerability in coastal communities.  From the experience of Superstorm Sandy, three key 
findings emerged regarding the weaknesses of historic preservation community’s response at the 
Jersey Shore.  These issues center on surveys and planning, flood insurance, and the interpretation 
of significance and appropriateness.  Acknowledging that the obstacles extend far beyond those 
identified below, this section attempts to examine the aforementioned challenges in greater detail.  
This enhanced understanding of the problems associated with the response to Superstorm Sandy 
will ultimately be used as a framework to analyze the feasibility of long-term hazard mitigation 
and climate change adaptation strategies. 
Surveys & Planning 
The typical New Jersey resident does not imagine the shore as a historic landscape.  Visitors 
look past the intact illustrations of nineteenth century urban form in Atlantic City and the 
remarkable collection of postwar “Doo Wop” motels in Wildwood, to the beaches, boardwalks, 
and barbecues that seem to define life “down the shore.” Besides the four Certified Local 
Governments, the state’s preservation agencies have largely regarded the shore in a manner similar 
to that of its residents.  As Dorothy Guzzo, the director of the New Jersey Historic Trust, saw it: 
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I think the Jersey Shore, because it’s a transient population and because people only 
go there for vacation and aren’t year-round residents, does not have a well-
developed network of preservation.  So there aren’t a lot of historic preservation 
commissions at the shore.  There hadn’t been a lot of survey work done at the shore, 
so that was a very weak part of the state.  When Sandy hit, preservation wasn’t there 
because the people in the local areas weren’t there...You do see spots like at Beach 
Haven, but that’s because the population is there and they were fully capitalizing 
on their historic resources for tourism purposes...If Sandy had come in at Cape May, 
I think we’d be having a different conversation right now...but it’s because of where 
it hit, in the central part of Jersey, that I think it’s very different.  There would have 
been more emphasis on “historic,” for one thing.  Cape May is a National Historic 
Landmark, so you probably would’ve had Washington, DC and all the National 
Parks Service people up in arms over this and maybe sending help right away...I 
know one of the biggest questions that was asked right after the storm was about 
Lucy [the Margate Elephant].  Everybody wanted to know about Lucy. Lucy didn’t 
move. Lucy wasn’t hurt at all, but it is kind of funny.  It’s what people know. Cape 
May would’ve been that icon...Preservation is a bit lower unless someone makes it 
their forefront.131 
 
Instead of nationally recognized Cape May, most of the communities that bore the brunt of 
Sandy’s impact were beyond what most preservationists regarded as historically significant, 
places like Skippers Cove and Cedar Bonnet.  These developments of mid-twentieth century tract 
housing were built for middle-class vacationers, giving every resident waterfront access along a 
series of manmade lagoons feeding into the Barnegat Bay.  The storm surge of Sandy flooded 
Barnegat Bay, wiping out these modest homes and displacing the middle-class community with 
the new construction that followed.  However, these arguably “vernacular” landscapes remained 
outside the scope of preservationists until they were threatened with extinction.132 
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The lack of funding for surveying certainly exacerbated these issues.  While a FEMA 
employee argued that survey work burdens already overstressed HPO staffs and diverts limited 
funds away from actually “protecting” heritage, historic resource surveys play a crucial role in 
the context of post-disaster recovery.  Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 
1966, which “requires Federal agencies to take into account the effects of their undertakings on 
historic properties,” is only triggered when it is determined that an agency’s actions will affect 
resources that are listed on the National Register of Historic Places or meet the criteria for the 
National Register.133  Surveys provide a way for preservationists to quickly assess the impacts of 
various projects carried out in the aftermath of a disaster. In the case of Hurricane Sandy, Section 
106 reviews were largely the result of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s response 
and recovery work   However, since the Shore occupied a peripheral place in the minds of 
preservationists, its heritage was less documented than other parts of the state.  Jennifer Wellock, 
a technical reviewer and historian with the National Parks Service, felt that: 
In many cases the survey was incredibly outdated. They had done a big push at the 
bicentennial and that was probably the last time they looked at shoreline resources 
unless there were economic issues. The data wasn’t able to be shared with our 
colleagues at emergency management because it wasn’t digital. That’s why [the 
HPO staff] had to go out in the car. They had to see the current condition because 
they didn’t have that on hand. That’s a time suck. If you have a programmatic 
agreement, it’s typically a three-day turn-around because there’s life safety issues. 
If you don’t have baseline data, you are at a disadvantage.134   
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While the “pink & green” survey that facilitated the Programmatic Agreement between the HPO 
and FEMA was innovative, there were many shortcomings that could have been avoided with a 
more formal survey of historic resources conducted before the storm.  A HPO employee involved 
in the survey admitted, “Well in some places we were being asked to look at places that were 
previously identified as eligible but had experienced a lot of damage.  Some of the FEMA 
employees wanted to push us towards, ‘Okay, now reevaluate: Is this still eligible?’ Sometimes in 
the morning, if you had some familiarity with why a property was significant, and the damage was 
obvious, there was some room for discussion.  But at four in the afternoon [when] you didn’t know 
why we said the property was eligible to begin with, and it was in a large district...” the assessment 
may have been less thorough.135  
Without a firm grasp of these coastal historic assets, it should come as no surprise that there 
were no comprehensive emergency preparation plans for historic preservation in place before 
Hurricane Sandy hit.  The diverse character of the federal, state, and local actors involved in 
preservation brought a distinct set of strengths, weaknesses, priorities, and strategies to the table.  
However, the cooperation between these parties developed in an ad hoc manner as each 
organization found their unique role.  FEMA’s most important contribution to preservation in New 
Jersey was the aforementioned historic resource survey of 93 square miles area affected by the 
storm.  Done primarily to streamline the Section 106 process, these surveys were fairly simple and 
were by no means comprehensive.  However as a FEMA surveyor noted, “Because there never 
had been a comprehensive survey, you needed to start with something not comprehensive.  If you 
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do it in an extremely detailed manner and you wait ten years to do something about it, then a lot 
of those details are gone…Would there have been one otherwise? No. Would it have been worth 
the money? No...It was good for the HPO because we gave them a survey for free.”136  While the 
HPO had neglected to update their surveys of the shore for decades, the “pink and green” provided 
a foundation upon which to inform future decision-making for coastal resources.   
Learning from the experience following Superstorm Sandy, the Historic Preservation 
Office proactively surveyed vulnerable coastal areas with little previous documentation.  
Cumberland County, a largely rural county along the often-forgotten shore of the Delaware Bay, 
was the focus of efforts that, according to Andrea Tingey, were “one hundred percent based on 
vulnerability, lack of knowledge, and the realization that had the storm taken a slightly different 
course we didn’t feel like we could have done pink and green because we didn’t feel like we knew 
well enough how to see that place.”  Tingey describes the development of the survey process in 
greater detail: 
Clearly, the shore was the most impacted, but there was a huge surge zone along 
the bay shore as well.  As paltry as our knowledge was about the Atlantic shoreline, 
our knowledge about the bayshore was much, much less. A couple of us had been 
down there, just out of curiosity, and saw enough to know that it’s a very vernacular 
landscape.  It’s difficult for us to make sense of what we’re seeing because it’s also 
a very retardataire landscape. So you look at something and you think ‘Oh, that’s 
first quarter of the 19th Century,” and it’s really like 1925.  The way that the disaster 
response came, all the attention was to the shore.  Cumberland County didn’t get 
any of the Housing and Urban Development money for the recovery because they 
had poverty, but they lacked sufficient concentrations of population and didn’t 
qualify in the way that the matrix was designed...So one of the things that we 
decided to do was take some of the mitigation money from the disaster recovery to 
go out and adapt the pink and green methodology to do field survey work. We took 
the surge zone in Cumberland County, buffered it…and created a study area that 
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was roughly the southern half of the county.  Then we decided to exclude certain 
areas of population, like Millville, Bridgeton, Greenwich, areas where there had 
been some previous survey work or areas that could really suck a whole survey 
effort in and of themselves.  Then we’ve been going out in a car, putting a GoPro 
on the driver’s side, with a driver, navigator, and two photographers. We tiled the 
whole survey area to create map pages and we loaded into the GIS everything that 
had been previously surveyed, everything that was on the Cumberland County, 
New Jersey, and National Registers, and everything on the online historical marker 
database.  Our GIS guru then went into the tax assessors’ data and pulled everything 
that had a construction date before 1970 and treated a layer of target properties.  
We’ve been grinding through, driving every single mile of public right of way, and 
evaluating targets and looking to see what targets didn’t pop up because of 
inaccuracies in the tax data.137  
 
By adopting a methodological and informed approach to surveying, HPO staff were able to address 
the shortcomings identified the HPO-FEMA assessment survey, such as the exclusion of 
vernacular landscapes and the effects of fatigue surveyors’ assessments, that could have been 
avoided with a more formal inventory of historic resources. 
A majority of the funding for post-Sandy preservation came from the $47.5 million 
appropriated from the Historic Preservation Fund by the federal Disaster Relief Appropriations 
Act of 2013.  This money was allocated to the National Park Service by way of the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, which then funneled around $40 million to four the most severely 
affected states.138  The NJ HPO received around $13 million of this money, using around 16% for 
its own purposes and distributing over $11 million directly to property owners through subgrants 
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while only using around 16% of the money for its own purposes.139  The Deputy State Historic 
Preservation Officer described the coordination that followed: 
There was some interaction. Preservation New Jersey was kind of at its nadir at the 
point, so they were not a player in that real sense. There were a couple of people, 
like Debbie Kelly, doing some stuff so that worked. The New Jersey Historic Trust 
has money, so they were doing their own thing. They really stepped up when it 
came time to give out grant money because they had the experience to do that. So 
that was perfect. They just slotted in with what they know how to do.  They did 
some other stuff too.  They did historic structure reports and updated guidance with 
some disaster-preparedness, sustainable stuff built in.140 
 
While the coordination might have seemed effective in retrospect, the initial process of identifying 
roles wasted crucial time.  As previously noted, the HPO’s recovery work did not begin until late 
November, almost a month since the storm made landfall and long after FEMA had been deployed 
in the field.  Additionally, a surveyor contracted by FEMA noted, “in spite of the fact that the New 
Jersey Historic Trust had a Sandy point person and was the only statewide that had interest in 
historic buildings (which FEMA is supposed to notify for Section 106), FEMA never notified the 
Historic Trust.  FEMA sometimes omitted contacting municipalities, but always neglected to 
contact the Trust.“141  Until they began implementing the HPO’s subgrant program, ineffective 
communication left the Trust’s financial resources and extra manpower sitting in its office in 
Trenton as surveyors were down at the shore. 
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 As heritage practitioners at the state level were grappling with damage from Cape May 
Point to Middletown, local preservationists, particularly those in communities with Certified Local 
Governments, served as the eyes and ears at ground zero.  Before they could send staff out 
 in the field, “the HPO solicited and collected anecdotal information about damage to historic 
properties owned by individuals, nonprofits, and local governments throughout the state through 
our website and other electronic media.”142  While surveyors were able to make general 
characterizations regarding a structure’s damage, local preservationists’ constant presence in the 
community and strong rapport with property owners produced a more thorough understanding of 
the challenges facing a historic site. Seeing houses still on their foundations with little visible 
damage, FEMA and state surveyors marked most homes in the borough of Beach Haven as “no 
damage.”  According to committee member Jeanette Lloyd, the borough’s Historic Preservation 
Advisory Committee called on the HPO to “come down here and tell us how we can save this 
thing. You tell me how to tell my people how to save this thing.”143  However, upon touring six 
houses, the HPO staff soon discovered more insidious “slow-burning damage” in the form of mold 
and interior water damage and approved the demolition of some structures.144   While this strategy 
worked in towns with proactive and vocal preservationists, like Beach Haven, it proved ineffective 
in places without a significant year-round population vested in retaining community character.  
Wellock, the NPS service technical reviewer, saw the exclusion of preservation from statewide 
disaster mitigation plans and municipal master plans as a national issue: 
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Planning isn’t very sexy these days.  It’s ignorance.  It’s not willful.  They don’t 
understand that if you’re not in the mitigation plans for your Office of Emergency 
Management, then you are not considered when the money comes in.  So you need 
to get in the plan for the next one.  We discovered this in Alabama when they had 
a tornado, and we said, “How about we do GIS for all the counties?  At FEMA’s 
mitigation office they said, ‘Well it’s not in the plan.  If you had identified this 
before the event…’ They go through the approved hazard mitigation plan and see 
what was listed as a priority project, they might be “sewers, floodwall, or upgrades 
to broadband.”  ‘Cultural resources’ is a boilerplate plan that links us with fish and 
biology: ‘Historic properties are in the area and this would be managed in the event 
of a disaster within the SHPO.’  It doesn’t articulate a real desire to keep them, so 
when the money comes in, that’s where it goes. Nobody is going to care.145   
 
This is a double-sided issue, in which preservationists fail to adopt hazard mitigation into their 
master plans and communities exclude preservation from their hazard mitigation plans.  Wellock 
continues: 
The main thing is integrating preservation policy into these places.  HUD has the 
same kind of planning document that they go to after a disaster, of course, no one 
in the preservation community has tapped into that plan to say that historic 
resources are important…I looked up the City of Newport, Rhode Island.  We know 
there’s big money in preservation.  Everyone goes to visit the mansions.  Their city 
plan in 2008...talks about how preservation is part of the economy and gives a map 
of the districts. It doesn’t necessarily say that they want anything. It doesn’t suggest 
that giving up to date documentation would be good, it doesn’t say that they are on 
a shoreline and that potential inundation is an issue.  They updated that in 2014, so 
they are trying…The City of Annapolis is good.  The National Trust has put a lot 
of money into it. I think it’s important. It’s unfortunate that Annapolis’ is 
economically a little bit different than the rest of the country. The New Jersey Shore 
vs. Annapolis:   They might have more resources.146 
 
In fact, the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management’s [OEM] 2014 State Hazard Mitigation 
Plan addresses historic preservation once, simply stating that it “coordinates with state and federal 
                                               




programs affecting natural hazard mitigation including open space conservation, historic 
preservation, water resources management, dam safety and shore protection.”147  The 2013-2019 
New Jersey Comprehensive Statewide Historic Preservation plan proves no more helpful.  Under 
“Goal 1: Use historic preservation as a tool to strengthen and revitalize New Jersey’s state and 
local economies in a sustainable manner,” the plan simply lists the aim to “assist individuals and 
organizations in disaster preparedness including the effects of sea level rise.148”  Without any 
clearly articulated strategy for promoting resilience or responding to disasters, it is unsurprising 
that preservationists’ responses were largely reactive. 
  Of the 47 New Jersey municipalities that border the Atlantic Ocean, only 22 (47%) had 
their master plans easily accessible online.  Of these 22, 15 (68%) mentioned historic preservation 
in some form as a goal within their plan.  However, none of them addressed historic resources in 
the context of recovery, adaptation, or resilience.  Even towns that included a historic preservation 
component in their master plan, like Brick Township, Cape May, Ocean City, and Point Pleasant 
Beach, failed to address heritage within their separate Floodplain Management Plans. This is as 
much the fault of unconcerned preservationists as it is seemingly apathetic planners.  In the “Log 
of Stakeholder Interactions” appendix of Point Pleasant Beach’s 2015 Floodplain Management 
Plan, the borough’s Historic Preservation Commission was contacted with no response.149   
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The only instance where a planning document effectively linked a municipality’s historic 
resources with resiliency was the “Development of Climate Change Adaptation Elements for 
Municipal Land Use Plans” report produced for Ventnor City.  The report maps out historic 
resources identified by the HPO and overlays them with both the potential storm surge for a 
Category 1 Hurricane and projections for sea level rise.  Referencing the work done in Annapolis, 
Maryland, the report suggests that “One way the City can collect data on historic properties and 
their vulnerability to climate change impacts is to create a Historic Preservation Plan taking sea 
level rise projections and storm surge inundation into account. The plan should list the 
characteristics of each building, and then address architectural and structural measures to make 
them more resilient to climate change.”150  
Additionally, New Jersey’s Department of Community Affairs sponsored a Post Sandy 
Planning Assistance Grant Program “to support long range planning for community redevelopment 
in the municipalities and counties sustaining damage from Superstorm Sandy.”151  Of the 7 
municipalities on the coast with published Strategic Recovery Planning Reports, 5 mentioned 
historic preservation.  However, most of the documents only paid lip service to a community’s 
heritage.   For instance both Berkeley Township, a large rural township with only a thin strip of 
coast on the Barnegat Peninsula, and Point Pleasant Beach, a densely developed borough with 
amusement attractions and a boardwalk, used identical wording for their goal to: “Encourage the 
                                               
150  Stacy A. Krause. Development of Climate Change Adaptation Elements for Municipal Land Use Plans: 
Building Resiliency in Ventnor City, New Jersey. Report. New Brunswick: Rutgers, the State University of New 
Jersey, 2015.  




retention of established residential neighborhoods and the rehabilitation of the county’s older 
housing stock [and] facilitate participation in home rehabilitation and historical preservation grant 
programs, where applicable.152 Home rehabilitation may help to improve the structural integrity of 
existing housing stock. This, in turn, provides extra security and protection during extreme weather 
events, such as hurricanes and storms.”153   
At the county level, only Atlantic and Monmouth Counties include preservation goals 
within their Natural Hazard Mitigation Plans.154 They both list all of the historic and cultural 
resources identified on the State and National Registers of Historic Places, with the 
acknowledgment that “inclusion in this data set does not preclude the existence of other historic 
properties or sites not within this category or as yet unidentified.”155  However, as noted previously, 
these listings were produced by surveys that were outdated and limited in scope.  Monmouth 
County’s plan, produced in 2009, takes this inventory a step further by illustrating the exposure of 
historic resources to the hazards of flooding, wave action, storm surge, coastal erosion, dam failure, 
landslide, and wildlife, using GIS data provided by the HPO.  Although the plan fails to take this 
information a step further by prioritizing resources and outlining mitigation strategies, it 
nonetheless provides a succinct depiction of which hazards threatened which resources in the 
county. While the inclusion of historic preservation within a local government’s strategic plan 
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indicates an awareness of the importance of heritage, these token statements and generalities prove 
ineffective when resources truly come under threat. 
Inserting heritage into broader discussions of community planning and disaster recovery 
requires active voices that assert the importance of preservation.  Once again, the Beach Haven 
Historic Preservation Advisory Committee [HPAC] serves as an excellent example.  Seeing the 
construction of pumping and drainage infrastructure as important to the long-term health of the 
borough’s historic district, Jeanette Lloyd explained, “we know that if we wanted this change we 
had to be part of the master plan system.  Our master plan is your road map for your town or city, 
and it has to be done every ten years. It’s mandated by law.  So we made sure that two of us were 
on the master plan committee, and part of the master plan committee is infrastructure.”156   
The steps taken by individual actors are encouraging signs.  However, the processes of 
identifying vulnerable historic resources and solidifying preservation’s role in strategic planning 
requires large shifts in policy and thinking on the part of both preservationists and the community 
at large.  This corresponds to the assertions of Appler & Rumbach’s “Building Community 
Resilience Through Historic Preservation.”  Examining the relationship between historic 
preservation and disaster planning, Appler & Rumbauch attempt to answer the question:  
“To what degree do state historic preservation plans and state hazard mitigation plans reflect an 
effort to connect planning processes or goals?”  Seeing the role of historic resources in contributing 
to a community’s social stability and economic recovery following a disaster, the authors argue 
that the emerging discourse on resilience presents an opportunity to integrate preservation into 
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hazard mitigation.  While there are many instances of historic resources being effectively 
incorporated into disaster preparedness, there is no clear understanding regarding the degree to 
which practitioners in these two fields coordinate to set policy priorities.  According to their 
findings, 50% of all state historic preservation plans “make explicit mention of disaster or 
emergency planning,” but 60% of state hazard mitigation plans fail to “include a representative 
from historic preservation on the core planning team.”  According to their metrics, there is a weak 
connection between hazard mitigation and historic preservation in New Jersey’s state plans.157 
 
Flood Insurance 
 Despite the destructive storm surge of Hurricane Sandy and the increasing likelihood of 
long-term inundation by rising seas, heritage practitioners along the Jersey Shore remain 
preoccupied with the threats posed by changes to the National Flood Insurance Program [NFIP] 
and its treatment of historic resources.  As noted previously, the NFIP originally provided 
subsidized insurance rates for structures built before Flood Insurance Rate Maps [FIRMs] were 
issued for that particular locale.  So long as there was no substantial damage or alteration (totaling 
more than 50% of the building’s market value), these pre-FIRM buildings were grandfathered into 
the program.  Structures listed on an inventory of historic places, or deemed eligible for listing, 
are further protected through a provision that allows municipalities to either “exempt historic 
structures from the substantial improvement and substantial damage requirements of the NFIP” or 
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“place conditions to make the building more flood resistant and minimize flood damages, but such 
conditions should not affect the historic character and design of the building.”158   
Exemption from substantial improvement requirements operates with the assumption that 
owners of historic properties, wishing to avoid the higher insurance rates that come with a loss of 
historic status, will be encouraged to maintain historic integrity when altering their building.  
However, this strategy of providing relief for historic properties in flood zones neglects the fact 
that these buildings are still vulnerable to the very dangers that the NFIP was designed to mitigate 
against. In line with its three accepted strategies for flood hazard mitigation (elevation, relocation, 
or demolition), NFIP policy treats flood-proofing historic properties as an all-or-nothing scenario.  
A building can either meet the requirements of the NFIP through elevation or retain its historic 
integrity.   
 These criticisms almost became irrelevant with the passage of the United States Congress’ 
passage of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.  After Hurricanes Katrina, 
Rita, Wilma, and Ike pummeled the southeast between 2005 and 2008, the NFIP incurred a debt 
of over $18 billion.  The particularly destructive nature of these storms was exacerbated by the 
fact that around 20% of all policyholders pay discounted insurances rates.  In an attempt address 
the unsustainability of the NFIP, the Biggert-Waters Act “required the NFIP to raise rates to reflect 
true flood risk, made the program more financially stable, and changed how Flood Insurance Rate 
Map updates impact policyholders.”  The law made “no special provisions or exceptions for 
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historic buildings. For rating purposes, historic buildings are to be treated the same as any other 
Pre-FIRM properties.” Pre-FIRM primary residences located in special flood hazard areas would 
see a 16-17% increase in their insurance premiums.  Non-primary residences, businesses, and 
severe repetitive loss properties (where claims payments exceed the fair market value), would see 
a rate increase of 25% a year until reaching full actuarial rates.  Biggert-Waters did not explicitly 
modify any of the provisions for historic structures in the NFIP, but the wording of the legislation 
did not grant FEMA any discretion in implementing the rate increases.  Therefore, “while historic 
structures can still be exempt for floodplain management purposes, under BW 12 there is no flood 
insurance exemption, and they will be rated accordingly.”  This created a paradoxical policy in 
which owners of historic properties were not required to elevate their homes while simultaneously 
being punished for not doing so. 
Hurricane Sandy hit within months of the passage of the Biggert-Waters Act.  New Jersey 
had $54.5 billion of NFIP coverage in force in 2012 and the proposed insurance rate increases had 
not taken effect yet.  The uncertainties surrounding the new flood insurance policies meant that 
recovery and reconstruction would be a long and complicated process for affected property 
owners.  It is therefore no surprise that Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey spearheaded the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 to “delay the implementation of certain 
provisions of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act.”159  The provisions of the bill 
included the repeal of certain rate increases, the restoration of grandfathered rates for primary 
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residences, and the mandate that premium estimates take into account “the flood mitigation 
activities that an owner or lessee has undertaken on a property, including differences in the risk 
involved due to land use measures, flood-proofing, flood forecasting, and similar measures.”  
However, second homes and businesses, even those that were exempt from elevation as historic 
structures, would still face the 25% increase in insurance rates.  Now $24 billion in debt, the NFIP 
comes up for reauthorization in 2017 and the provisions of the Flood Insurance Affordability Act 
will likely come under scrutiny. 
 However, the consideration of other flood mitigation measures, in addition to elevation, 
when determining insurance rates has the potential to promote the integrity of historic properties 
while reducing the burden placed on taxpayers by way of the National Flood Insurance Program.   
While NFIP’s accepted strategies of elevation, relocation, or demolition effectively ensure that a 
building is out of the reach of floodwaters and thus subject to reduced insurance premiums, there 
are many negatives associated with limiting itself to three strategies: 
● They are the most expensive. 
● Relocation is not always feasible. 
● Not all structures are worth the cost to move or elevation. 
● These strategies alter the historic appearance of buildings and neighborhoods. 
● Demographics change as elderly and low income housing is replaced by more 
expensive and compliant homes. 
● Historic communities are displaced.160 
 
The inflexibility of FEMA’s approach is partially to blame for the large number of 
grandfathered properties with subsidized rates.  Rather than providing thousands of pre-FIRM 
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properties with artificially low rates, FEMA could introduce a graduated assessment system that 
took into account certain floodproofing activities.  This would address the social consequences 
associated with the broad-brush increase in insurance rates and the accompanying mandate for 
costly elevations.  Homeowners would be able prioritize flood-proofing techniques based on 
individual circumstance. Historic properties in particular would benefit from this more nuanced 
understanding of flood hazard mitigation.   
 Mary Delaney Krugman, a practicing preservation consultant, laid out the availability of 
various floodproofing options and providing guidance for determining their appropriateness when 
retrofitting historic buildings.  According to FEMA, floodproofing should only occur in the 
nonresidential portions of a building. The techniques used can be broken down into two broad 
categories: dry floodproofing with watertight barriers and wet floodproofing that uses flood-
resistant materials.  Dry floodproofing can be achieved with a range of systems that are deployed 
when the threat of flooding is imminent. While these barriers attempt to hold back the floodwaters, 
wet floodproofing “includes permanent or contingent measures applied to a structure or its contents 
that prevent or provide resistance to damage from flooding while allowing floodwaters to enter the 
structure or area.”161    Krugman asserts that this technique “is appropriate for older and historic 
buildings in “A” flood zones or low risk areas that should not be elevated because of potentially 
adverse effects to historic character, physical constraints, or a functional relationship to the water.  
Before selecting a treatment for their building, a property owner should ask two key questions: 
● “Would not elevating expose a historic building to a substantial risk of loss or 
damage that would affect its long- term preservation?” 





● “Would elevation adversely affect historic character?” 
 
Upon choosing the method of flood-proofing, the owner must identify the building’s historic 
significance and establish the character-defining features that must be retained in order to convey 
this significance.   
Krugman’s vacation home located just outside of the boundaries of Ocean City’s historic 
district, serves as an excellent case study for appropriately flood-proofing a historic home.  Built 
in 1885, the house is a surviving example of Ocean City’s origins as a religious camp meeting 
community.  With their origins in open-air revivals in the early nineteenth century, American camp 
meetings gradually evolved from communities of canvas tents to ornamented wooden cottages. 
Even as the houses grew in size, they continued to be built close to the ground, thus resembling 
tents.  One of the camp meeting cottage typology’s main character-defining features is its 
proximity to the landscape, which obviously came into direct conflict with elevation requirements 
for buildings in flood zones.  
In 2010, an elevated addition was added to the rear, but the building’s historic front was 
allowed to remain at grade thanks to the historic structure variance in Ocean City’s floodplain 
ordinance.  Therefore, the cottage was subjected to eighteen inches of floodwater when Hurricane 
Sandy struck, ruining the carpets and insulation installed by the previous owner.  The flooding was 
exacerbated by inappropriate construction methods employed over many years, the use of 
materials that promote mold, and highly absorbent fiberglass insulation.  The significant damage 
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prompted Krugman to utilize an array of wet flood-proofing measures that would promote the 
resiliency of the cottage without destroying its character-defining relationship to the landscape. 
First, the foundation was strengthened by tying in the original un-grouted concrete blocks 
to a concrete slab, adding stability to the historic foundation while allowing flood waters to flow 
through.  Krugman then flood-proofed the cottage’s walls, using only flood-resistant building 
materials, such as a concrete wallboard and a pressure treated wood sill, below the base flood 
elevation [BFE].  To facilitate drying after a flood and consequently prevent the spread of mold, 
venting slots were introduced into the baseboard and crown molding while latticework opened up 
the “understair” to promote air circulation.162  The electrical panel and connections to the floor 
heating system were relocated above the BFE.  In the historic section of the house, Ground Fault 
Interrupter receptacles were installed, which immediately shut down in the presence of water.  
Instead of carpeting, movable area rugs were laid out on a moisture resistant hardwood floor that 
could be easily cleaned after a flood.  Pulleys were installed to lift new lightweight furniture above 
water levels.  While the finished product resulted in the loss of some historic fabric during 
retrofitting and will require remediation and some repairs following the next flood, wet 
floodproofing was “less expensive than elevation; less destructive, wasteful, and disorienting than 
demolition; and helped preserve community identity.”163   
Despite the care and expense taken to minimize damages in future storms, the reformed 
NFIP would charge the same flood insurance premiums as they would for an unaltered structure 





sitting at grade-level and exposed to all the risks of flooding.  According to Krugman, this is 
because the NFIP will charge rates that reflect the “actual risk” of flooding, rather than the “actual 
risk” of loss.164  While elevation, relocation, and demolition will forever remain the only ways to 
positively prevent damage in a floodplain, there are many alternative forms of mitigation that 
prevent loss (and the associated insurance claims) without compromising a building’s historic 
integrity.   
Interpreting Significance & Appropriateness 
Changes to flood insurance policy requires massive shifts in the ideologies of private and 
public sector players.  Preservationists have a role in advocating for policy changes that better meet 
the goals of preservation, but they can make a bigger impact in the short-term by better articulating 
design standards that meet the NFIP’s elevation requirements while also maintaining historic 
integrity.  In fact, the cycle of destructive storms and the adaptation that follows is woven into the 
history of the shore.   In 1962, a particularly powerful nor’easter, known as the Ash Wednesday 
Storm, changed the landscape of the Jersey Shore forever.  On Long Beach Island, twenty-five 
foot waves washed over the island, leaving it completely underwater for several days, carving three 
new channels between the ocean and Barnegat Bay and damaging or destroying over 80% of its 
structures.    Ultimately, 21,533 structures in New Jersey experienced significant flooding.  The 
widespread destruction catalyzed a series of proactive measures at the local, state, and federal 
level, including “the engineering of shore protection structures, beach replenishment projects, dune 




construction, improved siting and building codes, and the establishment of sound floodplain 
management through the National Flood Insurance Program [which] all contributed to reducing 
the vulnerability of New Jersey’s coastal communities.”165  For the first time, elevation 
requirements were introduced in localities along the shore, ensuring that some rebuilt towns would 
bear little resemblance to their pre-1962 character.   
Unsurprisingly, the Ash Wednesday Storm of 1962 served as a rupture point in the history 
of the shore that is reflected in the interpretation of historic resources.  For example, the National 
Register of Historic Places nomination for the Beach Haven Historic District concludes that “As 
the result of a fierce nor’easter in 1962, over 270 houses were destroyed island wide.  In Beach 
Haven, most beachside cottages were destroyed. These cottages were not rebuilt but were replaced 
by concrete block motels. The storm’s devastation resulted in new local building codes and 
construction techniques that significantly changed the character of shore architecture beginning in 
the 1970s, with the living spaces of residences raised to the second floor on pilings.”166   
Rarely interpreted, however, is the storm’s catalyzing effect on the preservation movement 
in Cape May, now a National Historic Landmark District.  “Before the storm, Cape May had 
survived half of the 20th century through “benign neglect” with little new development but with 
loyal summer residents who returned year after year, many to the cottages built by their ancestors. 
By the early 1960s, a once fashionable Cape May was not only dated and old-fashioned but 
severely damaged by the storm.  This destruction forced residents to consider state and federal 
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funding in the reconstruction of their town.  The budding preservation community was able to 
successfully advocate for the use of federal money in restoration projects, and increased 
recognition of the importance of these resource is reflected in the city’s 1963 master plan which 
“mandated a complete assessment of the town’s historic resources.”167  A more in-depth 
interpretation of the history of storms in shaping the built form of the Jersey Shore, both through 
destruction and preservation, would allow heritage practitioners to define the integrity and 
significance of coastal historic resources in more flexible ways.  
 Recognizing adaptation as part of a structure’s historic significance may be easy.  
Determining how this significance can be appropriately reflected in the building’s character 
defining features proves more problematic.  It seems that almost every shore town with a historic 
preservation commission has a poster child for inappropriate elevation.  In Cape May, most of the 
applications that went through the city’s Historic Preservation Commission review process 
following Hurricane Sandy were requests to replace windows, siding, and roofs.  Last updated in 
March of 2013, the City of Cape May’s ordinance regarding Flood Damage Prevention includes 
the provision that “Variances may be issued for the repair or rehabilitation of historic structures 
upon a determination that the proposed repair or rehabilitation will not preclude the structure’s 
continued designation as a historic structure and the variance is the minimum necessary to preserve 
the historic character and design of the structure.”168  Despite this legal exemption for historic 
properties, the elevation of a single cottage at 329 Congress Street sparked a debate within the 
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HPC regarding the effect of elevation on historic integrity that set a precedent for future adaptation 
measures undertaken in the city.  The owners of the property told their story at an HPC meeting: 
We bought the cottage-style house at 329 Congress Street in 1992.  It was a needy 
two-story house set on one cedar block, very close to the front sidewalk.  We did 
external repairs on the house and incorporated an expensive flower garden on the 
Congress Street side and a privacy shrub on Claghorne Place.  We laughed every 
day in the spring and summer because as tourists walked by they would say: ‘This 
is the cutest house in Cape May.’  We were delighted when Steve Murray, the 
creator of the North Wildwood Light House Gardens, would make a point of 
stopping to see the garden...We were one of three cottages at the intersection of 
Congress and Claghorne.  We were told these cottages were Montgomery Ward 
properties.  They each sat low to the ground and each had gardens outside the front 
door.169   
 
Superstorm Sandy resulted in substantial damage (exceeding 50% of the building’s market value) 
to the house, requiring the property owners to bring the building into compliance with the flood-
damage-resistant provisions identified in the aforementioned city ordinance.  The property was 
raised from an existing first floor elevation of 6.26 feet to meet the required height of 12 feet, with 
a front porch and a new set of stairs added on.  The zoning board issued a variance for the property, 
reducing the minimum setback requirements needed to build the porch and thus allowing the 
owners to slightly move the building for aesthetic effect.  
Before elevation could occur, the work also needed to be approved the HPC.  At the January 
28, 2013 meeting, “Members discussed at length the misfortune of losing the English Cottage 
[architecture style], indicating that elevating the property and introducing other exterior changes 
will give the structure another look. Concerns of the streetscape being affected were discussed at 
length.”  Nevertheless, the conceptual approval of the project passed unanimously “with the 
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request that the house be set back on the property to reflect the streetscapes in the neighborhood, 
that the porch roof be lowered in its elevation and given treatment of either simulated flat metal, 
acromax, or cedar shakes in appropriate color to match the country look of the house, the lattice 
be done in a privacy lattice, the entrance to the rear area be done in lattice to lower the elevation 
bringing it back to the cottage look, and that the return peak centers over the front door be treated 
with cedar shake.”170   
Despite this careful consideration of the proposed alterations, in November of 2015 the 
owners of 329 Congress Street applied for the removal of their property from the historic district’s 
list of contributing properties because of the previous changes to the structure that were necessary 
to meet FEMA requirements.  At the November 23, 2013 meeting of the HPC, the applicants 
testified that: 
On October 20, 2012, Sandy hit and because we sustained damage we had to raise 
our house 12 feet.  Along with this was the requirement of moving the house back 
because of the sidewalk setbacks.  This caused the destruction of all the flower 
beds, bulbs, trees, bushes, and perennials.  Also, the three doors into the house 
needed stairs to allow entry.  We are now higher than sea level.  We no longer can 
hear the people enjoying the look of the house.  This is a house on stilts; the area 
under the house is four feet of dead space.  A fine house, but not a cozy cottage.  
The charm is gone. 
 
According to the meeting minutes, “the members debated the issue at length and were 
recommended that the application be tabled because a few members felt it retained its historic 
significance.”171   
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This stalemate caught the attention of a local newspaper, the Cape May Star and Wave, 
which referenced the statements of Commissioner Corbin Cogswell and Chairman Warren 
Coupland.  Cogswell asserted that “the HPC worked with the owner of the home to ensure the 
changes were keeping with the design of the house [and] the basic shape of the house remains 
despite the fact that it is now elevated.”  Even so, Coupland felt that “so many changes were made 
to 329 Congress St. that it would be hard to argue the home continued to be a contributing 
structure.”  Cogswell said the changes were dictated by floodplain changes and that the question 
of changing the home’s rating could recur all over Cape May.”  Homeowners throughout the city, 
allowed to “sensitively” elevate their properties under the HPC review, could then use the 
alterations to justify downgrading their properties to non-contributing status.  This reduced rating 
would arguably loosen the infamously strict standards upheld by the Cape May HPC for key 
properties in the historic district.172    
Before the building’s historic status came under official scrutiny, the elevation of 329 
Congress Street already had consequences for other properties in the district.  On August 23, 2013,  
a little over a month after the HPC gave final approval for the elevation of 329 Congress, the 
owners of a similar house next door at 325 Congress Street applied to elevate their house.  Similar 
to its northern neighbor, “the structure [was] a 1925 Sears House that must be raised to meet FEMA 
requirements. The house was built at ground level and incurred flooding...that collapsed a section 
of the main floor” The owners introduced plans that included “a 9 ft increase in height (total 13ft 
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above sea level to meet FEMA), with replacement of all windows, new windows on lower level 
(wood), new siding will match cedar shake (same for same) and introduction of a staircase to the 
archway that exists (side entrance), along with a lower level floor.”173   
Once again, “members were understanding of the applicant’s position but shared their 
concerns at length regarding the cottage style structure that will be altered because of the 
elevation,” but ultimately gave unanimous conceptual approval with the requirement that the 
elevation be reduced by one foot to match the height of 329 Congress Street.174  Of the three 
English Cottage style homes that stand at the corner of Congress Street and Claghorne Place, only 
one remains at its original height, negatively affecting the historic integrity of the streetscape.  
Cape May’s well-established preservation community, as well as the relatively low number of 
damaged properties in the historic district, fostered an intense discussion regarding the effect of 
elevation on the historic integrity of properties.  While the community seemed to accept the 
inevitably of raising properties as a response to FEMA’s requirements, preservationists failed to 
frame elevation as tool within the context of adapting to the long-term threats of climate change 
and sea level rise.  
The HPO identified elevation as a common, but problematic response for property owners 
all along the Jersey Shore.   In Ocean Beach, a uniform neighborhood of small one-story houses, 
seemingly random elevations, many of them much higher than what was required by the flood 
insurance maps, destroyed the character-defining consistency of the community. In fact, Sandy 
                                               




recovery and reconstruction served as a crash course in flood-proofing and substitute materials for 
HPO staff.   
These still-developing standards for appropriate adaptation were most notably put to the 
test during the regulatory review for the elevation of the Bay Head Yacht Club. Platt Byard Dovell 
White Architects were hired to elevate and restore the 1920s clubhouse that was constructed above 
the Barnegat Bay.  Hurricane Sandy struck in the middle of the project, forcing the architects to 
revise their approach and settle on a design that “honors the Colonial Revival idiom of the original 
architecture, restores the role of clubhouse in its historic context, and celebrates the relationship of 
building to water.”175  This entailed raising the building by over ten feet, constructing a new two-
story wing, and entirely restoring the historic facade, so that the building barely resembled its pre-
Sandy condition. Serving as the home of an exclusive organization with a long history in the 
community, the Bay Head Yacht Club’s historic and architectural significance made it a 
contributing property in the Bay Head Historic District.   
Despite the drastic alterations, the HPO determined the intervention produced no adverse 
effect.  According to staff, the elevation and expansion of the historic property were viewed with 
a focus of their impact to the historic district, namely how the yacht club’s size and location related 
to other properties, rather than how they affected the individual building.  In fact, the HPO saw the 
additional width on the structure as balance to the effects of the elevation.  As Andrea Tingey 
stated,  “If you didn’t know what it looked like before, it’s not jarring...I was not in disagreement 
                                               





with the office, but I was surprised by how positively we all viewed the project.”  Jonathan Kinney 
asserted that “we have to balance how much impact there is to the building” with the acceptance 
that alterations are necessary if owners plan on ”keeping the building there in that location and 
avoiding a future complete loss...We’re dealing with the threat of climate change, and it’s kind of 
a net benefit weighing.”176 
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  329 Congress Street: Before & After. 
Image Sources: City of Cape May Historic Preservation Commission 
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Evidently, guidelines for appropriate elevation would provide clarity for heritage 
practitioners dealing with flood-proofing issues for the first time. This is not to say that relevant 
materials are not already available for public use. The National Flood Insurance Program’s 
Floodplain Management Bulletin for Historic Structures provides accounts of good examples of 
elevation, flood-proofing, and relocation, but lacks any detailed guidelines for implementing these 
measures.  On the other hand, two publications produced in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
provide comprehensive yet highly contextual interpretations and recommendations for elevation.  
Establishing a continuity between the historic development of the city’s iconic building typologies 
and the reconstruction following Katrina, FEMA’s History of Building Elevation in New Orleans 
asserts “that the appearance of these houses and the methods of elevating them have changed, but 
the reasons that prompted their raising have remained the same.”  This history plots out the 
circumstances that spurred elevation, identifies historically prominent house moving firms, 
illustrates the raised house types of the New Orleans area, and defines building elevation designs 
and technologies, all while providing examples of buildings being appropriately restored and 
elevated after Hurricane Katrina.   
In Mississippi, the Mississippi Development Authority published its Elevation Design 
Guidelines for Historic Homes in the Mississippi Gulf Coast Region to “provide recommended 
elevation design guidance for the rehabilitation of historic buildings funded through MDA 
programs. The goal of this effort is to reduce risk from future flood events through elevation, and 
to preserve the physical integrity and character of historic buildings. Specifically, one of the most 
important outcomes of this effort is to limit the total height of elevation for historic buildings so 
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they maintain their historic character in relation to other historic buildings within each local 
historic district, thus protecting the architectural qualities of each historic district as a whole.”  The 
document uses historic precedent and local context to provide guidance on the site, architectural, 
and foundation designs of properties being elevated.  
These codified elevation histories and standards are entirely absent down at the Jersey 
Shore.  On the Hurricane Sandy Cultural Resources Recovery page of the New Jersey HPO 
website, the only information available on the elevation of historic properties is a link to the 
guidelines for the Mississippi Gulf Coast Region.  Even in Cape May, the Historic Preservation 
Commission’s eighty-one page Design Standards book, which addresses everything from Gothic 
Revival finials to the installation of dumpsters, only references flood-proofing once when 
discussing the historic use of berms to both give a house grandeur and protect it from flooding.   
While most preservationists agree that guidelines are needed, the party responsible for creating 
them remains up for debate.  Many feel that the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for the 
Treatment of Historic Properties make it difficult to balance mitigation goals with those of 
maintaining historic integrity.  With exemption from elevation requirements contingent on 
National Register-eligibility, which itself relies on the Secretary of the Interior’s standards, owners 
of historic properties who choose to elevate sensitively to reduce vulnerability run the risk of 
compromising the building’s historic integrity, which may ultimately require it to be elevated to 
the BFE for that flood zone.  Given the influence of these standards, the dream scenario, as seen 
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by Jennifer Stark of NJHT, “would be that the Park Service actually updates the standards. Right 
now it seems like the states are trying to tackle that individually.”177  
While they had developed an understanding of what constituted an appropriate elevation 
following the storm, in early 2016 the HPO still remained in the contract negotiation process 
regarding the development of clearly-articulated elevation design guidelines.  These would not be 
mandatory, but would nonetheless serve as a useful resource for owners of damaged historic homes 
that are required to elevate their property in the face of decreasing federal subsidies for flood 
insurance.  
Even with funding available, defining a uniform set of standards for elevation along the 
Jersey shore would be a difficult task. Mary Krugman and Michael Calafati, AIA (an architect 
practicing out of Cape May) identified twenty major architectural styles found at the shore, ranging 
from the “cottage vernacular” to mid-20th century modern.  Given this diversity, specific elevation 
standards catering to the unique needs and context of each community would be the most ideal 
scenario.  While the Beach Haven already produced a design guideline book similar to Cape 
May’s, its HPAC received funding from the HPO to update it with new standards for elevation.  
Preservationists in Beach Haven referenced features on historically elevated houses to guide future 
construction and alterations.  Each of the stairways of the “Seven Sisters,” a series of seven 
elevated houses built between 1926 and 1930, provided a set of templates for appropriate front 
steps in the historic district.  Also included were recommendations for elevating bungalows so that 
they retained the distinct front roofline with its gable and dormer while simultaneously allowing 
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additional height towards the rear.  However, the implementation of design standards at the local 
level is limited to the interest of active governments that demonstrate a commitment to 
preservation. 
 At the end of the day, however, Deputy SHPO Daniel Saunders argues that while FEMA 
and the HPO are positioned to provide funding and aid, it is the homeowner that is deciding how 
to treat their property.  Therefore “the planning really does make a difference. The idea that a 
community has, even if it’s not ‘planning’ but a shared vision for what they will do to make their 
community more resilient, is incredibly important. Because if you don’t have that you get 
hodgepodge.  Except for some districts where hodgepodge is their current character, that’s bad for 
them.”178  Even so, the HPO staff agreed that regulation did not necessarily mean preservation.   
According to them, locales with old money, like Bay Head, or towns that saw economic value in 
preserving and promoting their heritage, like Ocean Grove or the Wildwoods, were in fact often 
more preserved than communities with a Certified Local Government [CLG].  Jonathan Kinney, 
who leads the state’s CLG program, observed: 
I think we’ve seen, at least with the CLG communities, that there is that first step, 
which is knowing what you have. The commissions that are really successful take 
that to another level and are able to get the word out to the community about what 
they have and why it’s important.  [They show that the reason] why it’s important 
for the community as a whole, not just the six or seven people on this commission, 
to care about and try to preserve is because really everyone benefits. So there’s a 
constant outreach and education effort going on…Beach Haven, I think, does a very 
good job of that.  I don’t think Cape May has to do much of that because it’s so 
well known. It’s so clear that people are going to Cape May, staying in Cape May, 
and spending money in Cape May because of the town. Middletown, I really don’t 
know much about their efforts... It’s not what you would consider a shore 
community.  It’s more bay shore. They’ve got Sandy Hook right there, but that’s 
                                               
178 Daniel Saunders. 
145 
 
federal property...I think Ocean City is a fantastic example of a shore community 
where the district is under constant and very strong pressure from 
development…They’ve got a National Register district and a local district where 
the boundaries are slightly different...It’s a tiny district.  It’s certainly changed a lot 
over the years.  The commission is in a constant struggle to assert their presence, 
assert the importance of the district.  How many realtors are on the town council? 
At least two or three.  I mean that’s like the trenches of shore preservation right 
there, and you can see it.179   
 
Acknowledging the varying rates of success for certified local governments, Andrea Tingey 
asserted that “CLG status is not the answer to the problems.  In Beach Haven, it’s because they’re 
rock stars that they went after CLG and have been able to take advantage of the program to some 
extent.  It’s their intrinsic knowledge base, work ethic, and passion that has made them successful. 
And I think we’ve benefitted more from Beach Haven’s CLG status in some ways than they’ve 
benefitted from it.  I mean they’ve got some survey projects and some other planning tools, but 
they’d be rock stars without the program to be honest.”180 
Beyond the Key Challenges 
In the months following Hurricane Sandy, questions began to emerge regarding the 
efficacy of rebuilding on barrier islands threatened by rising sea levels and increasingly powerful 
storms.  However, in New Jersey, these questions were quickly silenced by the state’s “Stronger 
than the Storm” marketing campaign that demonstrated an institutional commitment to “Restore 
the Shore.”  An article in Grist, an online environmental magazine, highlights the New Jersey 
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Department of Environmental Protection [DEP] and its failure to even mention climate change or 
sea level rise in its 2013 “Rebuilding After Sandy” fact sheet: 
Of course, it can convey the main information without addressing climate change. 
And Sandy, like any other storm, cannot be blamed specifically on climate change. 
But placing rebuilding in the context of climate change — and its promise of higher 
sea levels and stronger, more frequent storms — would be helpful. For example, in 
answering the question “What’s the benefit of elevating now if I’m not required 
to?” the agency writes, “In addition to ensuring that your structure and all of its 
contents are better protected, many property owners will find that they will recoup 
the cost of elevating through lower insurance premiums over a matter of years.” 
Another reason to elevate your beachfront home is that in the years ahead, the polar 
ice caps will melt, the seas will rise, and your house will be underwater.181 
 
Likely because of its location within the DEP, the state HPO has neglected to prioritize climate 
change in its hazard mitigation plans.  Nevertheless, Deputy State Historic Preservation Officer 
Dan Saunders gave the ominous forecast that: “The whole state is in denial.  I mean with the 
barrier islands we’re all just going, ‘Sure if you have the money and you can afford the insurance, 
go ahead and rebuild. Build higher.’ But we all know the barrier island is going to go west.”  As 
he puts it, 
It’s also a question of ‘How fast is change going to come?’ It’s a huge question. If 
the sea level is going to rise six inches in the next thirty years, the homeowner is 
like, ‘okay.’ But if it’s six feet, it’s a whole different world. That’s this huge 
unknown. If you’re more [of a] ‘free market lets things decide’ [person], you step 
back and say ‘We’re not going to do anything.” But if you’re very proactive, [you 
think] government should be involved and plan and change...The wild end of that 
would be: ‘We’re going to move the houses on the barrier island west.  Because if 
you look at Holgate, the barrier island where man hasn’t been holding it in place, 
it’s moving west.  That’s where it’s going to go.’  And obviously you have huge 
amounts of property value.  Any piece of infrastructure has big momentum, and the 
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shore is a big piece of infrastructure. It’s very hard to move that. That’s why the 
planning at the local and state level doesn’t seem to be going anywhere.182 
 
Dorothy Guzzo, Executive Director of the New Jersey Historic Trust had a similarly bleak outlook 
on the long-term challenges posed by sea level rise: 
Somebody told me that it’s after your third storm that the conversation starts to 
happen.  Because I saw that conversation nowhere.  I saw some people writing 
things in blogs, questioning ‘What is the right thing to do here? We have the 
opportunity to re-plan for the future.’ The emphasis was on rebuilding.  
Everything’s supposed to be rebuilt. I don’t even think that conversation is 
happening that much.  If it is, it’s in small corners, not necessarily by decision 
makers and policymakers.  Somebody told me you had to wait until the third 
devastation. I don’t know if that’s true, but that’s what I was told. Isn’t that a scary 
thought: that you have to have another two storms like this for people to sit down 
saying, ‘What’s the right thing to do?’183 
 
According to staff at the HPO, historic preservation commissions in communities that dodged a 
bullet during Sandy seemed particularly unfazed by sea level rise and the increasing likelihood of 
storms in the future.184 
Commissioners in Ocean City recognized that the impact of Hurricane Sandy had largely 
fallen from the popular consciousness of Ocean City residents. However, a week before the 
interview with the HPC, a nor’easter flooded portions of Cape May County at levels that rivalled 
those of Sandy.  One commissioner noted that, “the storm is going to start to bring some of this to 
the forefront again. The storm last week was severe enough to get people to start to think about it 
again. I think Sandy was starting to fade. It did not make it into the district, but if that second tide 
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had been a foot higher then we’d be in a completely different situation right now.  It would've been 
Sandy all over again.”185 Unfortunately, the minutes for the two subsequent HPC meetings make 
no mention of the recent storm.  
Even if the community were galvanized by the most recent storm, one commissioner 
ominously concluded that, “We were at the bottom fringe of Sandy impact. If you look at the 100 
to 500 year storm water mark, you're going to be going into Milmay (around 20 miles inland) 
before you won’t get your ankles wet. We've just been lucky that it hasn't happened.  There used 
to be a schooner on land in Cape May Court House. Those storms happen. When you take a virgin 
section of this island and dig a three foot hole, you are going to find three compressed black lines.  
That’s vegetation that was totally awash. It’s going to happen.  It’s just a matter of time.”186  Even 
in Beach Haven, which saw the full force of Sandy, sea level rise did not seem to threaten the 
stalwart preservation community six miles out to sea.  While Jeanette Lloyd acknowledged that 
their storms were worse, she asserted that: 
I’m a science teacher. I know for a fact that the whole universe is all cyclical. We 
live in a cyclical world. It’s all give and take.  If you study the science behind the 
Earth warming and the Earth cooling, you'll realize that the Earth is going through 
a transition now and getting warmer. What they don’t want to tell you is how much 
ice and snow is now building in Antarctica.  They don’t want to tell you the ozone 
layer above the Arctic is closed up, It’s no longer there.  Now, what we do have is 
our glacial melting. Yes, it is definitely, but I think El Niño has more effect on 
weather system at the present time than global warming does.187 
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While this perspective is not unique to those living in coastal communities, it certainly proves 
more problematic in this setting, especially when decision-makers fail to prepare for the potential 
threat of climate change.  In fact, the values ascribed to historic preservation in Beach Haven 
remained largely disjoined from the larger discourse surrounding sustainability.  For instance, 
when a federal grant application posed the question: “Are you a sustainable energy community? “ 
Lloyd remarked that, “well this has nothing to do with historic preservation.”   
Rather than recognizing the dense, walkable character of the community, or the energy 
savings associated with reusing existing buildings, the HPAC saw preservation and sustainability 
as unconnected goals.  This perspective framed preservationists’ understanding of how promoting 
resilience and protecting heritage interacted.  According to Lloyd, the stance of the HPAC was 
that “it’s not going to affect us that much, but it is going to affect us.  I think that the lower houses, 
the bungalows that were severely damaged, we’ve taken care of by raising them.”188   Essentially, 
so long as threatened houses were elevated, the permanent inundation of half of the town was not 
a primary concern of preservationists. Although Beach Haven has been characterized as one of the 
most responsive and proactive certified local governments following Hurricane Sandy, 
preservationists here neglected to solidify a role for heritage in the community’s long-term 
resilience in the face of climate change. 
 A paradox emerges in which preservation professionals at the state and local level 
acknowledge the inevitability of future inundation but fail to incorporate these threats into policy 
decisions.  Deborah Kelly, with Preservation New Jersey, identified it as a statewide “political 




issue.  It shouldn’t really be.  It was a political issue saying, ‘Everything is fine, the shore is open 
again, without really addressing some of the long-term and short-term problems.’  There are a lot 
of people still out of their houses, but the long-term problems with future flooding and trying to 
plan to protect some of the communities...are happening in a spotty way too.”  However, Kelly 
and other preservationists in the state saw the proactive work of the National Parks Service as 
having the potential to shift policy discourse in the right direction: 
I think that they are starting to look at these as major problems over the country.  
The entire east coast, and a lot of the southeast, have historic resources that are 
threatened by climate change.  However they’re going to look at it, or what side 
they’re going to come out on as far as triage, I don’t know. At least they’re having 
discussions about it. Sometimes the top defines the issue. It might not be in the 
same format that makes it way down to the townships, but when they identify 
priority issues I think that then all of a sudden it gets more attention and more 
resources and it helps everybody focus on those issues.189 
 
In fact, the National Parks Service [NPS] was carrying out these conversations right on the Jersey 
Shore, at the Sandy Hook Unit of its Gateway National Recreation Area.   “At the Park Service 
level, they have a different problem. It’s not ‘Do we put money into stuff?  Do we change things?’  
It’s ‘How do we make decisions about our fundamental obligation, which is to preserve for future 
generations?’ And they’ve started to come up with a process for how they decide.”190  
Ever since Superstorm Sandy, the conversations surrounding preservation at the Jersey 
Shore have primarily focused on resource surveys, flood insurance, and appropriate elevations.  
However, Sandy’s floodwaters unearthed a vulnerability to climate change that requires 
interventions on a scale beyond the scope of the solutions provided above.  On the surface, the 
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challenges of sea level rise and more severe storms appear to be outside the purview of the 
preservation.  Others see responding to climate change as a task that is beyond the capacities of 
preservation agencies.  Even if preservationists choose to leave resilience out of their vocabulary. 
Sandy demonstrated that floodwaters and storm surges do not respect the boundaries of historic 
districts.  As the threats become imminent, preservationists will be eventually be forced to take 
action regarding the treatment of the resources that they have been entrusted to steward.  If 
heritage practitioners neglect to insert themselves into larger discussions of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation now, historic properties will not be prioritized when the difficult 
choices need to be made.  Assuming that heritage has the ability to positively contribute to the 
social and cultural recovery, communities will be less resilient if preservation is excluded from 





Chapter 6: Opportunities for Change 
Although the scenario described above is not unique to the Jersey Shore, the historic, 
ecological, demographic, political, and economic factors that contributed to the region’s 
vulnerability require highly contextual responses to achieve resilient and inclusive outcomes. 
Acknowledging the strengths and challenges associated with this particular case, the following 
chapter seeks to make specific recommendations that capitalize on identified opportunities for 
change.  Previous work has provided valuable guidelines, recommendations, processes for 
decision-making and policy development in the context of climate change.  Therefore, a pre-
existing framework will be applied better understand the feasibility of implementing various 
strategies in the particular context of the shore.   
In April of 2014, the National Parks Service held its Preserving Coastal Heritage planning 
session at Federal Hall in Lower Manhattan.  Participants, drawn from fields including historic 
preservation, planning, and cultural resource management, used case studies to develop a decision-
making framework that would ultimately inform the Cultural Resources Climate Change Response 
Strategy currently being developed by the NPS.  At the conference, the Chief of Technical 
Preservation Services at the NPS presented a conceptual diagram illustrating the factors that shape 
the decisions made regarding the treatment of historic sites threatened by climate change.  Before 
identifying an adaptation action, practitioners should: consider the historic significance, 
programmatic function, and importance of the resource; identify the different approaches to 
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climate change adaptation, along with their cost and feasibility; and weigh the impacts climate 
change against the effects of an action on a resource.  Participants in the discussion identified five 
additional criteria that they felt should influence the decision-making process for treating 
vulnerable historic resources: 
● Value of resources to public/community 
● Public input throughout the process 
● Focus on public awareness regarding climate change 
● Potential for outside partners or funding 
● Timeframe/urgency of threats. 
 
However, these decisions needed to be made as part of a larger planning process, which was also 




Following the NPS’ six step process, heritage practitioners are first called to inventory 
resources and compile baseline data.  After taking stock of existing historic properties, the next 
step calls for conducting a vulnerability assessment and establishing a time horizon.  
Understanding a resource’s susceptibility to hazards allows the preservationist to formulate and 
evaluate alternative treatments for the resource.  Taking this a step further, the practitioner can 
then compare alternatives and weigh their effects on cultural resources.  Once an appropriate 
course of action is selected, the implementation step can finally begin.  However, the process is 
The Criteria/Factors in Decision-Making identified by the National Park Service. 
Image Sources: National Park Service 
155 
 
not over, for preservationists must continue to monitor and reevaluate the effectiveness of the 
treatment, gathering information to inform future planning. 
 
 Although this planning process is widely applicable and can be used to arrive at a variety 
of decisions, the NPS Climate Change Adaptation Coordinator for Cultural Resources presented 
seven options relating specifically to historic resources in the context of climate change adaptation: 
Planning Process outline at the National Park Service’s Preserving Cultural Heritage conference. 
Image Sources: National Park Service 
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● Do Nothing 
● Offsite Action 
● Improve Resiliency 
● Relocate Or Allow Movement 
● Data Recovery, Then Let Go 
● Record, Then Let Go 
● Interpret The Change 
 
These options emerged out of the NPS’s plan for the treatment of their vulnerable resources, 
including structures located in Gateway National Recreation Area, located at the northern end of 
the Jersey Shore on Sandy Hook. 
 Sandy Hook, a unit of the NPS’s Gateway National Recreation Area includes both historic 
properties, like the Sandy Hook Lighthouse and the structures of Fort Hancock, and recreational 
resources.  “The batteries and homes of Fort Hancock exhibit the greatest vulnerability to sea level 
rise, due to their location on the coast.[but] Extreme weather events also threaten Fort Hancock’s 
Officer’s Row; some of these buildings are already deteriorating due to the harsh, humid coastal 
climate and the effects of past storms.”191  Tim Hudson, the National Park Service’s Hurricane 
Sandy Recovery Manager, described the process of assessing all of the buildings in Fort Hancock.  
Park Service staff identified each structure’s actual use before the storm, intended use after the 
storm, year of construction, known deferred maintenance, status in the General Management Plan 
(whether it was to be rehabilitated, stabilized, or left as a ruin), FEMA flood zone plus a buffer of 
five feet, Asset Priority Index score (indicating its importance to the park), and a determination of 
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what percentage of required maintenance the Park could afford to put into the building.  According 
to Hudson,  
The data was then analyzed to prioritize work.  All critical systems were to be above 
feet above the FEMA base flood elevations, while non-critical systems would be 
two feet above FEMA BFEs if possible.  We tried to concentrate on buildings with 
first floors at one foot above the BFE or higher.  Where we had that, we abandoned 
the basements, moved all boilers, and electrical panels out of the basement and 
found places with the least intrusion of historic fabric in the buildings (or on 
porches).  We took out all mold growing material, like carpets and gypsum board, 
and replaced it with tile or heavily painted wood on the floors and cement board on 
the walls.  We also made sure that we weren't trapping water in the building.  We 
had issues with Americans with Disabilities Act compliance on some outlets, so 
those that we couldn't move we put on separate breakers that would trip while the 
main panel would be okay.  Where were couldn't get to one foot above the base 
flood elevation and we had to keep the buildings, we made sure that the buildings 
would flow through whenever possible and used marine paint wherever possible.192   
 
Controlled by a single agency with the resources to conduct thorough assessments and 
develop comprehensive strategies, Sandy Hook represents an ideal scenario to carry out 
the adaptation planning processes outlined above.  While the model of Fort Hancock cannot 
be precisely replicated along the Jersey Shore, it nonetheless demonstrates that a 
practicable decision-making framework exists for the treatment of heritage in the face of 
climate. 
 Despite the work done on Sandy Hook, the experience of Superstorm Sandy demonstrates 
that New Jersey’s preservation agencies have arrived at different steps in the planning process.  
Depending on the circumstances surrounding a decision, heritage practitioners have differentially 
weighed the aforementioned criteria to select a treatment option.  Regarding climate change, 
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preservationists on the Jersey Shore have more often than not pursued the “Do Nothing” option.  
Evidently, there is insufficient discussion regarding the practical application of these 
recommendations to the specific context of New Jersey. The National Park Service’s framework 
will serve as a structure for this analysis, in which will take a generic process and examine it 
against the particular strengths and weaknesses associated with its application on the Jersey Shore. 
Inventory Resources 
Immediately following Superstorm Sandy, Stephanie Cherry-Farmer bemoaned the loss of 
“the myriad of resources that may meet the age, integrity, and significance thresholds for official 
designation as ‘historic,’ but have simply never been officially identified, surveyed, or 
recorded.”193   This lack of knowledge or awareness regarding extant resources can largely be 
attributed to the lack of surveys discussed at length  in the previous chapter. However, a closer 
look at the New Jersey’s Cultural Resources GIS reveals even existing data was collected fairly 
inconsistently.  The state Historic Preservation Office relied on information gathered from registers 
of historic places, local preservation commissions, and previous surveys to populate the dataset. 
Therefore, historic properties in places with pre-existing historic preservation activity were more 
likely to be recognize, leaving out many resources in both vernacular rural landscapes and 
marginalized urban communities.  In an attempt to address these inconsistencies, the HPO 
launched a GIS Pilot Project that conducted an architectural survey of Gloucester and Salem 
Counties. However, the comprehensive survey stopped after these two counties, further skewing 
                                               
193 Cherry-Farmer, "Sustained Survival,” 2. 
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the data. For instance, Bergen County had a 2010 population of 905,116 but only featured 2,048 
historic properties.  In contrast, Salem County, with a 2010 population of 66,083, boasted a total 
of 10,436 resources.  The need to broaden the scope of resource documentation became even more 
urgent after Sandy, which demonstrated how data informed preservationists responded to the 
disaster.  The inequity embedded within the process of  inventorying cultural resources ultimately 
reinforced the unequal recovery of heritage following Sandy 
As mentioned previously, most of the HPO’s cultural resource documentation for the 
Jersey Shore is out of date, and only a portion of these surveys have been digitized. Fortunately, 
the HPO’s work in Cumberland County serves as a precedent that can be easily adapted for use 
along the rest of the coast.  Using GIS, the HPO can create buffer zone along the coastline with a 
width determined by the particular aims and scope of the survey: Sandy’s storm surge, NFIP flood 
zones, or sea level rise protection serve as good examples.  Recently documented areas, such as 
CLG communities or designated historic districts, can be excluded from this initial broad-brush 
survey.  Travelling by foot, car, or boat, surveyors can quickly assess and photograph a resource.  
This strategy benefits from the expediency and low cost of the “pink and green” surveys conducted 
after Sandy, but lacks the associated time constraints that prevented the development of a more 
thorough methodology needed for an adequate cultural resource assessment.  These surveys would 
have the dual purposes of both increasing the accuracy and expediency of Section 106 reviews 
following future storms and serving as a foundation on which to build a long-term climate change 
mitigation plan.   
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Nevertheless, this represents a massive undertaking that will require a large investment of 
time and labor drawn from the HPO’s limited pool of resources.  Short- and long-term goals for 
surveying should be based on the vulnerability of an area and the date of the last survey.  A public 
outreach campaign jointly conducted by the HPO and Preservation New Jersey [PNJ], would 
encourage Jersey Shore stakeholders to participate in the program.  Funded by the  New Jersey 
Historic Trust [NJHT], PNJ could hold workshops that trained residents to assess properties using 
a digital platform.  Adding much needed manpower to the survey effort, public participation will 
add another layer of understanding of the significance of particular resources.  By documenting 
properties not typically seen as “cultural resources” in the eyes of professional preservationists, 
this survey effort has the potential to create a more inclusive understanding of heritage that may 
lead to more equitable processes of recovery.  This valuation of resources can be further enriched 
through coordination with other preservation agencies, like the National Parks Service and 
Certified Local Governments, which would allow the HPO to better assess the significance or need 
of a site and establish priorities for documentation. 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Appler & Rumbauch attempted to establish a methodology for measuring the exposure of 
historic resources to flood hazards in their aforementioned article on building community 
resilience through preservation. By using publicly accessible GIS data on National Register-listed 
properties and FEMA’s 100- and 500- year floodplain maps, the authors intended to make their 
assessment replicable at any government agency with access to GIS software.  With Kentucky, 
Colorado, and Florida serving as case studies, the authors were able to analyze vulnerability in a 
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number of ways. For instance, they identified the ways in which resources were differentially 
exposed to flood hazards based on the “area of significance” defined on their National Register 
nominations.  Additionally, the authors determined the number of CLGs located within 
floodplains, as well as the number of flood-exposed resources in these communities.  According 
to them, as CLG communities “have already made an investment in protecting their historic 
resources, developing a flood mitigation strategy for those resources should be recognized as a 
necessary extension of their effort in communities with a high number of vulnerable buildings or 
districts.”194 
Although New Jersey was not included as a case study within the Appler & Rumbauch 
article, the geographic units used by the SHPO to delineate survey areas in the aforementioned 
step (Sandy’s storm surge, flood insurance, and sea level rise maps) can also serve as a foundation 
for identifying vulnerable resources.  These layers can inform the development of a “Vulnerability 
Index,” in which historic properties are assigned a rating based on the possibility of inundation by 
sea level rise.  Learning from the objections to FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps, mapping 
would not be the only means of assessing a property’s susceptibility to flooding.  A mechanism 
must be built into the rating process that allows property owners to request a more thorough 
assessment that takes specifics like site topography, adaptation and mitigation measures, and 
community infrastructure into account.  Agencies like the HPO and NJHT could use these ratings 
as tool for prioritizing the allocation of funds for adaptation projects..  Additionally, any Section 
                                               
194 Appler &  Rumbach. "Building Community Resilience Through Historic Preservation,” 99. 
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106 reviews, National Register nominations, or grant recipients that involve properties flagged 
with a certain vulnerability rating would be required to include an adaptation plan. 
Certified Local Governments can complement of the work of the HPO by harnessing the 
pre-existing social and financial capital that is typically found in CLG communities and applying 
it to address issues of adaptation.  Just as the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs 
awarded sponsored strategic recovery plans for communities through its Post Sandy Planning 
Assistance Grants program, the HPO or NJHT could provide funds for CLGs to conduct 
vulnerability assessments to be incorporated into a municipality’s hazard mitigation and historic 
preservation plans.  Following the recommendations of the Development of Climate Change 
Adaptation Elements for Municipal Land Use Plans report produced for Ventnor City, these plans 
would list the threatened historic resources, identify their character-defining features, and provide 
recommendations for how to reduce the impact of climate change.  Following this model, the City 
of Cape May, a National Historic Landmark District with 2,923 documented historic resources, 
would overlay a map of Superstorm Sandy’s storm surge and recognize that 45% of its resources 
were threatened by future storms.  This baseline data could then be broken down to assess 
threatened resources into categories such as typology, materials, use, age.  Understanding the 
character of the threatened resources, the Cape May Historic Preservation Commission could insert 
tailor-made recommendations into its comprehensive Design Standards.  This vulnerability 
assessment would also help to quiet the debates surrounding appropriate alterations, like the 
aforementioned controversy regarding the elevation of the cottage at 329 Congress Street. 
Properties identified as very susceptible to flooding in sea level rise projections would be held to 
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a different standard of adaptation than a structure located away from the oceanfront on high 
ground. 
While the “pink and green” surveys conducted by the HPO in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Sandy were a response to an emergency, this vulnerability assessment moves preservationists away 
from reactive strategies to proactive approaches that ensure that future threats are little surprise to 
preservationists. However, these vulnerability reports are not intended to simply sit on the shelves 
of the borough hall but rather serve as tools for the formulation, evaluation, and comparison of 
potential adaptation strategies. 
Formulate, Evaluate, and Compare Alternatives 
The decision regarding which adaptation measure to undertake, as well as whether to even 
acknowledge climate change, ultimately rests in the steward of the historic resource.  However, 
the preservation agencies discussed in this thesis have the resources to positively influence the way 
historic properties are handled in the face of these threats.  Ideally the discussion surrounding the 
treatment of resources would be fostered by a variety of agencies, operating at the international, 
federal, state, and local levels.  Local actors could take the fundamental principles of this dialogue 
and determine their applicability to the specific context of their communities.  In order to ensure 
that the adaptation process is inclusive, a variety of stakeholders must be engaged to understand 
the range of values ascribed heritage.  
 In Annapolis, Maryland, the city’s “Weather It Together Survey” will inform its Cultural 
Resources Hazard Mitigation Plan. Taking this to New Jersey, the Ocean City Historic 
Preservation, which recently engaged in an advocacy campaign to defend the city’s small historic 
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district, could build off of this foundation of community participation and adopt the questions of 
the Annapolis survey for its own purposes: 
● Which of the following describes your relationship with the Ocean City Historic 
District? 
 
● What visual elements define a visitor's experience in the historic district? 
 
● Besides your own property, which are the five most important buildings or public 
spaces that need to be protected in preparation for a flooding or weather-related 
disaster? 
 
● If you own a property, which of the following incentives would encourage you to 
spend money to retrofit your building to protect against disasters? 
 
The survey results would help to craft an understanding of how stakeholders interact with the 
historic district, the elements of the community that they think should be preserved, and which 
strategies will most effectively encourage outside participation in the preservation process. With 
clearly articulated goals informed by community surveys, preservationists can also more 
effectively advocate for historic properties when governments begin to grapple with floodwater 
inundation. 
 Once the community’s input is gathered and assessed, it can be inserted among the other 
factors for decisionmaking identified at the NPS’s Preserving Coastal Heritage conference.  
However, adaptation is not single decision made by solitary actor.  In many cases, multiple agents 
will be making a number of decisions regarding the treatment of an individual resource.   The 
complexity of this process precludes the implementation of a simple analytical framework. Four 
properties listed on the National Register of Historic Places will serve as examples to demonstrate 
the varied ways in which preservationists can assess adaptation options and weigh them against 
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the aforementioned decision-making criteria. These hypothetical scenarios will be based on 
projections that sea levels on the Jersey Shore will rise three feet by 2100. 
 
205 Second Street in Beach Haven, is listed as a contributing structure in the Beach Haven 
Historic District.  “Built in 1880, this gabled-front, two-and-one-half story, vernacular Victorian 
dwelling has a full-width shed-roofed porch set on a concrete foundation with turned posts and 
turned spindles. A shed-roofed dormer projects from the west roof slope and a single-story, lean-
205 Second Street and its neighbors will be inundated by sea level rise by 2100. 
Image Sources: Google Street View & Climate Central 
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to addition adjoins the rear wall.”  The Beach Haven Historic District is identified as “significant 
for its planned development as a major summer railroad resort, as a grouping of summer residences 
with overall architectural distinction, and as a cohesive entity that shows the evolution of barrier 
island architectural design and construction at the New Jersey shore from 1873 through 1940.”195  
Like all structures within the historic district, 205 Second Street is subject to the design review of 
the proactive Beach Haven Historic Preservation Advisory Committee [HPAC].  
By 2100, water overflowing from the bay will have permanently inundated Beach Haven 
up to the western side of Beach Avenue, leaving one and a half blocks (and consequently half of 
the historic district) still on dry land. The narrow lot that 205 Second Street sits on will be 
underwater as well.  “Do Nothing” is the cheapest option, but will ultimately result in the 
destruction of the resource, eliminating its functional and historic value and negatively affecting 
the integrity of the Beach Haven Historic District.  “Taking Offsite Action” will reduce the 
likelihood of flooding, allowing the house to retain its historic integrity while continuing to be 
used.  Even though they might save the neighborhood, these large scale infrastructure projects are 
costly to implement and will negatively impact the character of the historic district. “Improving 
Resilience” with tactics such as elevation and flood-proofing will reduce the impact of stronger 
storms exacerbated by rising seas in the near-future, but the structure will inevitably be 
uninhabitable when the entire block is overtaken by the bay.   
“Relocation” off the island will preserve the house at a high cost, but rob it of the setting 
that contributes to its significance.  If it becomes clear that some mitigation action must be taken, 
                                               
195 National Register of Historic Places, Beach Haven Historic District. 
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the house should be “Documented” in its unaltered form before any alterations are made.  
Therefore, even if the owner decides to “Let Go” and abandon the property to the rising tide, a 
physical record of the structure will remain.  The presence of the Beach Haven HPAC would prove 
to be an advantage to 205 Second Street and its neighbors.  Besides the ability to review flood-
proofing measures to ensure that they are appropriate, this established and comparatively well-
resourced preservation group has the ability collectively advocate for historic resources in large-
scale plans for infrastructure or relocation.  With additional funding, the HPAC could record this 
history of adaptation and deterioration and add it to their already well-stocked records on all of the 
properties within the historic district. 
St. Nicholas of Tolentine Church, at 1409 Pacific Avenue in Atlantic City, was built in 
1905 with an addition in 1935.  The National Register describes it as a Romanesque Revival style 
church erected in rough-cut, light-colored North Carolina granite on a granite foundation.  The 
church is significant as “an intact example of ecclesiastical architecture executed in the 
Romanesque Revival style in 1905. It is the most majestic, almost cathedral-like, church in the city 
of Atlantic City and is the only extant Romanesque Revival church there.”196  The church retains 
a loyal congregation in a city whose dwindling number of practicing Catholics prompted two 
church closures in 2015.197  In 2100, St. Nicholas and most of downtown Atlantic City will remain 
dry, with flooding concentrated in the residential neighborhoods closer to the bay.    
                                               
196 National Register of Historic Places, St. Nicholas of Tolentine Church, Atlantic City, Atlantic County, New 
Jersey, National Register #01000039. 
197  Don E. Woods. "Two Atlantic City Churches Closing as Diocese of Camden Consolidates Parishes." Nj.com. 





In this instance, abandonment or relocation are unnecessary, and doing nothing presents 
itself as a feasible option.  However, other factors must be taken into consideration before arriving 
at this decision. While the sturdy stone edifice of St. Nicholas remained untouched by Sandy’s 
storm surge, a sea level rise of less than one foot will put the church well within the surge zone of 
In 2100, St. Nicholas of Tolentine Church will remain dry with most of downtown Atlantic City. 
Image Sources: Wikimedia Commons & Climate Central 
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another powerful storm.  Therefore, floodproofing measures will likely be necessary.  Given the 
expense associated with elevating a masonry structure, wet floodproofing options might prove to 
be the most feasible option for a parish with financial difficulties.   Inundation in residential 
neighborhoods will also likely result in displacement, diminishing the size of St. Nicholas’ already 
shrinking congregation.  This would decrease the parish’s financial and social capital, ultimately 
hindering its ability to respond to additional threats posed by climate change.  This situation could 
be alleviated with infrastructural interventions undertaken by the municipality or state to make 
Atlantic City more resilient, decreasing the likelihood that St. Nicholas will get flooded and 
encouraging the church’s parishioners to remain on Absecon Island. 
Battery 223 is located in Lower Township within the boundaries of Cape May Point State 
Park. “Constructed in the fall of 1942 and completed in June 1943 as part of the Harbor Defenses 
of the Delaware, Battery 223 is made of thick reinforced concrete with a substantial blast proof 
roof.”  The battery is significant for its “association with the U.S. coastal defense system 
established during World War II.“198  While the battery has sat unused and abandoned since the 
1950s, it remains in fairly good condition with minor deterioration.  Given its historic use, Battery 
223 is located right on the beach.  Thanks to an Army Corps of Engineers beach replenishment 
project the battery now sits above the high tide mark, but another severe storm could potentially 
wash away this unstable sand and once again exposure the structure to erosion.   
                                               





Even if the beach replenishment holds steady, a rise in sea level of just one foot (predicted 
to occur within 40 years) will leave it out at sea.  Moving Battery 223 further inland on the beach 
will allow the concrete structure to retain its character-defining relationship to the coastline.  
However, this may prove prohibitively expensive for the New Jersey Division of Parks & Forestry, 
Located on the beach in Cape May Point State Park, Battery 223 will be inundated within 40 years. 
Image Sources: Wikipedia & Climate Central 
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which recently considered closing nine parks in the face of decreased funding.199  Constructing 
flood barriers or sea walls will disrupt the relatively undisturbed ecosystem protected within Cape 
May Point State Park, sacrificing the integrity of the natural landscape for that of the Battery 223.  
Other flood-proofing measures, such as elevation or wet flood-proofing are inappropriate or 
ineffective for an unused structure sitting on a sand beach.  In this case, documentation and 
abandonment appear to be a logical course of action.  Parks & Forestry, located within the 
Department of Environmental Protection, could call on colleagues at the HPO to conduct an 
extensive documentation of the site.  Park staff could then monitor the condition of the structure 
overtime to better understand the effects sea level rise on historic concrete resources.  
The Brielle Road Bridge over the Glimmer Glass in Manasquan “is a movable bridge 
where the bascule leaf opens by pivoting about a horizontal axis and the position of the leaf is 
controlled by counterweights set on a curved track...The bridge is technologically and historically 
significant as the only example of its type in New Jersey and exemplifies the need for movable 
bridge technology in the late 19th and early 20th centuries for the transportation of vehicles over 
navigable waterways...Although some of the modifications were made within the last fifty years, 
they were in response to the continued use and operation of the bridge within a marine environment 
and to accommodate increased automobile traffic in this location.”200  Owned by Monmouth 
County, the Brielle Road Bridge provides an important link between the beaches of Manasquan 
and the inland town of Brielle.   The structure bridges the gap between a small island o undeveloped 
                                               
199  The Associated Press. "Nine State Parks May Close Under Budget Ax." NJ.com. April 1, 2008. Accessed April 
25, 2016. http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/04/nine_state_parks_may_close_und.html.  
200 National Register of Historic Places, Brielle Road Bridge over the Glimmer Glass, Manasquan, Monmouth 
County, New Jersey, National Register #08000336. 
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marshland and a peninsula of with both modern suburban development and the bulkheads and 
docks of a marina.  One foot of sea level rise (projected in 40 years) will inundate the bridge’s 
western base on the marshy island, and an additional foot (projected in 70 years) will leave the 
eastern end underwater as well.  The bridge’s location over the Glimmer Glass is another 
contributor to its vulnerability.  This body of water overflowed during Superstorm Sandy and left 
boats scattered across the bridge’s span, indicating that the Brielle Road Bridge will likely be 
damaged by more intense storms in the future.  
In this instance, the structure and technology of the bridge, as well as its setting over the 
Glimmer Glass, are the character-defining features of the historic resource.  Therefore, any 
attempts at relocating or improving the resiliency of the bridge will almost certainly have aa 
negative impact the structure’s historic integrity.  Monmouth County cannot “document and let 
go” either, for the bridge requires constant upkeep to keep it functioning as a transportation link.   
However, another crossing less than a mile north sits in a less vulnerable location.  When the time 
comes to evaluate the feasibility of maintaining bridges to a partially inundated Manasquan, 
Monmouth County could divest itself of the span, documenting it and letting it deteriorate while 
allocating funds to the remaining bridge on Main Street.  Alternatively, Monmouth County could 
explore the options of relocating the structure to a new location now in need of a bridge thanks to 
the rising sea level.  Ultimately, even if an investment in infrastructure was able to protect 
Manasquan from sea level rise or control the flow of the Glimmer Glass, thiswould not guarantee 
the continued use of the Brielle Road Bridge.  After a heavy truck caused $1.6 million in damage 
and caused the bridge to be shut down, the Monmouth County Freeholder Board began exploring 
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the options.  As far back as 2007, the county recognized the need for a bridge that could safely 
accommodate increased traffic loads and offered to give it away to anybody who would cover the  
cost of moving the structure.201 
                                               
201  MaryAnn Spoto. "Future of Glimmer Glass Bridge in Manasquan Uncertain as It Closes for Repairs." NJ.com. 
September 30, 2014. Accessed May 5, 2016. 
http://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2014/09/future_of_glimmer_glass_bridge_in_manasquan_uncertain_as_it_
closes_for_repairs.html.  
Projected to be inundated by 2070, the Brielle Road Bridge is threatened also threatened by powerful 
storm surges that have overflowed the Glimmer Glass in the past. 




Not meant to be exhaustive, these case studies simply served as a decision-making exercise.  
While the input of stakeholders and community groups may have resulted in a different 
interpretation of the proposals, the scenarios above demonstrated the feasibility a wide range of 
adaptation measures for four different types of resources.  Even though elevation dominates the 
discourse surrounding adaptation to sea level rise, these samples demonstrate that this strategy is 
only a feasible option for a specific portion of the shore’s historic resources.  Additionally, these 
examples indicated that the threats to historic properties are not evenly distributed along the Jersey 
Shore but in fact varied with their elevation and proximity to water.  The current function of these 
building structures, ranging from a ruin to a busy transportation artery, illustrates how the use of a 
resource is critical in choosing the adaptation measure.  Finally, the diverse areas of significance 
associated with each of these cases shows just how severe the impact that climate change will have 
on New Jersey’s heritage. 
Implementation 
This list of possible actions fails to address the criticism directed at other academic work 
on climate change and historic resources, namely their failure to consider how preservationists will 
practically implement their proposed recommendations.  In order to understand how 
preservationists can carry out the aforementioned adaptation strategies along the Jersey Shore, the 
focus will shift away from the four case studies to examine how different agencies in the state can 
overcome the challenges associated with this particular context.  Besides the vulnerabilities 
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inherent in its coastal landscape, the emphasis on home rule governance and limited funding pose 
the greatest challenges to achieving comprehensive goals for preservation along the shore. 
The dispersal of political power among the 565 municipal governments in New Jersey is 
frequently cited as a hindrance to achieving goals at the regional level.  While home rule 
governance provides greater autonomy for communities, the lack of large scale planning is 
particularly problematic in the context of climate change.  In New Jersey, municipalities are 
essentially left to individually plan for a threat whose impacts will be felt at a global level.   While 
there have been steps towards larger scale planning, such as county Floodplain Management Plans, 
political balkanization appears to be an intractable issue plaguing New Jersey.  Fortunately, the 
centralized structure of the New Jersey preservation community provides an opportunity to work 
around the challenges associated with home rule governance.  Preservation agencies like the HPO, 
NJHT, and PNJ can break down municipal barriers to take on the threats to resources in a regional 
way.  The development of regional surveys, assessment methods, and decision-making tools will 
both reduce the burden placed on communities and encourage a consistent approach to climate 
change in the heritage field.   
As an important source of funding for Certified Local Governments, statewide agencies 
have the ability to shape the way preservation is carried out at the local level as well.  At the same 
time, the integration of CLGs into the New Jersey’s preservation hierarchy can also serve as a 
means to legitimize the voice of local heritage practitioners, providing Trenton insight into as to 
how policy goals can be achieved on the ground.  The power of these kinds of interactions was 
demonstrated in Beach Haven, where the local HPAC, understanding the extent of Sandy’s impact 
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on the community, argued against the HPO in support the demolition of severely damaged 
bungalows.  However, the HPAC later capitalized on outside funding to formulate design 
guidelines for elevating other vulnerable properties, including bungalows, in their community.  
Ultimately, while preservationists not be able to change the state’s municipal structure, the balance 
of power and distribution of resources within organizational structure of New Jersey’s preservation 
community affords agencies the chance to circumvent some of the more constraining aspects of 
home rule governance. 
However, the capacity for these agencies to implement comprehensive strategies is 
inhibited by limited manpower and funding.  The effect of this chronic lack of resources on 
preservation agencies’ work was highlighted during Superstorm Sandy.   The constant fear of being 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task was the impetus behind two major policy decisions in 
the aftermath of the storm: the exclusion of private homes from the NJHT’s disaster relief grants 
for historic properties and the HPO’s somewhat perfunctory approach to surveying for Section 106 
reviews.  While the choices made are understandable given the difficult realities of preservation 
and disaster recovery, they nonetheless came with the cost of undervaluing and neglecting certain 
parts of the Jersey Shore’s heritage.  Many practitioners see support for preservation as a cyclical 
process reflecting the changes in political, economic, and social conditions.  As Dorothy Guzzo at 
the NJHT described it,  “I dont think its very good right now, and part of it is the administration 
that we’re in. It’s just that everything is sort of in a ‘hanging on’ policy right now. We’re waiting 
for better days.”  Nevertheless, advocates like Preservation New Jersey can work to change this 
waiting game by actively campaigning for increased funding, the incorporation of preservation 
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into disaster planning, or simply more awareness for the state’s heritage.  This task does not rest 
on the shoulders of agencies alone, but requires the support of the preservation community at large 
that includes planners, architects, consultants, property owners, and concerned citizens.  
Acknowledging the variety of unnamed stakeholders that make up the preservation community, 
the following recommendations will be geared towards the preservation agencies already discussed 
at length in this resource. 
Recommendations for Agencies 
The New Jersey Historic Preservation Office, as the agency that regularly receives funding 
from the National Park Service and works directly with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency after a disaster, has the ability to both contribute to the national discourse on climate 
change and incorporate these discussions into its own work.  The recipient of most funds allocated 
to heritage in New Jersey, the HPO functions as a power broker that can potentially to shift the 
focus of preservation activity towards an emphasis on adaptation and resilience. According to the 
testimony of most the preservationists interviewed, a set of elevation design guidelines will prove 
valuable for determining how retain historic significance while both making properties more 
resilient and responding to the new standards of flood insurance policy.  e short-term threats of 
flood insurance reform and additional storms,  Nevertheless, the HPO must acknowledge that 
elevation is a short-term solution for a long-term problem that requires a more complex set of 
responses.  The HPO will therefore need to lead the charge in conducting the aforementioned 
inventory of resources and vulnerability assessments. This will create contribute to an 
understanding of a historic resources on the Jersey Shore that is much broader and more inclusive.   
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While the state’s “Vulnerability Index” for historic resources will be informative, in order 
to make it relevant to the work of preservationist the HPO also needs to create a clearly articulated 
“Sea Level Rise Decision-making Criteria.”  Building off of the factors and processes identified 
in the NPS’ Preserving Coastal Heritage conference, this document would function like Secretary 
of the Interior’s Standards to serve as a framework for all actions regarding climate change 
mitigation.  Informed by the site’s Vulnerability Index, the HPO staff could then apply the Sea 
Level Rise Criteria to Section 106 reviews, disaster relief grants, and historic preservation plans 
in the aftermath of the storm.  These standards have the potential to streamline the recovery 
process, assuaging preservationists’ concerns of being overwhelmed and encouraging them to 
conduct “pink and green” surveys more thoroughly. Ultimately, the HPO’s role in adaptation 
planning will be providing the tools, including an inventory of coastal resources, the Vulnerability 
Index, and the Sea Level Rise Criteria, as well as financial assistance, that can then be used by the 
stewards of historic resources. 
The New Jersey Historic Trust should apply these tools into their grant programs as well, 
Any site applying for funding will need to include a mitigation and adaptation component in their 
application, with the exact requirements depending on their Vulnerability Index rating.  To 
encourage preservationists to better understand the vulnerability of historic resources, NJHT 
should provide grants for stewards of historic resources to carry out “Disaster Mitigation and 
Climate Change Adaptation Plans.”  Within these plans, heritage practitioners would apply the Sea 
Level Rise criteria to inform the treatment of their resources, ensuring that the critical decisions 
are made before the floodwaters arrive. This standard decision-making framework would also 
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expedite the grantmaking process following another storm, possibly allowing private homes to be 
included in future disaster relief grants.  In fact, if NJHT intends to truly influence the resilience 
of New Jersey’s coastal heritage, its funding must be extended to the private homes that make up 
a good portion of the historic fabric of the Jersey Shore.  
Preservation New Jersey’s role as an advocate can serve to increase public awareness of 
the threats that climate change poses to historic resources, providing a counterbalance to the 
“Stronger than the Storm” mentality that pervades the state.  Including sites threatened by sea level 
rise on its annual list of the “Ten Building Most Endangered Historic Places” would be an 
relatively easy way to generate publicity and start a discussion.  Building off of this experience 
engaging with the public, PNJ would be able to effectively administer the aforementioned 
“Weather it Together’ surveys to include the public in the decision-making process regarding the 
prioritization of resources and the adaptation method to be used. The organization can serve as a 
conduit for information regarding new technologies and assessment techniques, channel updates 
from the HPO office in Trenton to affected communities down at the shore.  This can be 
accomplished by continuing its Resiliency Workshop series, expanding it to educate 
preservationists on the ways that they can apply the Sea Level Rise criteria.  In a state where a 
commitment to “business as usual” precludes most attempts to plan for inevitable changes, PNJ 
can potentially use threatened heritage to bring climate change back into the forefront. 
Unlike other preservation players in the state, the Certified Local Governments and local 
preservation commissions at the Jersey Shore are managed by people who face the same threats as 
the historic properties they seek to protect.  While they may have the most to lose, preservationists 
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at shore will provide the critical perspective necessary to put any of the previously discussed 
adaptation projects in motion.  Preservation commissions have the knowledge and resources to 
conduct resource inventories and vulnerability assessments at levels of detail beyond the capacity 
of the HPO. PNJ may be able to facilitate the “Weather it Together” surveys, but CLGs can craft 
the questions to better reflect the particularities of their community.  These would then contribute 
to their “Disaster Mitigation and Climate Change Adaptation Plans” which were funded by the 
NJHT. Essentially, statewide agencies will provide the tools needed to establish a framework that 
will then guide the local preservation commissions in their treatment of vulnerable resources. 
During the Design Review process, commissioners could use their influence to compel 
property owners to incorporate appropriate adaptation measures into their alterations. The 
treatment of historic structures would be informed by updated design guidelines that incorporate 
specific recommendations based off of building typology and Vulnerability Index rating.  These 
standards could either mirror documents produced at the state level or be developed in response to 
the specific context of the community.  By quantifying the threats to heritage and developing 
clearly articulated strategies for mitigation, preservationist can more easily integrate heritage into 
a community’s plans for resilience. 
Unfortunately, these actions require a municipality to have a proactive and well-resourced 
preservation commission.  While there are only 4 Certified Local Governments along the Jersey 
Shore, there are many more with local preservation commissions operating outside of this NPS 
program.  Encouraging these other historic preservation commissions would be a good first step 
towards empowering communities with the means to make their heritage more resilient.  However, 
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statewide agencies will need to fill in the void and serve the populations most vulnerable.  Larger 
organizations should acknowledge the likelihood that there may not be any local actors prepared 
to survey resources, assess vulnerability, or develop hazard mitigation plans for historic properties. 
In supporting the creation of a more inclusive, as well as more resilient, concept of heritage, the 
historic preservation community can begin to correct the processes that have contributed to the 






Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 The Jersey Shore is an iconic place imbued with a distinct set of values for residents and 
visitors alike.  Many argue, with good reason, that the shore is a timeless and unique place.  
However, the storm surge of Superstorm Sandy dramatically undermined this idealization of the 
landscape to remind stakeholders of its inherent temporality and vulnerability.  At first, Sandy 
seemed like a critical juncture that would shift conversations towards climate change adaptation.  
It soon became apparent that the calls to be “Jersey Strong” and “Restore the Shore” drowned out 
the chance to critically reflect on the processes that magnified the impact of Sandy.  While Sandy 
certainly left a permanent scar on some communities and displaced segments of the population, in 
many ways the Jersey Shore is the same place that place that it was before October 29, 2012. The 
resilience and recovery of New Jersey’s heritage served to reinforce this notion of continuity and 
stability.  Nevertheless, historic preservation has the ability to move the shore beyond the 
“Stronger than the Storm” mentality.  By exposing the ways in which climate change will 
ultimately destroy the resources that contribute the shore’s identity, from Lucy the Elephant to the 
Barnegat Lighthouse, preservationists can start a conversation and begin the process of adaptation 
for the community at large. 
 While Superstorm Sandy forced New Jersey to critically reflect on its own vulnerability, it 
also integrated the Jersey Shore into the global discourse on climate change.  Consequently, the 
lessons learned from the preservation community’s response to Sandy can be also be of value to 
preservationists practicing outside of the Garden State.  Sandy clearly demonstrated that hazard 
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mitigation is critically underrepresented in the practice historic preservation.  Whether at the 
international or neighborhood level, making the hard decisions beforehand will result in a more 
desirable outcome in the long run.  The exclusion of heritage from planning for hazards can partly 
be explained by another issue seen in New Jersey:  the need for preservationists to move beyond 
the symptoms and address the root of the issues.   
The interviews presented in this thesis indicate that design standards for elevation are the 
primary concern of most preservationists at the shore.  Much energy has been devoted to 
combatting the effects of the National Flood Insurance Program, yet little attention has been given 
to the acknowledging the rationale behind elevation requirements.  Sensitive elevations will 
certainly produce more appropriate adaptations, but this will matter little if the historic district is 
submerged in rising seas.  Climate change threatens to wipe out entire communities, countering 
decades of concerted preservation efforts. Unfortunately, it appears that most heritage practitioners 
find it easier to neglect the issue altogether rather than attempt to address the magnitude of the 
challenge at hand.  However, if they hope to preserve at least some coastal heritage for the next 
century, preservationists based in vulnerable communities must proactively identify important 
values and use these prioritize adaptation actions with the limited capital and time available.   
In many cases, preservationists did not identify these values until it was too late.  The loss 
of previously overlooked middle-class communities on the Jersey Shore, however, can serve as a 
warning to heritage practitioners working in locales far beyond the shores of the Barnegat Bay.  
The existing inventory of historic resources reflects the narratives of history and perceptions of 
culture embodied within the dominant group.  If only this heritage is integrated into adaptation 
184 
 
plans, climate change will simply reinforce existing social inequity, as seen in the displacement of 
middle-class homeowners from the Jersey Shore.  While historic preservation alone cannot correct 
inequitable processes, if heritage contributes to a community’s post-disaster recovery, 
acknowledging alternative values in preservation will serve to promote the resilience of 
marginalized groups. 
 Even though Superstorm Sandy caught the preservation community by surprise, its 
response the storm and the threats it posed to heritage illustrated the dynamism and adeptness of 
preservationists in New Jersey.  The Historic Preservation Office’s “pink and green” surveys were 
innovative way to identify historic resources, assess damage, and streamline interagency 
coordination while working within the constraints of limited time, finances, and staff.  The Beach 
Haven Historic Preservation Advisory Commission’s constant engagement with their constituents 
in the recovery process, responding to the particular threats to their community and developing 
highly contextual standards of appropriateness, provides a model that can be replicated in a variety 
of scenarios.  The work undertaken by New Jersey’s preservationists, consultants, and architects 
to identify methods of retaining historic integrity for structures undergoing elevation and flood-
proofing demonstrates that historic preservation has the ability to evolve with the changes 
necessitated by the new realities of climate change.  Ultimately, the shortcomings of the 
preservation community’s response to Sandy was not for lack of hard work, but rather a reflection 
of larger forces at play that shaped the preservation landscape on the Jersey Shore. 
 Climate change does not lend itself a simple solution.  In many ways, the case study of 
Superstorm Sandy and the Jersey Shore has done little but reinforce pre-existing uncertainties 
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regarding the status of heritage in a future of rising seas and stronger storms.  Despite this, the 
information provided in the preceding chapters answered the questions that this thesis initially set 
out to ask.  The insufficient disaster planning, understanding of extant resources, and financial 
resources shaped the preservation community’s response to an already difficult set of 
circumstances facing the Jersey Shore. Despite these conditions, preservationists effectively 
responded to a scenario by providing solutions that reflected the specific needs of the heritage in 
their stewardship.  However, the preservation community has not entirely bridged the gap between 
mitigating disasters and adapting to climate change.  Even so, Superstorm Sandy demonstrated 
that preservationists can contribute to resilience by identifying valued resources, managing the 
changes to these resources, and advocating for policies that better protect them for the future.  
Regardless of the vulnerability of these physical resources, Sandy demonstrated the resilience of 
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